James M. Lindsay's research while affiliated with The Brookings Institution and other places

Publications (17)

Article
The United States will deploy a national missile defence (NMD) system within the next decade. The question is no longer, therefore, whether to build an NMD system, but how to do so without making the US less secure. Washington must avoid two risks. One is that Moscow will respond by taking steps that raise the risk of nuclear war. The other is that...
Article
At heart, Bush is a revolutionary. Everything he has done in his first 32 months as president shows that he is committed to challenging the existing order. He has been audacious rather than cautious proactive rather than reactive risk-prone rather than risk averse. In his actions as well as his doctrines, he has changed the course of American forei...
Article
D ays before the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom this past March, a well-known intellectual close to the White House walked me through the neces-sity and promise of the coming invasion. Whatever rancor it caused in the short term, he said, would pale in comparison to the payoff that would follow. In the months and years to come, Iraq...
Article
The return of the deferential Congress after September 11 was another chapter in the fluctuating balance of power in executive-legislative relations on foreign policy. The reason for this ebb and flow lies not in the Constitution but in politics. How aggressively Congress exercises its formal foreign policy powers turns foremost on whether the coun...
Article
The administration's National Security Strategy forthrightly commits to ‘fighting terrorists and tyrants’ and ‘encouraging free and open societies on every continent.’ What it ignores is that these two goals often conflict. … Which should take priority: America's commitment to its ideals, or a concern for its safety? … The strategy offers no advice...
Article
As of mid‐June, the U.S. is free to develop, test, and deploy missile defenses in any fashion it sees fit. Yet, the administration has been short on details about the kind of defense it would build. What system is Washington likely to deploy? What should it?
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Full-text available
International Security 26.4 (2002) 190-196 To the Editors: In their article "National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter perform a valuable service for readers of International Security and, more generally, the U.S. debate on national missile defense (NMD). Their nonpolemical treatment of...
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"A critical question as the United States enters this new 'cold war' is whether it has learned the lessons of the last-or whether it is destined to repeat its mistakes."
Article
The Washington Quarterly 24.3 (2001) 15-30 Should an outgoing president make foreign policy commitments that might bind the incoming administration? To judge by the vitriol that greeted President Bill Clinton's foreign policy actions in his last weeks in office, many believe that the answer is an emphatic "no." Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) fulminat...
Article
But deciding that national missile defense can promote American security does not end the debate—it begins it. Deciding precipitously on deployment, or deploying the wrong kind of defense, could do more harm than good. The danger is not a new arms race, but rather that Russia and China will respond with policies that discourage arms reduction and e...

Citations

... All rights reserved 0305-750X/$ -see front matter www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.06.009 and James Lindsay's study of the new dynamics in world politics after 9/11 focused on tensions within the transatlantic alliance, without considering that China might change the whole game (Daalder & Lindsay, 2005). The global governance debate of the last 15 years, in trying to understand the main drivers and dynamics of globalization, also ignored the rise of China as a significant actor until 2003-04 (Kennedy, Messner, & Nuscheler, 2002;Nye & Donahue, 2000;Rosenau, 1995). ...
... Terör savaş yaklaşımının askeri boyutu ve siyasi boyutu olan bir yapılanması mevcuttur. Örneğin ABD'nin 11 Eylül sonrası terörle savaş yaklaşımı Afganistan ve Irak'ta fiili savaşları, açık ve gizli askeri operasyonları (Daalder & Lindsay, 2001) ve askeri yardım programlarını içermekle kalmayıp, ulusal boyutta resmi kurumların düzenlenmesini, Ulusal Güvenlik birimi gibi yeni yapılanmaları, ABD Vatanseverlik Kanunu gibi yasal değişimleri, Guantanomo Hapishanesi gibi yeni hapishane düzenlemelerini içermektedir (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2020). ...
... 1 Some scholars have focused on evaluating the basic factors that lead to varying missile defense effectiveness (e.g., Wilkening 2000;Lebovic 2002), while others (e.g., Lennon 2002;Wirtz and Larsen 2001;Urayama 2004;Sokolsky 2001) have debated anticipated reactions by Russia, China, and other countries. The largest portion of the literature (e.g., Krepon 2003;Cordesman 2002;Lindsay and O'Hanlon 2001;Lennon 2002;Wirtz and Larsen 2001;Miller and Van Evera 1986) has 533 National Missile Defense and Deterrence STEPHEN L. QUACKENBUSH, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI The current stance of the Bush administration has renewed debate on the implications of national missile defense. While a large part of that debate concerns its technical and economic feasibility, there is also considerable debate concerning the ramifications of national missile defense for international peace and stability. ...
... In fact, debased and compromised by its accommodation to the interests of powerful states, the R2P 'off ers no vision for superior forms of political organisation that might transcend the limits of the current world order' (Cunliff e, 2014 ). Thirdly, it represents a retreat from peace because, not unlike the US neo-conservative offi cials in George W. Bush's administration who employed military force as the foreign policy tool ostensibly through which to bring democracy to Iraq (Marshall, 2003 ;Muravchik, 2007 ), the advocates for humanitarian intervention are not at all shy to use military force -or at least consider the use of force -to achieve their desired objectives. 14 As Cunliff e has argued elsewhere, by reinterpreting confl ict prevention through subsuming it under the terms of the R2P, its advocates have undermined the very essence of the liberal project itself, which is to pursue the gradual restriction, suppression and eventual elimination of violence from an increasingly rational and globalized political order (Cunliff e, 2017 ). ...
... The continued debate over MD has created different schools of thought among America's allies, partners, and within the United States itself, that range from fully supporting the idea of a MD, 26 to questioning its overall technical feasibility, 27 to arguing that MD could create different spheres of security with NATO, should it indeed be limited to a "national" program, 28 to believing that MD would create new global arms races. Despite all troubles that MD may face and despite all its critics and worries, the new Bush administration made it clear to the international audience that the program is to be pursued at high speed. ...
... At the same time, it was the beginning of aggressive U.S. unilateralism and the loss of international support. As early as December 2001, President Bush, in a meeting with Tommy Franks, a U.S. Army general who headed the United States Central Command from 2000 to 2003, discussed the military option for Iraq (Daalder and Lindsay 2003). The decision to invade Iraq was made in the summer of 2002, regardless of whether the intervention would be approved by the Security Council or not. ...
... One of the important global factors in the growth of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh is the widely presumed neo-imperialist ambition of US. The United States is today the only truly global power owing to its overwhelming military capability to reach across land, air, and water and indeed to every corner of the globe (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). This has enabled the superpower to exploit others nations. ...
... If the United States cannot do so, a preemptive strike may well "trigger the very attack it was intended to prevent." 237 In another sense, the United States must maintain adequate long-range offensive strike forces to perform such missions (details on this criterion are discussed in the section on counterattack below). ...
... In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) II Treaty, both the United States and Russia agreed to a radical reduction of their strategic nuclear forces.26 Eliminating this constraint gave the United States the freedom to develop, test, and deploy missile defenses in any manner it desires.27 Opponents of the Administration's policies feared the U.S withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would draw a strong reaction from Russia and possibly give them a reason to abandon the first and second START Treaties, by building up their forces and taking a harder line on other issues. ...
... Scholars have examined outgoing presidents' interregnum policies (Daalder & Lindsay, 2001;Dunn, 2006;Howell & Mayer, 2005;Nelson, 1998), but presidents' interregnum rhetoric has received less attention. The current study turns to presidential interregnum rhetoric-rhetoric "during the period between the election and the inauguration of a new president" (Klotz, 1997, p. 32)-to identify image repair strategies of two presidents, William Jefferson Clinton and George W. ...