Inken von Borzyskowski’s research while affiliated with University of Oxford and other places

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Publications (19)


When do member state withdrawals lead to the death of international organizations?
  • Article

July 2024

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14 Reads

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4 Citations

European Journal of International Relations

Inken von Borzyskowski

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Felicity Vabulas

Recent research has drawn attention to states’ backlash against international organizations (IOs), including whether member state withdrawals affect the longevity of IOs. We therefore ask when do member state withdrawals lead to the death of IOs? We are skeptical of a general link between withdrawal and IO death because on average, any one member is not critical for the survival of an IO. Also, withdrawal is often driven by one member state’s preferences diverging from remaining members; these remaining states may band together after withdrawal, ensuring or even enhancing the longevity of the IO. Even withdrawal by several states may not contribute to IO death because a smaller group of remaining members may better overcome collective action challenges. Nonetheless, exit by an important member may affect IO survival by removing resources, market power, and guidance. We test these arguments using survival models on an original dataset of withdrawals across 532 IOs from 1909 to 2014/2020 and illustrate the dynamics with case vignettes. The results support our arguments: withdrawals in general do not lead to IO death but the withdrawal of founding members can speed IO death. Interestingly, withdrawal by economically powerful states seems to facilitate IO survival (often through reform and/or re-entry). These findings contribute to a better understanding of the lifecycle of IOs as well as to the resilience and vulnerabilities of international cooperation.


Withdrawal Frequency across US Administrations, 1945–2022
Framings of US Withdrawals and Withdrawal Threats (1919–2022)
Conjoint – Aggregate Results
Conjoint – Heterogenous Results
Baseline Differences between Republicans and Democrats (Vignette 1)

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Public support for withdrawal from international organizations: Experimental evidence from the US
  • Article
  • Full-text available

April 2024

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99 Reads

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7 Citations

The Review of International Organizations

The United States has helped create and lead many international organizations (IOs). Yet in the last six years, the US announced its withdrawal from several IOs including the World Health Organization, UNESCO, and the Universal Postal Union. Do Americans care about US withdrawals from IOs? When do Americans support withdrawing from IOs and support candidates who propose this? We argue that Americans’ support for multilateralism tends to divide along party lines, and that IO withdrawal can activate those preferences. We also argue that framing an IO withdrawal as benefiting US national interests can make Americans more likely to favor IO exit. Data from four US survey experiments during the 2016–2020 Trump administration support these arguments. Democrats tend to oppose IO withdrawals while Republicans tend to support them. Further, results show that IO withdrawal (and how it is framed) affects candidate choice and policy support. This suggests that announcing IO withdrawal can be used to rally domestic electoral support. Still, the data also show that a large proportion of the US public values remaining in IOs, even when IOs are imperfect or challenging. In these cases, we note that sunk cost fallacies, status quo bias, and loss aversion may pose friction points for supporting withdrawal. Our findings have important implications for research on public opinion about international cooperation, backlash against IOs, and their life cycles.

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Figure 1. Rates of UN sanctions onset by previous regional organization (RO) sanction.
Accounting for Sample Selection.
Effect of Intra-vs Extra-Regional Sanctions on UNSC Sanctions Onset.
Global Governance From Below: Regional Sanctions as Drivers of UN Sanctions

February 2023

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103 Reads

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5 Citations

Journal of Conflict Resolution

The imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council (UNSC) is notoriously selective. Many crises have qualified for UNSC sanctions by endangering peace and security, yet the UN has imposed sanctions in only a few. Selectivity in UNSC sanctions is conventionally explained by conflict intensity or the interests of the Council’s permanent members. Complementing these accounts, we document a third explanation: pre-existing sanctions by regional organizations. We argue that the UNSC has incentives to sanction countries which are already under sanctions by regional organizations because regional sanctions embody neighborhood consensus on the legitimacy of these sanctions and reassure the Council about implementation. Statistical analyses of original data, text analyses, a case study, and interviews strongly support our argument: regional sanctions increase the likelihood of UNSC sanctions adoption, particularly when these are enacted by regional organizations composed of neighboring states. This study advances research on sanctions, conflict resolution, and regime complexity.


When Do Withdrawal Threats Achieve Reform in International Organizations?

January 2023

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60 Reads

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9 Citations

Global Perspectives

International organizations often come under pressure when states desire their reform. Some states threaten to leave international organizations unless their reform demands are met. But how often is threatening to withdraw associated with states demanding institutional reform? And under what conditions do states’ withdrawal threats actually achieve institutional reform? We argue that withdrawal threats are more likely to result in institutional reform when they (1) are made by powerful states and (2) are limited reform demands rather than calls for broader reform. We examine whether threatening to exit institutions can be a catalyst for institutional reform using an original dataset of withdrawal threats from all international organizations and states since 1980 (N = 130). The analysis supports our argument that withdrawal threats are more likely to lead to reforms when their associated demands are made by powerful states and are limited in scope. Further, we find that less than half of exit threats are linked to reform demands: many states threaten to withdraw due to conflicts with another state or for face-saving purposes, without making reform requests. This contrasts with the conventional understanding that exit threats often represent a backlash against international organizations. Perhaps surprisingly, the dynamics of bargaining over reform suggest that some organizations may emerge more, rather than less, resilient after states threaten to withdraw. We conclude with policy implications for rethinking multilateralism.


Peacemaking and Election Violence

January 2022

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137 Reads

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2 Citations

Elections in post-conflict states serve a dual role. The first role, as in most countries, is to select leaders and lend legitimacy to the elected government and its policies. The second role, specific to post-conflict states, is for elections to help implement and consolidate an often fragile peace in the wake of ceasefires and in the context of destruction and mistrust; in this context, elections are part of a longer term peacebuilding process centred around re-establishing the rule of law and political participation.



Figure 1. Effect of fear of campaign violence on attitudinal and behavioral support for democracy.
Figure 3. Effect of fear of campaign violence on support for autocratic government forms.
Fear of campaign violence and support for democracy and autocracy

July 2021

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120 Reads

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10 Citations

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Election violence is common in many developing countries and has potentially detrimental implications for democratic consolidation. Drawing on political psychology, we argue that citizens’ fear of campaign violence undermines support for democracy while increasing support for autocracy. Using individual-level survey data from 21 electoral democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa, we find robust support for our argument. Citizens fearing campaign violence are less likely to support democracy and multi-party competition, more likely to favor a return to autocracy, and less likely to turn out to vote. Our findings have important implications for democratic survival and provide further impetus for reducing electoral violence.




Dangerously informed: Voter information and pre-electoral violence in Africa

January 2020

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60 Reads

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43 Citations

Journal of Peace Research

A considerable literature examines the effect of voter information on candidate strategies and voter–politician interactions in the developing world. The voter information literature argues that information can improve accountability because more informed voters are harder to woo with traditional campaign tools, such as ethnic appeals and vote-buying. However, this literature has largely ignored the reaction of political candidates and thus may reach conclusions that are overly optimistic regarding the impact of information on electoral accountability. We argue that voter information can increase electoral violence in developing countries where politicians face fewer institutional constraints on their campaign tactics. When violence is used as a campaign strategy, more informed electorates are more at risk because they are harder to sway through alternative campaign techniques. Using data from 35 African countries, we show that respondents receiving their news predominantly from newspapers are a good proxy for informed voters because they differ in terms of their political attitudes from respondents consuming no news or receiving it via other channels. Combining the geo-coded survey data with pre-electoral violence event data, we find a robust positive association between newspaper readership and fear of and exposure to campaign violence. This finding contributes to the micro-foundations of election violence and adds a cautionary note for voter information programs.


Citations (15)


... Studies that consider the sources and implications of economic crises focused on their domestic economic and, to a lesser extent, political repercussions (Gourevitch, 1986;Pepinsky, 2009). While the life cycle of IOs, and the sources of their demise in particular, are gaining much scholarly interest of late (von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019, 2024aEilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2020Gray, 2018Gray, , 2020, recent studies largely overlook the consequences of economic crises (for partial exceptions, see Debre & Dijkstra, 2021a, b;Haftel et al., 2020). By theoretically contemplating the relationships between these two phenomena, this study offers new insights to both research agendas. ...

Reference:

Economic crises and the survival of international organizations
When do member state withdrawals lead to the death of international organizations?
  • Citing Article
  • July 2024

European Journal of International Relations

... [117] theories and methodologies. Subsequently, legal scholars play a critical role in shaping the discourse surrounding UNSC sanctions by delving into the legal frameworks that underpin their imposition and enforcement [9,127]. Their analyses focus on the legality of UNSC sanctions, examining the extent of the UNSC's authority to impose UNSC sanctions under international law and the legal obligations of UN member states to implement UNSC sanctions [128]. ...

Global Governance From Below: Regional Sanctions as Drivers of UN Sanctions

Journal of Conflict Resolution

... position vis-à-vis other member states with typically lesser institutional power (Lipscy, 2015(Lipscy, , 2017von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2023). To be sure, in order to succeed in inducing institutional changes that accommodate their demands and reduce their dissatisfaction, states in such a position of extensive negative institutional power still need to make their threats to use that negative power credible (Sebenius 1992;Fearon 1994;Schelling 1997;Lipscy 2015;Zangl et al. 2016). ...

When Do Withdrawal Threats Achieve Reform in International Organizations?

Global Perspectives

... Existing studies, which often focus on specific countries, suggest that electoral violence frequently leads voters to withdraw from the electoral process and could even make voters less supportive of elections overall (see, for example, Bratton 2008;Gutierrez-Romero 2014;Gutiérrez-Romero and LeBas 2020;Höglund 2009;Rosenzweig 2023). Two recent cross-national studies, drawing on survey data from Africa, corroborate that respondents who report being fearful of electoral violence are less likely to support democratic principles and more likely to favour a return to autocracy (Borzyskowski et al. 2021;Burchard 2015). ...

Fear of campaign violence and support for democracy and autocracy

Conflict Management and Peace Science

... In Africa, large-scale elections are characterized by violence, intimidation and electoral disputes (Ani and Uwizeyimana, 2022;Bekoe, 2012;Bob-Milliar, 2014;Borzyskowski and Kuhn, 2020;Leonard, 2009;Kumah-Abbiw, 2017;Mueller, 2011;Oduro, 2021;Söderström, 2018). The causes of this violence, intimidation and fear are the lack of political knowledge among the electorate, and the lack of good election monitoring systems. ...

Dangerously informed: Voter information and pre-electoral violence in Africa
  • Citing Article
  • January 2020

Journal of Peace Research

... For example, in Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe's hold on power after losing the 2008 presidential election to opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai led to a violent crackdown of opposition supporters by state security and Zanu-PF loyalists (Nyamutata, 2012). Furthermore, international election observers usually from Western democratic institutions condemn fraudulent elections with good intentions yet legitimize the use of violence by the opposition (Kelley, 2012;Smidt, 2016;von Borzyskowski, 2019). Smidt (2016) argues that opposition groups exploit the presence and condemnation of election observers to express their grievances and force incumbents to hand over power. ...

The Risks of Election Observation: International Condemnation and Post-Election Violence
  • Citing Article
  • June 2019

International Studies Quarterly

... Internationale Organisationen (IOs) 1 (Gronau/Schmidtke 2016;Ecker-Ehrhardt 2018;Dingwerth et al. 2019;Dingwerth et al. 2020) sowie Legitimitätskrisen (Heupel und Zürn 2017;Sommerer et al. 2022). Sie zeigt sich darüber hinaus vor allem in verschiedenen Formen der Kontestation durch Mitgliedstaaten, welche etwa in Austrittsdrohungen, Budgetkürzungen oder der systematischen Missachtung institutioneller Normen besteht (Borzyskowski/Vabulas 2019;Hirschmann 2021b;Daßler et al. 2022). Die bisherige Forschung verdeutlicht, dass die Anfechtung von IOs unterschiedlich ausfällt, je nachdem ob es sich um etablierte Mächte (Kruck et al. 2022), sogenannte ‚rising powers' oder nichtstaatliche Akteure handelt (Stephen und Zürn 2019). ...

Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations?

The Review of International Organizations

... And the commitment to democracy, human rights, and good governance has become a typical condition for international trade agreements as well (Hafner-Burton, 2005). Even though these efforts have been applied and enforced rather inconsistently (Börzel, 2015;Bush, 2015;Kurlantzick, 2013;Tieku, 2009;Von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019), democracy promotion and other instruments of socialization contributed to democratization in a number of contexts (Börzel & Risse, 2009a, 2009bSchimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008;Vachudová, 2005), and at a minimum put pressure on illiberal leaders in both autocracies and democracies. 5 It was precisely these forms of democracy promotion which generated a more hopeful literature on what multilateral and regional organizations might accomplish. ...

Credible Commitments? Explaining IGO Suspensions to Sanction Political Backsliding
  • Citing Article
  • February 2019

International Studies Quarterly