Jeffrey D. Wilson’s research while affiliated with Murdoch University and other places

China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a controversial addition to both the global and Asian economic architectures. Western critics have alleged it is a vehicle designed to achieve China's geostrategic goals, while scholars have argued it marks China's adoption of a 'revisionist' foreign policy strategy. This article argues that such interpretations are incorrect, as they fail to account for the evolution of China's AIIB agenda. To secure a broad membership and international legitimacy for the AIIB, China compromised with partners during governance negotiations in 2015. Western country demands saw several controversial initial proposals dropped, the governance practices of existing multilateral development banks were adopted, and cooperative partnerships were developed with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. This transition from a revisionist to status-seeking AIIB agenda reveals the flexibility of Chinese economic statecraft, and its willingness to compromise strategic goals to boost the legitimacy of its international leadership claims.

The ‘Indo-Pacific’ has emerged as the newest addition to the lexicon of Asian regionalism. Conceived of as the conjunction of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, it reflects the belief that maritime linkages require extending Asian regionalism westwards to include countries on the Indian Ocean rim. It also competes with the longstanding ‘Asia-Pacific’ conceptualisation of the region, and four governments—Australia, India, Japan and the USA—have adopted it into their foreign policies. Much of the debate on the Indo-Pacific focusses on how it institutionally ‘rescales’ Asian regionalism through the incorporation of Indian Ocean states. This article considers the functional rescaling that attends this process: namely, what kind of regionalism is implied by the Indo-Pacific concept? It argues that the Indo-Pacific is a security-focussed regional project, reflecting the desire of its proponents to form a quadrilateral bloc to resist China’s growing maritime assertiveness. This security region is radically different from the Asia-Pacific concept, where regionalism was primarily driven by economic integration and cooperation. The Indo-Pacific thus marks a more contested period in Asia’s international politics, where the functional purpose of regional cooperation is being reoriented from economic- to security-focussed agendas.

In 2008, rare earth minerals (REMs) shot to the top of the international agenda. When China began restricting exports of these critical materials, many claimed it was threatening a “REMs weapon” against the US and Japan. Yet by 2014, the crisis had quickly abated, as China shelved its policies in the face of pressure from consumer governments. This article examines why REMs emerged – and then quickly disappeared – as a threat to international security in Asia. It first conceptualizes the geopolitics of critical materials, before analyzing the politics of the REMs crisis between Japan, China, and the US. It argues that China’s ability to use REMs for diplomatic coercion was inherently weak and is unlikely to pose a similar threat to international security in future years.

Of the recent transformations in the political economy of the Asia-Pacific, one of the most dramatic has been to the region's trade architecture. For many years, Asian government were committed trade multilateralists: pursuing liberalisation either globally through the GATT, or regionally via APEC's model of open regionalism. Underpinned by US and Japanese leadership, this system provided the foundation for the export-driven Asian economic miracle. But since the early twenty-first century, the system has been rapidly transformed. The proliferation of preferential trade agreements has threatened to undermine the cohesiveness of regional trade arrangements. The emergence of WTO-Plus style liberalisation, emphasising services, investment and intellectual property, marks the maturation of a system previously focussed on tariff reduction and manufacturing exports. Since 2011, competition between two ‘mega-regional’ proposals – the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership – is also indicative of new splits which cut across traditional developmental divides. Growing geopolitical rivalry between the US and China has also raised question of who will lead the next round of liberalisation in the region. Exploring these new trends, this paper argues the trade architecture of the Asia-Pacific is entering is becoming more contested and fragmented, with major implications for economic regionalism in coming years.

A common criticism of the minerals resource rent tax (MRRT) was that it would ‘kill the goose that laid the golden egg’ for the Australian economy. Mining companies, their industry associations, and the Liberal–National Coalition all argued the MRRT would reduce Australia's attractiveness for mining investment, and lead to ‘capital flight’ as resource firms shifted towards lower-taxing competitors. To evaluate this claim, it is necessary to compare Australia's resource policy regime – including, but not limited to, its taxation elements – against those of its principal competitors. This article undertakes such an evaluation by comparing Australian resource policies with those of nine of its major mineral and energy competitor countries. This survey reveals that Australia's comparatively high mining tax rates are partially offset by its ‘non-interventionist’ approach to resource policy, and that it has retained good rankings on international political risk surveys. There is some evidence of short-term market response to the mining tax, but there is little evidence of sustained capital flight occurring due to the MRRT. These data collectively suggest that the MRRT did not significantly undermine Australia's attractiveness for international mining investment, despite widespread perceptions to the contrary.

Resource nationalism is on the rise around the globe. During the recent global resource boom, many governments have adopted nationalistic policies to maximise the political and economic benefits from their mining and energy sectors. Existing theories of resource nationalism rely upon economistic bargaining models, which fail to interrogate how political processes shape governments’ resource policy strategies. This article extends and develops these bargaining models by theorising the role of political institutions - specifically those found in rentier, developing and liberal market economies - in determining patterns of resource nationalism. A survey of 12 major resource-producing countries reveals that contemporary resource nationalism takes a range of distinct forms, which are connected to differences in political institutions that structure the objectives and policies of governments. It is therefore argued that while economic dynamics function as an enabling factor, political institutions are an equally important conditioning factor shaping the distinctive forms of resource nationalism observed today.

The rise of new economic powers has seen increasing attention focused on the international role of the BRICS countries. Importantly, a common feature uniting the BRICS is that they are all resource-rich, and many analysts (and some BRICS governments) have argued that natural resources are one of the key factors propelling the rise of the group. This article explores the BRICS’ emerging status as ‘resource powers’, examining how resource wealth underpins their economic development and foreign policy strategies, and thus contributes to their growing influence in international affairs. It is argued that through the use of nationalistic mining and energy policies, the BRICS governments have exploited natural resources for both domestic economic and international diplomatic objectives. However, there are several challenges and emerging risks facing the BRICS’ resource strategies, which mean that resource wealth is making a positive – though inherently limited – contribution to the growing international status of the group.

Surging world energy prices, increasing oil market volatility and a nascent ‘energy transition’ are posing major challenges for global energy governance. In response, there has been a proliferation in the number of multilateral bodies addressing energy issues in recent years, and a wide range of organisations now claim a role in facilitating intergovernmental energy cooperation. However, the practical achievements of these organisations have been very poor, with all suffering difficulties that have limited their ability to promote shared energy interests between states. This article examines the dynamics of multilateral energy organisations, arguing that the political economy features of energy – securitisation and attendant patterns of economic nationalism – explain why they have failed to develop more robust cooperative mechanisms. Ten global-level organisations are evaluated and found to suffer from membership, design or commitment issues that limit their effectiveness in global energy governance. These challenges are linked to the securitisation of energy, which has led governments to favour low-cost soft-law approaches over potentially more effective hard-law institutional designs. Moreover, the securitisation of energy poses limits for how far multilateral energy cooperation can proceed and means that contemporary efforts to strengthen these organisations are unlikely to succeed in coming years.

Soaring prices for minerals and energy are posing a major threat to the resource security of economies in Asia. As a result, many regional governments have launched new resource security strategies in the last few years. Most recent attention to resource security in Asia has focused on debating whether the Chinese government’s resource policies are mercantilist or liberal. This China-focused debate is too narrow to fully capture the nature of resource politics in Northeast Asia, since the governments of Japan and Korea have also recently launched their own resource security strategies. This paper considers regional-level trends in Asian resource politics by examining the causes, content and implications of the resource security strategies deployed by the consumer governments in Northeast Asia. It argues that growing resource security concerns, combined with a process of competitive policy emulation, have seen the Chinese, Japanese and Korean governments each adopt mercantilist resource security strategies over the last decade. Furthermore, the competitive nature of these mercantilist strategies is acting to intensify political and economic competition for resources between the Asian region’s three main economic powers.