Jing Wang’s research while affiliated with Anhui University of Finance and Economics and other places

This paper examines a two‐tier supply chain system where the manufacturer leads by managing aftersales service, and the retailer follows by handling presales service. To address the manufacturer's capital constraints, we develop three game‐theoretic models: a model without capital constraints, another model with external financing under capital constraints, and yet another model with internal financing under capital constraints. We identify optimal financing strategies across these scenarios through comparative analysis. The findings reveal that external financing does not improve the level of presales service provided by the retailer. Under external financing, high consumer price sensitivity tends to increase product retail prices. Furthermore, wholesale prices are higher when financing is involved than in scenarios without financing. Interestingly, regardless of the financing model, higher consumer sensitivity to the retailer's presales service reduces wholesale prices, paradoxically benefiting the profits of both the manufacturer and retailer. An increase in the manufacturer's initial capital consistently enhances the manufacturer's profitability but may negatively impact the retailer's profits under internal financing. The manufacturer prefers internal financing, regardless of whether the manufacturer faces rising financing interest rates or increased aftersales service investments.

In order to reduce the carbon emissions of manufacturers and retailers in their business activities, carbon emission limits must be set for manufacturers and retailers respectively, and they must make favorable decisions within the limits. This paper will focus on a two-level supply chain system composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, and explore the optimal wholesale price, optimal retail price, and optimal profit under four scenarios: neither is constrained by carbon quotas, only the manufacturer is constrained by carbon quotas, only the retailer is constrained by carbon quotas, and both are constrained by carbon quotas, by constructing Lagrange functions. Comparative analysis will be conducted. Research has shown that only when manufacturers are subject to carbon quotas, the optimal wholesale and retail prices will rise, and the optimal profits of both manufacturers and retailers will decrease; When retailers are constrained by carbon quotas, whether manufacturers are constrained by carbon quotas does not affect the optimal price and profit; When both are subject to carbon emission restrictions and retailers increase their carbon emission quotas, manufacturers will lower wholesale prices and retailers will lower retail prices.

The ideological and political education of students is an important link in talent cultivation. By analyzing the foundation and role of tutors in carrying out ideological and political education, exploring the difficulties in the process of graduate ideological and political education, and providing feasible implementation paths, we aim to assist students in their comprehensive development.

In response to the decision-making problem of a secondary supply chain system composed of manufacturers and retailers, the optimal strategy of a master-slave game was studied, considering carbon emissions reduction. We compared and analyzed the differences in optimal strategies with and without coordination mechanisms, and explored the impact of sensitivity on the optimal strategy. Research has shown that the optimal profit of manufacturers and retailers under coordination mechanisms is greater than that without coordination mechanisms; Wholesale prices, carbon reduction levels, retail prices, and manufacturer profits are all negatively correlated with price sensitivity and positively correlated with carbon reduction sensitivity, while retailer profits are the opposite; There is an optimal cost sharing ratio that maximizes retailer profits.

In order to meet consumers' demand for green products, it is necessary for manufacturers to improve the greenness of their products during the production process. On the basis of considering the greenness of products, the strategy evolution behavior of multi-period game model was studied, and the stability and complexity of multi-period game system was explored. The stability domain of the system was given, and the effects of product market demand and strategy adjustment speed on the stability domain were analyzed. Research has shown that there are scope limitations on the adjustment speed of game strategies, and the stability domain of the system is positively correlated with the price sensitivity coefficient, while negatively correlated with the sensitivity coefficient of product greenness and product demand. A stable system helps the strategy reach equilibrium after multi-period of adjustment, while an unstable system leads to drastic fluctuations in prices and profits.

Taking the carbon emissions per unit product as the standard to measure the low-carbon technology level of the enterprise, this article analyzed how the technology supplier enterprises realize low-carbon production and achieve a win-win situation for both supply and demand through technology sharing through technology research and development. Based on the positive effect of low-carbon technology level on product demand, we studied the optimal pricing strategy and the optimal low-carbon technology level in the technology supply enterprises under the Stackelberg game in 3 conditions (i.e., without technology research and development or technology sharing, with technology research and development but no technology sharing, and with both technology research and development and technology sharing). We also drew a comparative analysis of the optimal product price, the optimal low-carbon technology level, and the optimal profit in the three scenarios. Besides, by constructing a delayed differential price game model, we studied the equilibrium strategy of price competition between technology supply and demand companies and the local asymptotic stability of the game system at the equilibrium point. In addition, the effects of delay strategy on game equilibrium strategy, the influence of the degree of adjustment of decision variables on the stability of the game system, and the stability of the game system on the evolution trend of the game are also explored. By comparing and analyzing the game results of the oligopoly enterprises in the stable system and the unstable system, it confirmed that the system instability usually causes serious harm to the enterprise.

This paper constructs a continuous dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (DCLSC) model with delayed decision under government intervention. The existence conditions of the local stability of the equilibrium point are discussed. We analyze the influence of delay parameters, the adjustment speed of wholesale price, recovery rate of waste products, direct price, carbon quota subsidy, and carbon tax on the stability and complexity of model by using bifurcation diagram, entropy diagram, attractor, and time series diagram and so on. Besides, the delay feedback control method is adopted to control the unstable or chaotic system effectively. The main conclusions of this paper show that the variables mentioned above must be within a reasonable range. Otherwise, the model will lose stability or enter chaos. The government can effectively adjust manufacturers' profit through carbon tax and carbon quota subsidy, and encourage manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions and increase the remanufacturing of waste products.

In this paper, a four-dimensional model of energy supply–demand with two-delay is built. The interactions among energy demand of east China, energy supply of west China and the utilization of renewable energy in east China are delayed in this model. We discuss stability of the system affected by parameters and the existence of Hopf bifurcation at the equilibrium point from two aspects: single delay and two-delay. The stability and complexity of the system are demonstrated through bifurcation diagram, Poincare section plot, entropy diagram, etc. in numerical simulation. The simulation results show that the parameters beyond the stable region will cause the system to be unstable and increase the complexity of the system. At this point, because of energy supply–demand system fluctuations, it is difficult to formulate energy policies. Finally, the bifurcation control is realized successfully by the method of delayed feedback control. The results of bifurcation control simulation indicate that the system can return to stable state by adjusting the control parameter. In addition, we find that the bigger the value of the control parameter, the better the effect of the bifurcation control. The results of this paper can provide help for maintaining the stability of the system, which will be conducive to energy scheduling.

In this paper, we build a model of energy-savings and emission-reductions with two delays. In this model, it is assumed that the interaction between energy-savings and emission-reduction and that between carbon emissions and economic growth are delayed. We examine the local stability and the existence of a Hopf bifurcation at the equilibrium point of the system. By employing System Complexity Theory, we also analyze the impact of delays and the feedback control on stability and entropy of the system are analyzed from two aspects: single delay and double delays. In numerical simulation section, we test the theoretical analysis by using means bifurcation diagram, the largest Lyapunov exponent diagrams, attractor, time-domain plot, Poincare section plot, power spectrum, entropy diagram, 3-D surface chart and 4-D graph, the simulation results demonstrating that the inappropriate changes of delays and the feedback control will result in instability and fluctuation of carbon emissions. Finally, the bifurcation control is achieved by using the method of variable feedback control. Hence, we conclude that the greater the value of the control parameter, the better the effect of the bifurcation control. The results will provide for the development of energy-saving and emission-reduction policies.

Stable software is used to make the empirical research for return rate in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market in this paper. The results show that stock returns distribution has an obvious peak and fat tail fractal characteristics. The traditional normal distribution has been very difficult to describe the phenomenon, but stable distribution is able to deal with this kind of problem.