Itamar Simonson’s research while affiliated with Stanford University and other places

Recent technology advances (e.g., tracking and “AI”) have led to claims and concerns regarding the ability of marketers to anticipate and predict consumer preferences with great accuracy. Here, we consider the predictive capabilities of both traditional techniques (e.g., conjoint analysis) and more recent tools (e.g., advanced machine learning methods) for predicting consumer choices. Our main conclusion is that for most of the more interesting consumer decisions, those that are “new” and non‐habitual, prediction remains hard. In fact, in many cases, prediction has become harder due to the increasing influence of just‐in‐time information (user reviews, online recommendations, new options, etc.) at the point of decision that can neither be measured nor anticipated ex ante. Sophisticated methods and “big data” can in certain contexts improve predictions, but usually only slightly, and prediction remains very imprecise—so much so that it is often a waste of effort. We suggest marketers focus less on trying to predict consumer choices with great accuracy and more on how the information environment affects the choice of their products. We also discuss implications for consumers and policymakers.

People invest much time and money in consuming knowledge. We argue that people systematically vary in the types of knowledge they prefer to know and that such preferences can have broad implications for consumer behavior. We illustrate this in the context of the preference for practical versus theoretical knowledge. Specifically, we propose and show that some people prefer to know more about how to apply and make use of phenomena they encounter, whereas others prefer to know more about what explicates and underlies the phenomena. We further propose and demonstrate that the extent to which people prefer practical versus theoretical knowledge can help predict their behaviors in a wide variety of consumption domains such as education (e.g., choice of learning materials, preference for different MBA programs), marketing information (e.g., skepticism toward advertising and reference prices), and intertemporal discounting (e.g., reaction to service delays; preference for fast food restaurants).

To explain trade-offs in choice, researchers have proposed myriad phenomena and decision rules, each paired with separate theories and idiosyncratic vocabularies. Yet most choice problems are ultimately resolved with one of just two types of solutions: mixed or extreme. For example, people adopt mixed solutions for resolving trade-offs when they allow exercising to license indulgence afterward (balancing between goals), read different literary genres (variety seeking), and order medium-sized coffees (the compromise effect). By contrast, when people adopt extreme solutions for resolving these exact same trade-offs, they exhibit highlighting, consistency seeking, and compromise avoidance, respectively. Our review of the choice literature first illustrates how many seemingly unrelated phenomena actually share the same underlying psychology. We then identify variables that promote one solution versus the other. These variables, in turn, systematically influence which of opposite choice effects arise (e.g., highlighting versus balancing). Finally, we demonstrate how several mistakes people purport to make can potentially instead be reinterpreted as mixed solutions for resolving trade-offs. We conclude with guidance for distinguishing mistakes from mixed solutions. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 72 is January 4, 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

After reviewing prior work regarding components of experience value, I present the concept of “Concurrent Experience Evaluation” (“CEE”), which expands the prior focus on experienced pain and pleasure in response to a stimulus/event. Specifically, the value of an experience is also determined by the concurrent (during‐the‐experience) cognitive assessment of the event relative to the person’s associated goal progress/regression. CEE can account for during‐the‐experience and subsequent choices that people make. Examples of CEE include cognitive evaluations that enhance the experience value such as “good for me” (while eating kale), “I’m getting my money’s worth” (while using a new camera), and “I’m having a cultural experience” (while visiting a museum), or detract from the experience such as “I shouldn’t be doing this” (while smoking or overeating) and “should have chosen the other line” (while waiting at the supermarket checkout). Although prior research has examined hedonic experiences and their context (e.g., being with friends, commuting, colonoscopy) as well as what else the mind may process during an experience (e.g., wandering, thinking of past and future decisions), the concurrent value derived from the cognitive evaluation of the goal implications of an experience has not been identified as a separate experience value component. I examine and illustrate the CEE concept, its determinants, moderators, and implications, as well as its distinctive characteristics as compared with other value perspectives and during‐the‐experience mental processes. Integrating the CEE framework with prior work regarding experience evaluations, I outline a program for future CEE research.

Delayed gratification is the ability to postpone an immediate gain in favor of greater and later reward. Although delayed gratification has been studied extensively, little is known about the motivation behind children’s decisions. Since values are cognitive representations of individuals’ motivations, which serve to guide behavior, we studied the relationship between children’s values and delayed gratification. Two main distinct motivations overlapping with values may underlie this decision: conservation - the desire to reduce uncertainty and preserve the status quo, and self-enhancement – the desire to maximize resources and profit for the self. Accordingly, we hypothesized that conservation values would relate to children’s preference to hold on to what is given as soon as possible, and that self-enhancement values would relate to children’s preference for delaying gratification. Seven-year old children (N = 205) ranked their values with the Picture-Based Values Survey (Döring et al., 2010) as part of the Longitudinal Israeli Study of Twins (LIST) (Avinun and Knafo, 2013). The children also played a decision-making animation game that included delayed gratification decisions. In support of our hypotheses, greater delayed gratification related negatively to conservation values, specifically to security and tradition, and related positively to self-enhancement values, especially power and achievement. This is one of the first demonstrations that children’s values relate meaningfully to their behaviors.

Although we disagree with some of Gal and Rucker's (2018 – this issue) specific evidence and with their overstated conclusion regarding loss aversion, their overarching message makes a worthwhile contribution. In particular, loss aversion is less robust and universal than has been assumed while its most prominent empirical support – the endowment effect and the status quo bias – is susceptible to multiple alternative explanations. Instead of accepting loss aversion as true unless proven otherwise, we should treat it like other decision properties and psychological accounts that are contingent on various moderators and call for an analysis of psychological mechanisms. In this commentary, we suggest that gatekeepers, such as reviewers, tend to favor loss aversion and other widely accepted tendencies, while demanding a much higher support‐threshold for alternative or newer accounts. Although building on prior theories and concepts is of course important, the bias in favor of incumbent assumptions can impede scientific progress, bar new ideas from the literature, and reinforce well‐established but contingent notions that may apply under some conditions but not others. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

Despite substantial prior research regarding the effect of context on choices, uncertainty remains regardingwhen particular context effectswill be observed. In this article, the authors advance a new perspective on contextdependent choices, according to which context effects are a function of the relative advantage of one option over another and of the different strategies that decision makers evoke when making a choice. They propose that context effects resulting from the addition of a third option to a two-option set are more frequently observed when the added option is relatively similar (adjacent) to the "disadvantaged" alternative (i.e., the lower-share option) in the set. The authors conduct a series of studies to analyze the occurrence of context effects and find support for predictions related to asymmetric dominance and extremeness aversion.

We propose that choice construction strategies often meet the criteria for “habits.” As an example of a constructed preference habit, we focus on extremeness aversion, namely, the tendency to prefer a middle or “compromise” option versus an “extreme” option from a given options set. We present evidence that some consumers appear to have a habitual tendency to avoid extreme options that is (1) partly heritable, (2) formed in childhood, and (3) moderated by age and personality traits such as preference for moderation. We discuss the implications of the notion of preference-construction habits and future research directions.

User reviews aggregate word of mouth and often greatly enhance consumers’ ability to estimate product quality. Consumers decide for themselves whether and how to incorporate user reviews with other sources when evaluating options (e.g., a small minority uses Consumer Reports). Despite the extraordinary diligence of Bart de Langhe, Philip Fernbach, and Donald Lichtenstein and their use of a variety of data sources and methods, I have concerns about the purpose of the research, the evidence and distinctions they rely on, and the overstated conclusions. However, studying how user reviews and other currently available quality sources of information affect consumers is important and offers new directions for judgment and decision-making researchers.