Jie Wang’s research while affiliated with Anhui University of Technology and other places

Given that female auditors’ representation in the audit market has averagely caught up to that of males, yet remains insufficient at the partner level, it is imperative to investigate gender discrimination in public accounting firms. Using data from the Chinese audit market, this paper analyzes the glass ceiling phenomenon faced by females as they aspire to promotion to partner positions. It also explores the professional barriers that may impede their career progression post-promotion. The findings illuminate that the opportunities for female promotion to partner positions are notably lower than for males. Furthermore, after their elevation to partner roles, females are more likely to be allocated to clients grappling with financial distress and high-risk situations. In contrast, opportunities to engage with auditing important clients are diminished, particularly within male-dominated audit firms. Additionally, the study reveals that female promotion to partner positions heightens their prospects for assuming the lead auditor role in audit projects. However, this phenomenon predominantly materializes within audit firms characterized by a higher proportion of female auditors. Instead, females face more significant challenges in garnering recognition within male-dominated audit firms. Lastly, the research examines investor reactions to female promotion to partner, revealing a generally negative response. In summary, this study contributes to a comprehensive exploration of gender discrimination within the public accounting firms, shedding light on women’s career development challenges after breaking the glass ceiling.

Given the influence of controlling shareholders on the company, it is important to analyze how independent directors can protect minority shareholders’ interests using the information and resources obtained from social networks. This paper studies the impact of director networks on controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior in China over the period 2002–2020. Using social network analysis, this paper finds that controlling shareholders’ appropriation to minority shareholders is mitigated in companies with well-connected independent directors. These results remain consistent after a series of robustness and endogeneity tests. This study also reveals that internal controls play a mediating role between director networks and tunneling behavior. In addition, the study indicates that the restraining effect of director networks on controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior is more pronounced in companies with weaker audit monitoring and poorer transparency. In conclusion, the results reveal that well-connected independent directors play an important role in protecting minority shareholders’ interests.

Corporate tax avoidance is ubiquitous and has a wide range of economic implications. In this paper, we investigate the effect of corporate tax avoidance on the pay level for employees and the internal pay gap between executives and ordinary employees based on the perspective of salary distribution. The results show that corporate tax avoidance can significantly improve the average pay level of all the staff, but the “inclusive” benefit on employee remuneration brought by tax avoidance is not evenly distributed. More of the increased remunerations are allocated to the top management, further widening executives-ordinary employees pay gap. In addition, evidence from the cross-section analysis reveals that the current life cycle, the level of realized pay, and the short-term investment strategy in Chinese publicly listed companies can significantly affect the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and the internal pay gap. Further analysis suggests that the remuneration-increase effect of corporate tax avoidance can contribute to improving employees' efficiency, but the uneven distribution of tax-saving benefits interferes with such improvement to some extent. Overall, our results demonstrate that reasonable and effective corporate tax avoidance features a certain degree of “inclusiveness” since it helps raise the pay level of the whole staff, which sheds light on the necessity of persistent implementation of tax and fee reduction policies in China.