Jane X. Wang’s research while affiliated with Google Inc. and other places

While problem solving is a standard evaluation task for foundation models, a crucial component of problem solving -- actively and strategically gathering information to test hypotheses -- has not been closely investigated. To assess the information gathering abilities of foundation models in interactive environments, we introduce a framework in which a model must determine the factors influencing a hidden reward function by iteratively reasoning about its previously gathered information and proposing its next exploratory action to maximize information gain at each step. We implement this framework in both a text-based environment, which offers a tightly controlled setting and enables high-throughput parameter sweeps, and in an embodied 3D environment, which requires addressing complexities of multi-modal interaction more relevant to real-world applications. We further investigate whether approaches such as self-correction and increased inference time improve information gathering efficiency. In a relatively simple task that requires identifying a single rewarding feature, we find that LLM's information gathering capability is close to optimal. However, when the model must identify a conjunction of rewarding features, performance is suboptimal. The hit in performance is due partly to the model translating task description to a policy and partly to the model's effectiveness in using its in-context memory. Performance is comparable in both text and 3D embodied environments, although imperfect visual object recognition reduces its accuracy in drawing conclusions from gathered information in the 3D embodied case. For single-feature-based rewards, we find that smaller models curiously perform better; for conjunction-based rewards, incorporating self correction into the model improves performance.

We are encouraged by the many positive commentaries on our target article. In this response, we recapitulate some of the points raised and identify synergies between them. We have arranged our response based on the tension between data and architecture that arises in the meta-learning framework. We additionally provide a short discussion that touches upon connections to foundation models.

Traditionally, cognitive and computer scientists have viewed intelligence solipsistically, as a property of unitary agents devoid of social context. Given the success of contemporary learning algorithms, we argue that the bottleneck in artificial intelligence (AI) progress is shifting from data assimilation to novel data generation. We bring together evidence showing that natural intelligence emerges at multiple scales in networks of interacting agents via collective living, social relationships and major evolutionary transitions, which contribute to novel data generation through mechanisms such as population pressures, arms races, Machiavellian selection, social learning and cumulative culture. Many breakthroughs in AI exploit some of these processes, from multi-agent structures enabling algorithms to master complex games like Capture-The-Flag and StarCraft II, to strategic communication in Diplomacy and the shaping of AI data streams by other AIs. Moving beyond a solipsistic view of agency to integrate these mechanisms suggests a path to human-like compounding innovation through ongoing novel data generation.

Psychologists and neuroscientists extensively rely on computational models for studying and analyzing the human mind. Traditionally, such computational models have been hand-designed by expert researchers. Two prominent examples are cognitive architectures and Bayesian models of cognition. While the former requires the specification of a fixed set of computational structures and a definition of how these structures interact with each other, the latter necessitates the commitment to a particular prior and a likelihood function which – in combination with Bayes’ rule – determine the model's behavior. In recent years, a new framework has established itself as a promising tool for building models of human cognition: the framework of meta-learning. In contrast to the previously mentioned model classes, meta-learned models acquire their inductive biases from experience, i.e., by repeatedly interacting with an environment. However, a coherent research program around meta-learned models of cognition is still missing to this day. The purpose of this article is to synthesize previous work in this field and establish such a research program. We accomplish this by pointing out that meta-learning can be used to construct Bayes-optimal learning algorithms, allowing us to draw strong connections to the rational analysis of cognition. We then discuss several advantages of the meta-learning framework over traditional methods and reexamine prior work in the context of these new insights.

People can easily evoke previously learned concepts, compose them, and apply the result to solve novel tasks on the first attempt. The aim of this paper is to improve our understanding of how people make such zero-shot compositional inferences in a reinforcement learning setting. To achieve this, we introduce an experimental paradigm where people learn two latent reward functions and need to compose them correctly to solve a novel task. We find that people have the capability to engage in zero-shot compositional reinforcement learning but deviate systematically from optimality. However, their mistakes are structured and can be explained by their performance in the sub-tasks leading up to the composition. Through extensive model-based analyses, we found that a meta-learned neural network model that accounts for limited computational resources best captures participants’ behaviour. Moreover, the amount of computational resources this model identified reliably quantifies how good individual participants are at zero-shot compositional reinforcement learning. Taken together, our work takes a considerable step towards studying compositional reasoning in agents – both natural and artificial – with limited computational resources.

What can be learned about causality and experimentation from passive data? This question is salient given recent successes of passively-trained language models in interactive domains such as tool use. Passive learning is inherently limited. However, we show that purely passive learning can in fact allow an agent to learn generalizable strategies for determining and using causal structures, as long as the agent can intervene at test time. We formally illustrate that learning a strategy of first experimenting, then seeking goals, can allow generalization from passive learning in principle. We then show empirically that agents trained via imitation on expert data can indeed generalize at test time to infer and use causal links which are never present in the training data; these agents can also generalize experimentation strategies to novel variable sets never observed in training. We then show that strategies for causal intervention and exploitation can be generalized from passive data even in a more complex environment with high-dimensional observations, with the support of natural language explanations. Explanations can even allow passive learners to generalize out-of-distribution from perfectly-confounded training data. Finally, we show that language models, trained only on passive next-word prediction, can generalize causal intervention strategies from a few-shot prompt containing examples of experimentation, together with explanations and reasoning. These results highlight the surprising power of passive learning of active causal strategies, and may help to understand the behaviors and capabilities of language models.

Large language models have shown tremendous performance in a variety of tasks. In-context learning -- the ability to improve at a task after being provided with a number of demonstrations -- is seen as one of the main contributors to their success. In the present paper, we demonstrate that the in-context learning abilities of large language models can be recursively improved via in-context learning itself. We coin this phenomenon meta-in-context learning. Looking at two idealized domains, a one-dimensional regression task and a two-armed bandit task, we show that meta-in-context learning adaptively reshapes a large language model's priors over expected tasks. Furthermore, we find that meta-in-context learning modifies the in-context learning strategies of such models. Finally, we extend our approach to a benchmark of real-world regression problems where we observe competitive performance to traditional learning algorithms. Taken together, our work improves our understanding of in-context learning and paves the way toward adapting large language models to the environment they are applied purely through meta-in-context learning rather than traditional finetuning.

Meta-learning is a framework for learning learning algorithms through repeated interactions with an environment as opposed to designing them by hand. In recent years, this framework has established itself as a promising tool for building models of human cognition. Yet, a coherent research program around meta-learned models of cognition is still missing. The purpose of this article is to synthesize previous work in this field and establish such a research program. We rely on three key pillars to accomplish this goal. We first point out that meta-learning can be used to construct Bayes-optimal learning algorithms. This result not only implies that any behavioral phenomenon that can be explained by a Bayesian model can also be explained by a meta-learned model but also allows us to draw strong connections to the rational analysis of cognition. We then discuss several advantages of the meta-learning framework over traditional Bayesian methods. In particular, we argue that meta-learning can be applied to situations where Bayesian inference is impossible and that it enables us to make rational models of cognition more realistic, either by incorporating limited computational resources or neuroscientific knowledge. Finally, we reexamine prior studies from psychology and neuroscience that have applied meta-learning and put them into the context of these new insights. In summary, our work highlights that meta-learning considerably extends the scope of rational analysis and thereby of cognitive theories more generally.

Accurately inferring Gene Regulatory Networks (GRNs) is a critical and challenging task in biology. GRNs model the activatory and inhibitory interactions between genes and are inherently causal in nature. To accurately identify GRNs, perturbational data is required. However, most GRN discovery methods only operate on observational data. Recent advances in neural network-based causal discovery methods have significantly improved causal discovery, including handling interventional data, improvements in performance and scalability. However, applying state-of-the-art (SOTA) causal discovery methods in biology poses challenges, such as noisy data and a large number of samples. Thus, adapting the causal discovery methods is necessary to handle these challenges. In this paper, we introduce DiscoGen, a neural network-based GRN discovery method that can denoise gene expression measurements and handle interventional data. We demonstrate that our model outperforms SOTA neural network-based causal discovery methods.