Joel S. Hellman’s research while affiliated with the world bank and other places

There is now a substantial literature demonstrating the negative impact of inequality on economic growth and on a wide range of intermediate social and economic outcomes that affect growth.’ Linking these results to another well-established literature—the quality of institutions—Glaeser et al. (2002) have argued that inequality affects growth by subverting the institutions that guarantee secure property rights. The rich can use their superior resources to manipulate political, legal, and regulatory institutions to preserve and extend their privileged positions through inefficient redistributions, anticompetitive measures, and other discriminatory practices. This subversion of institutions undermines the security of property rights for those less well-endowed and thus weakens investment and growth.Yet to the extent that inequality leads to the subversion of institutions, it is not necessarily through the inequality of wealth per se, but the inequality of influence, though the two are obviously closely interrelated. The rich are assumed to be able to convert their greater wealth into greater political influence over both the formation and functioning of institutions. However, the extent to which inequalities of wealth can be converted into inequalities of influence will be mediated by different configurations of the political system. In order to understand the mechanisms linking inequality and growth, we need a much deeper investigation into the inequality of influence in developing countries.

Recent studies have focussed on the characteristics and policies of the state to explain the extent and causes of corruption, with little attention paid to the role played by firms. Consequently, the links between corporate governance and national governance have been unexplored. This paper summarises the results of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) across 20 transition economies, providing an assessment of governance and corruption from the perspective of firms. The BEEPS is part of the global World Business Environment Survey being carried out by the World Bank. The survey design permits an in-depth empirical analysis of governance and corruption, unbundling governance into its component dimensions. This allows a more detailed quantitative assessment of corruption, a more nuanced understanding of the causes of the problem and as a result a stronger foundation for policy advice. Particular attention is paid to 'state capture' by parts of the corporate sector (i.e. the propensity of firms to shape the underlying 'rules of the game' including 'purchase' of legislation and court decisions). The survey also provides measures of other dimensions of 'grand corruption', such as that related to public procurement. Typically, cross-country surveys suffer from a potential bias if firms have a tendency to systematically over- or under-estimate the extent of problems in their own country. We implement a simple method for evaluating the extent of this 'country perception bias' and find little evidence pointing to such bias in the BEEPS.

Based on the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) of firms in transition countries, which unbundles corruption to measure different types of corrupt transactions and provide detailed information on the characteristics and performance of firms, we find that: i) corruption reduces FDI inflows and attracts lower quality investment in terms of governance standards; ii) in misgoverned settings, FDI firms may magnify the problems of state capture and procurement kickbacks, while paying a lower overall bribe burden than domestic firms; iii) FDI firms undertake those forms of corruption that suit their comparative advantages, generating substantial gains for them and challenging the premise that they are coerced, which makes it difficult to develop effective constraints on such behavior; and, iv) transnational legal restrictions to prevent bribery had not led to higher standards of corporate conduct among foreign investors by the year 2000. Rather than being construed as a case against foreign investment; we argue that state capture is created and maintained through restrictions on competition and entry in strategic sectors. Thus, enhancing competition by attracting a wider, more diverse set of FDI firms is critical to the broader strategic framework of fighting state capture and corruption.

Data from the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey is used to examine state capture and influence in transition economies. We find that a capture economy has emerged in many transition countries, where rent-generating advantages are sold by public officials and politicians to private firms. While influence is a legacy of the past inherited by large, incumbent firms with existing ties to the state, state capture is a strategic choice made primarily by large de novo firms competing against influential incumbents. Captor firms, in high-capture economies, enjoy private advantages in terms of more protection of their own property rights and superior firm performance. Despite the private gains to captor firms, state capture is associated at the aggregate level with social costs in the form of weaker economy-wide firm performance. Journal of Comparative Economics31 (4) (2003) 751–773.

This paper provides a survey on studies that analyze the macroeconomic effects of intellectual property rights (IPR). The first part of this paper introduces different patent policy instruments and reviews their effects on R&D and economic growth. This part also discusses the distortionary effects and distributional consequences of IPR protection as well as empirical evidence on the effects of patent rights. Then, the second part considers the international aspects of IPR protection. In summary, this paper draws the following conclusions from the literature. Firstly, different patent policy instruments have different effects on R&D and growth. Secondly, there is empirical evidence supporting a positive relationship between IPR protection and innovation, but the evidence is stronger for developed countries than for developing countries. Thirdly, the optimal level of IPR protection should tradeoff the social benefits of enhanced innovation against the social costs of multiple distortions and income inequality. Finally, in an open economy, achieving the globally optimal level of protection requires an international coordination (rather than the harmonization) of IPR protection.

The main challenge of the transition has been to redefine how the state interacts with firms, but little attention has been paid to the flip side of the relationship : how firms influence the state - especially how they exert influence on, and collude with public officials to extract advantages. Some firms in transition economies have been able to shape the rules of the game to their own advantage, at considerable social cost, creating what the authors call a"capture economy"in many countries. In the capture economy, public officials, and politicians privately sell under-provided public goods, and a range of rent-generating advantages"a la carte"to individual firms. The authors empirically investigate the dynamics of the capture economy, on the basis of new firm-level data from the 1999 Business Environment and enterprise performance survey (BEEPS), which permits the unbundling of corruption into meaningful, and measurable components. they contrast state capture (firms shaping, and affecting formulation of the rules of the game through private payments to public officials, and politicians) with influence (doing the same without recourse to payments), and with administrative corruption ("petty"forms of bribery in connection with the implementation of laws, rules, and regulations). They develop economy-wide measures for these phenomena, which are then subject to empirical measurement utilizing the BEEPS data. State capture, influence, and administrative corruption are all shown to have distinct causes, and consequences. Large incumbent firms with formal ties to the state tend to inherit influence as a legacy of the past, and tend to enjoy more secure property, and contractual rights, and higher growth rates. To compete against these influential incumbents, new entrants turn to state capture as a strategic choice - not as a substitute for innovation, but to compensate for weaknesses in the legal, and regulatory framework. When the state under-provides the public goods needed for entry and competition,"captor"firms purchase directly from the state, such private benefits as secure property rights, and removal of obstacles to improved performance - but only in a capture economy. Consistent with empirical findings in previous research on petty corruption, administrative corruption - unlike both capture and influence - is not associated with specific benefits for the firm. The focus of reform should be shifted toward channeling firms'strategies in the direction of more legitimate forms of influence, involving societal"voice", transparency reform, political accountability, and economic competition, Where state capture has distorted reform to create (or preserve) monopolistic structures, supported by powerful political interests, the challenge is particularly daunting.

We study the nexus between enterprises and the state in transition countries, using new enterprise survey data. We examine the quality of governance, state intervention in enterprise decision-making, state benefits to firms, and corruption payments. The quality of governance varies both across countries and across different dimensions of governance within countries. Economic reform improves governance in countries with a low degree of 'state capture' by vested interests, but not in high-capture countries. Despite reform, state intervention in firm decisions continues, but it varies substantially across firms. At the micro level (within a country), there is clear substitution between the degree of state intervention, state benefits to firms, and corruption payments, which is consistent with a bargaining model of politicians and firms. But at the macro level (across countries) these elements are complementary, suggesting that politicians, perhaps under pressure from captor firms, have some control over the scope of regulation and intervention.

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/825161468029662026/pdf/multi-page.pdf This report seeks to unbundle the varied practices of corruption to identify and compare different patterns of the problem across transition countries, notably on the distinction between administrative corruption and state capture. It then draws out lessons for tailoring anticorruption strategies to address the variation across the region in an effort to target reforms more effectively. The report draws on a multitude of sources of ongoing research and lessons of experience, including the World Bank’s work in this area.

Corruption has recently risen to the top of the development agenda, particularly in the transition economies. However, existing empirical research has been hampered by the lack of detailed and comparative data on the problem. We use the data from the ongoing Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) to unbundle corruption into its specific constituent components and examine their particular causes and consequences. In addition to conventional measures of administrative corruption, we unbundle the measurement of corruption to focus particularly on two corrupt strategies which firms may use in their interactions with the state. First, state capture, defined as the efforts of firms to shape the very institutional environment in which they operate, and, second, public procurement corruption, the payment of kickbacks for securing public contracts. We show that the incidence, costs and benefits to the firm of both types of corruption differ. The evidence suggests that while ‘captor’firms in some environments benefit through higher sales in the short term, such payoff from state capture may not be sustainable. Furthermore, the social costs of state capture are high: firms in an environment characterized by state capture face strong incentives to join the fray, leading to a downward development spiral of increasing