Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer’s research while affiliated with Balsillie School of International Affairs and other places

Drone warfare is the most emblematic manifestation of so-called remote warfare. And yet, how ‘remote’ is it really? Based on extensive interaction with French drone crews, and interviews conducted in 2020, this article shows how drone warfare is not so new, not so distant, not so different, not so indifferent, and not so riskless. In other words, how distancing is a constant in the history of warfare; how the cliché of the drone pilot killing people between the groceries and the family dinner is a partial reflect of reality; how the videogame-like immersive environment of drone pilots is not that different from the one of modern inhabited aircrafts; how drones contradict the widespread assumption that propensity to killing is proportionate to physical distance from target; and finally how drone warfare is not that riskless, at least compared to its most likely alternatives. Therefore, drone warfare is not that remote.

This article offers an analysis of the causes and consequences of the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement. The causes are both internal (each side had their reasons) and external (under the influence of the UAE and Saudi Arabia). As for the consequences, the peace served as a catalyst of Eritrea’s reintegration: it boosted bilateral visits, had a limited regional snowball effect, lifted the UNSC sanctions, and accelerated the engagement of multilateral organizations and the EU in Eritrea. However, this reintegration is limited because of the persistent ambivalence of the regime, the degradation of the relations with Saudi Arabia and the US, and the fact that the peace with Ethiopia has stalled. Moreover, there is no peace dividend for the Eritrean population: after a glimpse of freedom when the border opened a couple of months, it is all back to the status quo ante, and even worse in some human rights respects. The conclusion shows the paradoxical nature of a rapprochement that also had negative effects and draws some lessons from the deeper problem explaining the stalled peace, that is institutional imbalance between a totalitarian state and a democratic one.

Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer analyzes the impact of the massive data breach that was used in a large-scale disinformation campaign targeting Emmanuel Macron and his campaign team, in the run up to the 2017 French presidential elections. Despite the large data leak, the campaign was deemed a failure, as it did not succeed in significantly influencing French voters. Vilmer explores why this was the case by highlighting a number of mistakes made by the hackers, as well as the appropriate and effective strategies by the National Commission for the Control of the Electoral Campaign for the Presidential Election (CNCCEP) and the National Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI). Vilmer cautions that the threat of further leaks may persist, and emphasizes a number of steps and legislation to tackle the threat of disinformation head on.

The aim of this article is to assess the strength of the normative claim of banning nuclear weapons, expressed by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Thefirst part shows that, in the Finnemore/Sikkink norm lifecycle, it is likely to be stuck at the first stage (emergence), as it does not meet the conditions for reaching the tipping point and therefore cascading (a critical mass of states; a mass of critical states; the intrinsic characteristics of the norm; how it fits in the existing normative framework). Thesecond part shows that, in the three-part pattern of disarmament campaigns identified by Hanson, it is likely to be stuck at stage two, stigmatising and delegitimising nuclear weapons, but unable to eliminate them for three reasons (the exceptionality of nuclear weapons; the international security environment; and peer pressure). Overall, it will likely stay a forever-emerging norm.

In October 2016, South Africa became the first nation to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), after Burundi began taking steps to leave it. Kenya is likely to follow, and other states, like Uganda, could take the same cue. The ICC is facing the most serious diplomatic crisis of its history, with the African Union (AU) denouncing double standards, neo-colonialism and ‘white justice’, and regularly threatening to withdraw from the Rome Statute en masse. This article adopts both an interdisciplinary and a pragmatic policyoriented approach, with the aim of producing concrete recommendations to counteract the crisis. It firstly outlines the context of this crisis which, although not new, is becoming increasingly serious. It then responds to the AU’s objections to the ICC. The court’s ‘Afro-centrism’ is explained by objective facts (the occurrence of mass crimes taking place on the African continent, the large number of African parties to the Rome Statute, the principle of complementarity) as well as by subjective decisions (a convergence of interest between the African leaders who brought the cases to the court themselves to weaken their opponents, and the prosecutor who needed quickly to find cases). Afro-centrism should also be nuanced, as the ICC has already shown an interest in cases outside Africa and the extent to which it is a problem is a matter of perspective. The article also responds to the ‘peace vs justice’ objection, and emphasises that African states were instrumental in creating and sustaining the ICC. It finally formulates recommendations to ease relations between the ICC and AU, such as to investigate more outside Africa, reinforce African national jurisdictions, create intermediary institutional structures, promote regional-level action, and rely more on ICC-friendly African states and African civil society.

À première vue, il s’agit d’une chose et son contraire : la guerre est tellement le lieu par excellence de la violation des droits humains que leur relation semble se résumer à cet antagonisme primaire — l’un serait la négation de l’autre. La guerre viole les droits et les droits ont la paix, donc l’absence de guerre, comme condition de possibilité. Puis l’on se souvient que, contrairement aux apparences, la guerre n’est pas cet état de non-droit où tout est permis, mais un espace normé, codifié. Il est question des droits humains pendant la guerre — pour dénoncer leur violation, certes, mais la violation des règles n’est pas la preuve de leur absence — mais aussi avant la guerre, puisque certains conflits sont justifiés par la protection des droits des populations locales, ou en vertu d’un « droit de l’humanité » qui serait un intérêt à agir. Les relations entre droits humains et conflits armés sont résumées dans cet article en quatre parties : d’un point de vue historique, d’abord, où l’on montre leur réciprocité (le rôle de la guerre dans l’évolution des droits humains, et le rôle des droits humains dans l’évolution de la guerre). En reprenant la trilogie de l’éthique de la guerre ensuite : la guerre au nom des droits humains ( jus ad bellum ), les droits humains dans la guerre ( jus in bello ) et, en guise de conclusion, les droits humains après la guerre ( jus post bellum ).

International criminal justice's institutions, in particular the International Criminal Court and the ad hoc tribunals (ICTY and ICTR), not only have a punitive function, they also have a security function i.e. the ambition of having a pacifying effect and of fulfilling the Kantian project of achieving "peace through law". But, do they have the means to do so ? To what extent can they actually contribute towards peace ? Do they have a deterrent effect ? This paper shows that their contribution is limited at best and that judicial romanticism, i.e. holding unrealistic expectations of justice, has the perverse effect of harming its credibility and reducing its existing low likelihood of having a pacifying effect.