J. Y. Lee’s research while affiliated with IT University of Copenhagen and other places

What is this page?


This page lists works of an author who doesn't have a ResearchGate profile or hasn't added the works to their profile yet. It is automatically generated from public (personal) data to further our legitimate goal of comprehensive and accurate scientific recordkeeping. If you are this author and want this page removed, please let us know.

Publications (11)


What Is A Family? A Constitutive-Affirmative Account
  • Article
  • Full-text available

March 2024

·

120 Reads

·

1 Citation

Journal of Bioethical Inquiry

J Y Lee

·

R Bentzon

·

E Di Nucci

Bio-heteronormative conceptions of the family have long reinforced a nuclear ideal of the family as a heterosexual marriage, with children who are the genetic progeny of that union. This ideal, however, has also long been resisted in light of recent social developments, exhibited through the increased incidence and acceptance of step-families, donor-conceived families, and so forth. Although to this end some might claim that the bio-heteronormative ideal is not necessary for a social unit to count as a family, a more systematic conceptualization of the family—the kind of family that matters morally—is relatively underexplored in the philosophical literature. This paper makes a start at developing and defending an account of the family that is normatively attractive and in line with the growing prevalence of non-conventional families and methods of family-formation. Our account, which we call a constitutive-affirmative model of the family, takes the family to be constituted by an ongoing process of relevant affective and affirmative relations between the putative family members.

Download


Equal Access to Parenthood and the Imperfect Duty to Benefit

August 2023

·

28 Reads

Philosophy of Medicine

Should involuntarily childless people have the same opportunities to access parenthood as those who are not involuntarily childless? In the context of assisted reproductive technologies, affirmative answers to this question are often cashed out in terms of positive rights, including rights to third-party reproduction. In this paper, we critically explore the scope and extent to which any such right would hold up morally. Ultimately, we argue for a departure away from positive parental rights. Instead, we argue that the state has an imperfect duty to benefit involuntarily childless people in relation to their parental aspirations.



The limitations of liberal reproductive autonomy

June 2022

·

67 Reads

·

2 Citations

Medicine Health Care and Philosophy

The common liberal understanding of reproductive autonomy – characterized by free choice and a principle of non-interference – serves as a useful way to analyse the normative appeal of having certain choices open to people in the reproductive realm, especially for issues like abortion rights. However, this liberal reading of reproductive autonomy only offers us a limited ethical understanding of what is at stake in many kinds of reproductive choices, particularly when it comes to different uses of reproductive technologies and third-party reproduction. This is because the liberal framework does not fully capture who benefits from which reproductive options, the extent of the risks and harms involved in various reproductive interventions, and the reasons for why people are driven to make certain reproductive choices.



Revisiting Moral Bioenhancement and Autonomy

December 2021

·

84 Reads

·

3 Citations

Neuroethics

Some have claimed that moral bioenhancement undermines freedom and authenticity – thereby making moral bioenhancement problematic or undesirable – whereas others have said that moral bioenhancement does not undermine freedom and authenticity – thereby salvaging its ethical permissibility. These debates are characterized by a couple of features. First, a positive relationship is assumed to hold between these agency-related concepts and the ethical permissibility of moral bioenhancement. Second, these debates are centered around individualistic conceptions of agency, like free choice and authenticity, which hail from an atomistic tradition of autonomy. My view is that emphasizing individualistic conceptions of autonomy do not provide particularly strong foundations on which to argue about the issue of the permissibility of moral bioenhancement. This is because individualistic autonomy is not the kind of agency-related consideration we ought to value. Instead, I propose that we investigate the relationship between moral bioenhancement and a more relational kind of autonomy. Focusing on this latter relationship, on my view, clarifies the potential for moral bioenhancement to support or enhance people’s autonomy.


Bystander Omissions and Accountability for Testimonial Injustice

November 2021

·

9 Reads

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

Literature on testimonial injustice and ways that perpetrators might combat it have flourished since Miranda Fricker’s ground-breaking work on testimonial injustice. Less attention has been given, however, to the role of bystanders. In this paper, I examine the accountability that bystanders may have for their omissions to redress testimonial injustice. I argue that bystander accountability applies in cases where it is opportune for bystanders to intervene, and if they are also sufficiently equipped and able to redress the testimonial injustice. Moreover, I recommend that we move beyond virtue responsibilism for ameliorative thinking about testimonial injustice.


Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice

May 2021

·

33 Reads

·

21 Citations

Social Epistemology

Epistemic injustices are wrongs that agents can suffer in their capacity as knowers. In this article, I offer a conceptualisation of a phenomenon I call anticipatory epistemic injustice, which I claim is a distinct and particularly pernicious type of epistemic injustice worthy of independent analysis. I take anticipatory epistemic injustice to consist in the wrongs that agents can suffer as a result of anticipated challenges in their process of taking up testimony-sharing opportunities. I distinguish my account from paradigmatic cases of epistemic injustice, such as Miranda Fricker’s concepts of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice; additionally, I differentiate my view from Kristie Dotson’s account of testimonial smothering. I argue, ultimately, that anticipatory epistemic injustice is a useful addition to our current taxonomy of epistemic injustices, as it has promising explanatory potential for a range of non-standard cases of epistemic injustice.



Citations (3)


... For instance, in the context of disputes over the moral legitimacy of these technologically mediated reproductive options, reproductive autonomy was propagated as a moral right (Robertson 1994). While the precise scope of reproductive autonomy and its particular embodiment as a moral right remain contested (Johnson 2021;Lee 2022), appeal to this right has nonetheless shaped the bioethical debate and has become a focal point in discussing the moral and legal implications of IVF technology. Nowadays, reproductive autonomy enjoys legal protection in multiple countries; in some countries, such as South Africa, it is even regarded as a constitutional right (Thalder 2023). ...

Reference:

Conceptual Mediation in Technomoral Change: Reply to Danaher and Sætra
The limitations of liberal reproductive autonomy

Medicine Health Care and Philosophy

... Several authors have criticized this view. In particular, the analyzed literature makes a great effort to identify the moral difference between MBE and traditional enhancement in terms of moral agency, autonomy, and freedom (Lee, 2021;Reichlin, 2019). Harris (2014) argues that MBE importantly violates "freedom to fall", namely the freedom of an individual to make moral mistakes. ...

Revisiting Moral Bioenhancement and Autonomy

Neuroethics

... Therefore, the first proposed category, that of pre-transactional or participative injustice, must be employed to address issues related both to access to tangible and intangible epistemic resources necessary for the production, reproduction, and communication of knowledge, as well as those related to the lack of recognition of individuals' epistemic agency. This form of injustice occurs when a subject is prevented from participating in an epistemic exchange in which their participation is relevant due to the nature of the matter (object or problem) in question (this has been treated mainly as "pre-emptive testimonial injustice" 7 (Fricker, 2007, p. 130); "participant perspective" (Hookway, 2010, p.155); and "anticipatory epistemic injustice" 8 (Lee, 2021)). ...

Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice
  • Citing Article
  • May 2021

Social Epistemology