Jeremy Fantl's research while affiliated with The University of Calgary and other places

Publications (33)

Chapter
This chapter addresses concerns that pragmatic encroachers are committed to problematic knowledge variance. It first replies to Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne’s new putative problem cases, which purport to show that pragmatic encroachment is committed to problematic variations in knowledge depending on what choices are available to the potenti...
Article
In Michael Williams' “What's So Special About Human knowledge?” he argues that the kind of knowledge characteristic of adult humans is distinctive in that it involves epistemic responsibility. In particular, when an adult human has knowledge, they have a certain kind of epistemic authority, and that to attribute knowledge to them is to grant them a...
Chapter
In Sect. 1 of this chapter, Matthew McGrath examines Sosa’s work on the nature of truth. Sosa’s chief purpose is to determine what sort of theory of truth is appropriate for “truth-centered epistemology” – an epistemology that takes truth to be the goal of inquiry and which explains key epistemic notions in terms of truth. While Sosa refutes argume...
Article
This book is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on the reasons you have. If knowledge doesn't allow for a chance of error - if it requires certa...
Chapter
The chapter distinguishes two different strategies one could use to defend 'shifty epistemology' according to which the truth values of knowledge ascriptions vary not merely with differences in traditional factors such as belief, truth, and evidence, etc., but also with the salience of error possibilities and practical stakes. Shifty epistemologist...
Article
There is pragmatic encroachment on some epistemic status just in case whether a proposition has that status for a subject depends not only on the subject's epistemic position with respect to the proposition, but also on features of the subject's non-epistemic, practical environment. Discussions of pragmatic encroachment usually focus on knowledge....
Chapter
Much epistemological work in the Western tradition focuses on the nature of knowledge—its sources, significance, and scope. But justified belief, epistemic virtue and responsibility, understanding, and evidence are epistemologically important, and not just because of the role they play in knowledge. The readings in this section represent the most r...
Article
This is a preprint of an article published in Nous, Volume 43, Issue 1, March 2009, Pages: 178-192,. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.01701.x/abstract. The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.01701.x
Article
We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how...
Article
You know that George W. Bush is the U.S. president, but you know how to ride a bicycle. What's the difference? According to intellectualists, not much: either knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing that something is the case or, at the very least, know-how requires a prior bit of theoretical knowledge. Anti-intellectualists deny this or...
Article
We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails...
Article
Infinitism, a theory of the structure of justification most recently developed and defended by Peter Klein, is the view that justification is a matter of having an infinite series of non-repeating reasons for a proposition. I argue that infinitism is preferable to foundationalism in that only infinitism can plausibly account for two important featu...

Citations

... Another reason for selective use of evidence is reporters' endemic shortage of time and resources, which forces them to select where they invest their 'epistemic efforts' (Ekström et al., 2019). Like other responsible epistemic actors, according to 'pragmatic encroachment' theory, they tend to raise the threshold of proof under greater risks (Fantl and McGrath, 2009). This may happen whenever there are conflicts over facts (Reich and Barnoy, 2021), risks that may follow publication and unclear states of affairs that characterize unscheduled events (Molotch and Lester, 1974). ...
... For various formulations, seeSainsbury (1997),Sosa (1999Sosa ( , 2007Sosa ( , 2009,Williamson (2000), Luper (2003,Pritchard (2005,Manley (2007), Lasonen-Aarnio (2010),Hirvelä (2017), andWedgwood (2018). 3 SeeNeta & Rohrbaugh (2004),Comesaña (2005),Vogel (2007),Bogardus (2014),Baumann (2014Baumann ( , 2015, andKelp (2019).4 ...
... Neste caso, a inter-relação entre os indivíduos e sua observação não deve se 13 N.T. Direito de preferência em um contrato de compra e venda. 14 J. Raz 1986Raz , 1975 Este passo não é um passo contingente na filosofia da socialidade de Tuomela, porque os grupos hierárquicos e autoritários de modos de organização formal, que funcionam como agente de grupo, são uma característica importante do domínio social. ...
... Lately it has been argued that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge may depend on certain non-truth related factors (see, for example, [7,10,12]. Preferring to stick with the broader, doxastically-neutral definition of intellectualism provided above, this position claims that two subjects in the same epistemic position may not be alike in their position to know. In particular practicalism claims: ...
... Impurism seems to have an attractive explanation of the Bank Case intuitions: Hannah's evidence is sufficient for her to know that the bank will be open on Saturday in Low Stakes, but not so in High Stakes. Nevertheless, impurists are reluctant to rely on individual cases of 'knowledge'-attributions when motivating their view (Fantl and McGrath 2012;Stanley 2005, pp. 114-115). ...
... Initially Ryle seemed to have tried to formulate different meanings of "knowing" through the uses of "to know" in ordinary language, but the uses of "to know" appear to vary (Brown 1970). Later Ryle's distinction has been defended in terms of the referents of the knowledge; knowing how concerning actions and knowing something propositions (Fantl 2008). Anyway, we still do not know, if it is relevant and consequential for parties in interaction. ...
... Markedly, Ramsey's view does not adopt a binary conception of belief where belief is an all or nothing attitude of the agent in question but rather a partial one where belief comes in degrees, hence the "partial" qualifier in partial belief (Christensen 2004). Recent work in epistemology speaks of graded belief, as well as graded levels of justification for those beliefs (Fantl and McGrath 2009). Graded and partial beliefs are synonymous in use. ...
... Por fim, a noção infinitista de justificação (proposicional e doxástica) permite acomodar os seguintes aspectos: i) a justificação é uma questão de grau e ii) faz sentido falar de 'justificação completa'. Este ponto foi enfatizado por Jeremy Fantl (2003). Fantl argumenta que o facto de o infinitismo cumprir com estes dois requisitos: ...
Citing article
... Epistemic reasons, however, are not the only kinds of reasons relevant to the rationality of metaethical beliefs. We might have practical reasons to believe, or pragmatic considerations that make a difference to which of our beliefs qualify as metaethical knowledge (Fantl and McGrath 2012;Leary 2017). 1 Arguments for normative realism based on the practical indispensability of belief in realist normative properties pick up on this theme (Enoch 2011). But comparatively little has been said in metaethics about the practical reasons we might have for beliefs about the nature of normative or evaluative facts. ...
... This example is fromRoss and Schroeder (2014). Other similar cases can be found inCohen (1999), DeRose (1992),Fantl and McGrath (2009), Gerken (2017),Stanley (2005).2 For discussions on these practical factors, seeGerken (2011Gerken ( , 2017 andNagel (2008). ...