Ishita Dasgupta’s research while affiliated with Mountain View College and other places

We are encouraged by the many positive commentaries on our target article. In this response, we recapitulate some of the points raised and identify synergies between them. We have arranged our response based on the tension between data and architecture that arises in the meta-learning framework. We additionally provide a short discussion that touches upon connections to foundation models.

reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models (LMs) achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect. Human reasoning is affected by our real-world knowledge and beliefs, and shows notable “content effects”; humans reason more reliably when the semantic content of a problem supports the correct logical inferences. These content-entangled reasoning patterns are central to debates about the fundamental nature of human intelligence. Here, we investigate whether language models—whose prior expectations capture some aspects of human knowledge—similarly mix content into their answers to logic problems. We explored this question across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task. We evaluate state of the art LMs, as well as humans, and find that the LMs reflect many of the same qualitative human patterns on these tasks—like humans, models answer more accurately when the semantic content of a task supports the logical inferences. These parallels are reflected in accuracy patterns, and in some lower-level features like the relationship between LM confidence over possible answers and human response times. However, in some cases the humans and models behave differently—particularly on the Wason task, where humans perform much worse than large models, and exhibit a distinct error pattern. Our findings have implications for understanding possible contributors to these human cognitive effects, as well as the factors that influence language model performance.

Psychologists and neuroscientists extensively rely on computational models for studying and analyzing the human mind. Traditionally, such computational models have been hand-designed by expert researchers. Two prominent examples are cognitive architectures and Bayesian models of cognition. While the former requires the specification of a fixed set of computational structures and a definition of how these structures interact with each other, the latter necessitates the commitment to a particular prior and a likelihood function which – in combination with Bayes’ rule – determine the model's behavior. In recent years, a new framework has established itself as a promising tool for building models of human cognition: the framework of meta-learning. In contrast to the previously mentioned model classes, meta-learned models acquire their inductive biases from experience, i.e., by repeatedly interacting with an environment. However, a coherent research program around meta-learned models of cognition is still missing to this day. The purpose of this article is to synthesize previous work in this field and establish such a research program. We accomplish this by pointing out that meta-learning can be used to construct Bayes-optimal learning algorithms, allowing us to draw strong connections to the rational analysis of cognition. We then discuss several advantages of the meta-learning framework over traditional methods and reexamine prior work in the context of these new insights.

The ability to acquire abstract knowledge is a hallmark of human intelligence and is believed by many to be one of the core differences between humans and neural network models. Agents can be endowed with an inductive bias towards abstraction through meta-learning, where they are trained on a distribution of tasks that share some abstract structure that can be learned and applied. However, because neural networks are hard to interpret, it can be difficult to tell whether agents have learned the underlying abstraction, or alternatively statistical patterns that are characteristic of that abstraction. In this work, we compare the performance of humans and agents in a meta-reinforcement learning paradigm in which tasks are generated from abstract rules. We define a novel methodology for building “task metamers” that closely match the statistics of the abstract tasks but use a different underlying generative process, and evaluate performance on both abstract and metamer tasks. We find that humans perform better at abstract tasks than metamer tasks whereas common neural network architectures typically perform worse on the abstract tasks than the matched metamers. This work provides a foundation for characterizing differences between humans and machine learning that can be used in future work towards developing machines with more human-like behavior.

What can be learned about causality and experimentation from passive data? This question is salient given recent successes of passively-trained language models in interactive domains such as tool use. Passive learning is inherently limited. However, we show that purely passive learning can in fact allow an agent to learn generalizable strategies for determining and using causal structures, as long as the agent can intervene at test time. We formally illustrate that learning a strategy of first experimenting, then seeking goals, can allow generalization from passive learning in principle. We then show empirically that agents trained via imitation on expert data can indeed generalize at test time to infer and use causal links which are never present in the training data; these agents can also generalize experimentation strategies to novel variable sets never observed in training. We then show that strategies for causal intervention and exploitation can be generalized from passive data even in a more complex environment with high-dimensional observations, with the support of natural language explanations. Explanations can even allow passive learners to generalize out-of-distribution from perfectly-confounded training data. Finally, we show that language models, trained only on passive next-word prediction, can generalize causal intervention strategies from a few-shot prompt containing examples of experimentation, together with explanations and reasoning. These results highlight the surprising power of passive learning of active causal strategies, and may help to understand the behaviors and capabilities of language models.

When exposed to perceptual and motor sequences, people are able to gradually identify patterns within and form a compact internal description of the sequence. One proposal of how sequences can be compressed is people’s ability to form chunks. We study people’s chunking behavior in a serial reaction time task. We relate chunk representation with sequence statistics and task demands, and propose a rational model of chunking that rearranges and concatenates its representation to jointly optimize for accuracy and speed. Our model predicts that participants should chunk more if chunks are indeed part of the generative model underlying a task and should, on average, learn longer chunks when optimizing for speed than optimizing for accuracy. We test these predictions in two experiments. In the first experiment, participants learn sequences with underlying chunks. In the second experiment, participants were instructed to act either as fast or as accurately as possible. The results of both experiments confirmed our model’s predictions. Taken together, these results shed new light on the benefits of chunking and pave the way for future studies on step-wise representation learning in structured domains.

Meta-learning is a framework for learning learning algorithms through repeated interactions with an environment as opposed to designing them by hand. In recent years, this framework has established itself as a promising tool for building models of human cognition. Yet, a coherent research program around meta-learned models of cognition is still missing. The purpose of this article is to synthesize previous work in this field and establish such a research program. We rely on three key pillars to accomplish this goal. We first point out that meta-learning can be used to construct Bayes-optimal learning algorithms. This result not only implies that any behavioral phenomenon that can be explained by a Bayesian model can also be explained by a meta-learned model but also allows us to draw strong connections to the rational analysis of cognition. We then discuss several advantages of the meta-learning framework over traditional Bayesian methods. In particular, we argue that meta-learning can be applied to situations where Bayesian inference is impossible and that it enables us to make rational models of cognition more realistic, either by incorporating limited computational resources or neuroscientific knowledge. Finally, we reexamine prior studies from psychology and neuroscience that have applied meta-learning and put them into the context of these new insights. In summary, our work highlights that meta-learning considerably extends the scope of rational analysis and thereby of cognitive theories more generally.

Reasoning in a complex and ambiguous environment is a key goal for Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents. While some sophisticated RL agents can successfully solve difficult tasks, they require a large amount of training data and often struggle to generalize to new unseen environments and new tasks. On the other hand, Large Scale Language Models (LSLMs) have exhibited strong reasoning ability and the ability to to adapt to new tasks through in-context learning. However, LSLMs do not inherently have the ability to interrogate or intervene on the environment. In this work, we investigate how to combine these complementary abilities in a single system consisting of three parts: a Planner, an Actor, and a Reporter. The Planner is a pre-trained language model that can issue commands to a simple embodied agent (the Actor), while the Reporter communicates with the Planner to inform its next command. We present a set of tasks that require reasoning, test this system's ability to generalize zero-shot and investigate failure cases, and demonstrate how components of this system can be trained with reinforcement-learning to improve performance.

Instruction-following agents must ground language into their observation and action spaces. Learning to ground language is challenging, typically requiring domain-specific engineering or large quantities of human interaction data. To address this challenge, we propose using pretrained vision-language models (VLMs) to supervise embodied agents. We combine ideas from model distillation and hindsight experience replay (HER), using a VLM to retroactively generate language describing the agent's behavior. Simple prompting allows us to control the supervision signal, teaching an agent to interact with novel objects based on their names (e.g., planes) or their features (e.g., colors) in a 3D rendered environment. Fewshot prompting lets us teach abstract category membership, including pre-existing categories (food vs toys) and ad-hoc ones (arbitrary preferences over objects). Our work outlines a new and effective way to use internet-scale VLMs, repurposing the generic language grounding acquired by such models to teach task-relevant groundings to embodied agents.