February 2023
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12 Reads
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Publications (17)
March 2020
Philosophy in Review
October 2019
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67 Reads
Several aspects of torture are considered in the following chapter. The first section “Definitions of Torture” presents several definitions of torture. In the second section, “The History of Torture,” a brief history of torture in Europe illuminates the role torture has historically played in the legal system. In the third and fourth sections, “Moral and Legal Permissibility” and “The Ticking-Bomb Scenario,” a survey of some of the recent arguments for and against torture is offered. The final section, “Torture and Interrogation,” discusses the evidence surrounding the (in)effectiveness of torture.
August 2019
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36 Reads
July 2015
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28 Reads
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12 Citations
Journal of Medical Humanities
In recent literature on moral perception, much attention has been paid to questions about the relationship between metaethical commitments and moral experience. Far less attention has been paid to the nature of moral perception, its context-sensitivity, and the role it might play in carrying out everyday tasks with decency and care. I would like to reflect on just these features of moral perception in the context of healthcare. I will argue that healthcare providers do in fact have at least an imperfect duty (in Kant's sense) to develop their capacities to perceive with sympathy. I will further suggest, for some familiar reasons, that this development is not best accomplished through the model of adherence to 'ethics codes.'
September 2014
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12 Reads
Journal of Moral Philosophy
December 2013
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46 Reads
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1 Citation
Prolegomena: Casopis za filozofiju/Journal of Philosophy
In this paper I argue that Arthur Fine and Martin Heidegger present responses to the dispute between realism and antirealism that are remarkably close in character. Both claim that this dispute arises from a failure to take seriously our everyday experience of things in the world. I argue that it is useful to note the similarity between Fine and Heidegger for two distinct reasons: 1) their view provides a viable alternative to the current realist/antirealist dispute-an alternative that has not been given its due, and 2) it allows us to build a bridge between two seemingly distinct traditions.
March 2013
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26 Reads
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14 Citations
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
In this paper, I defend the view that we can literally perceive the morally right and wrong, or something near enough. In defending this claim, I will try to meet three primary objectives: (1) to clarify how an investigation into moral phenomenology should proceed, (2) to respond to a number of misconceptions and objections that are most frequently raised against the very idea of moral perception, and (3) to provide a model for how some moral perception can be seen as literal perception. Because I take “moral perception” to pick out a family of different experiences, I will limit myself (for the most part) to a discussion of the moral relevance of the emotions.
February 2013
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40 Reads
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1 Citation
Philosophy Today
September 2010
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148 Reads
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41 Citations
Despite Victor Hugo's 19th-century proclamation that torture no longer exists, we still find it even now, even in those nations that claim to be paradigms of civility. Why is it that torture still exists in a world where it is routinely regarded as immoral? Is it possible to eliminate torture, and if so, how? What exactly does it mean to call something 'torture', and is it always morally reprehensible? Arguments in favour of torture abound, but in this important new book, J. Jeremy Wisnewski examines and explains the moral dimensions of this perennial practice, paying careful attention to what lessons torture can teach us about our own moral psychology. By systematically exposing the weaknesses of the dominant arguments for torture, drawing on resources in both analytic and continental philosophy and relevant empirical literature in psychology, Wisnewski aims to provide an over-arching account of torture: what it is, why it's wrong, and why even the most civilized people can nevertheless engage in it.
Citations (7)
... Thus, more generally, each of these three arguments aims to support the moral that metaphysical theories-or at least Humean Supervenience, the Growing-Block theory, and presentism-are little constrained by truthmaking commitments. Hence, this paper aims to contribute to the debate about the methodology and legitimacy of metaphysics by urging caution on widespread strategies stemming from the twentieth century linguistic turnalong the lines of Lewis (1992), Varzi (2007), Wisnewski (2007), Liggins (2008), Betti (2014), Simpson (2014), Skiles (2014), Barceló (2015), Tallant (2018), Asay and Baron (2019) and among others (see also references in Sect. 3.2). ...
- Citing Article
January 2007
Organon F
... To say that the more you suffer and the less life, integrity, and dignity you possess, the more you grow as a virtuous person, sounds inconsistent. Think of torture (Wisnewski, 2010). Something goes wrong here because the lack of integrity and dignity necessarily means less virtuous development. ...
- Citing Article
September 2010
... They won't reduce epistemic injustice on their own. Such resources can help us perceive others sympathetically, 165 thereby avoiding devaluing other people's reports of their own experience, only if the types of reflection they aim to stimulate become habitual. In this sense, the ability to perceive sympathetically, facilitate inclusive and equitable deliberative exchanges, and avoid epistemic injustice in our dealings with others are like virtues. ...
- Citing Article
July 2015
Journal of Medical Humanities
... For defences of relationalist views of perceptual experience see Campbell (2002), Martin (2002), Travis (2004), and Brewer (2011). 4 Rich theorists include: Siewert (1998), Cullison (2010), Siegel (2006Siegel ( , 2009Siegel ( , 2010b, Butterfill (2009Butterfill ( , 2015, Bayne (2009Bayne ( , 2011, Masrour (2011), Nanay (2011), Fish (2013, Wisnewski (2015), Toribio (2015), Di Bona (2017), Helton (2018). Thin theorists include: Tye (1995Tye ( , 2000, Pautz (2008) 8 These explanations are compatible with a variety of accounts of perceptual justification and knowledge. ...
- Citing Article
March 2013
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
... Contrary to Bufacchi and Arrigo's (2006) analysis, most consequentialist philosophers do not invoke the ticking bomb dilemma to argue for the institutionalization of torture. In fact, Wisnewski (2009) argued against Bufacchi and Arrigo's analysis on the grounds that their emphasis on institutionalized torture did nothing to undermine the ticking bomb justification. Wisnewski too found fault with the external validity of the premises of the ticking bomb dilemma but pointed out that the goal of thinking about torture in these hypothetical terms is not to justify a national program of torture but to emphasize that there are exceptions to every general rule. ...
- Citing Article
May 2009
Journal of Applied Philosophy
... To begin a discussion about ethical action toward dead bodies or the deceased, it is important to establish whether a dead body has moral status and can be a moral patient: if a dead body is not a moral patient (in the same way many other inanimate objects are not considered moral patients), then wrongs cannot be done to them. 1 While the moral status of a dead body has not been universally agreed upon, there are numerous laws, ethics publications, and social practices that provide evidence dead bodies are and should be treated as moral patients. [3][4][5][6] Examples of legal and social proscriptions around the world include laws and taboos against necrophilia, cannibalism, and desecration of graves. [7][8][9][10] These actions are commonly seen as wrong, not just because they are upsetting to observers or the living who care about the dead body, but because these actions constitute a wrong done to the dead body because the dead body possesses some intrinsic quality. ...
- Citing Article
January 2009
Journal of Applied Philosophy
... In sum, the defects of torture can be concluded in the following broad lists (J. Jeremy Wisnewski, 2008): (1) torture warrants will lead to more torture (John Kleinig, 2006); (2) torture warrants are pragmatically intractable; (3) torture warrants compromise judicial integrity (C Sung, 2003); (4) torture warrants undermine the values of a liberal democracy (David Luban, 2007). To take the most extreme case and uses it to establish a general rule is not true. ...
Reference:
On Torture
- Citing Article
May 2008
Journal of Social Philosophy