Ilya Dyachkov’s research while affiliated with Moscow State Institute of International Relations and other places

Taking office in 2008, the Conservative administration moved away from their Liberal predecessors’ “sunshine policy” towards the North. Instead, Lee Myung-bak opted for expanding military co-operation with the United States and joining efforts with Washington in increasing political and economic pressure on Pyongyang. In 2010, South Korean authorities blamed Pyongyang for the sinking of ROKS Cheonan and inter-Korean relations drastically soured. Reduced communication, new sanctions and heightened tensions led to a number of dangerous situations, including the Yeonpyeong Island shelling and the 2013 spring crisis. The lowest point came in 2016, when all ties between the North and the South were severed.Moon Jae-in’s government strove to remedy the situation. Year 2018 truly became a period of diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula, and the inter-Korean track arguably became the most successful channel, yielding a number of summits and agreements in economic and military areas. However, Pyongyang soon got disappointed with Seoul, as the latter’s reluctance to launch practical economic co-operation became apparent. South Korea was too cautious not to anger the United States by being too friendly with the North, and relied too much on the success of North Korea–US summitry, which ultimately failed. Pyongyang saw that as lack of sovereignty and political will, and refused to continue dialogue for dialogue’s sake.

While the prospects of resolving the Korean nuclear problem are rather unclear, it is evident that the Six-Party Talks came the closest to achieving this goal. This forum that made legally binding and multilaterally supported decisions, and had great potential of becoming the backbone of regional security. Northeast Asia has no lack of multilateral economic institutions, but a regional political body is conspicuously absent. The Six Party Talks, if their scope was expanded, could fill that void. The growing tensions in Northeast Asia and the long-standing tradition of “communicating” via threats rather than diplomatic dialogue are very concerning. The need for a collective security system is apparent, and if the Six Party Talks can hardly be resurrected now, any new attempt to create a regional multilateral body with broad political functions should nonetheless learn from their example.

Cycles of tensions and detente in Korea follow each other with the regularity of seasons’ change. Initial attempts of 2012 to look for a diplomatic solution immediately after Kim Jong-un’s ascension to power proved futile due to deep mistrust and diverging interest of opponents, the United States and the DPRK. Diplomacy, including UN-based multilateral approach, failed to stop North Korea from progressing along the nuclear path. Sanctions supported by both DPRK “quasi-allies”—Russia and China—did not help at all, on the contrary, making Pyongyang more belligerent. The period of 2016–2017 was especially worrisome: due to US President Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign and Kim’s stubborn provocations, the situation was sliding to the “fire and fury” scenario—a direct military conflict, probably a nuclear one. The analysis of these dramatic events shows, among other things, that other international actors had very little, if any clout, to check this dangerous trajectory to war.

Lee Myung-bak came to power in 2008 with a range of plans and initiatives to revitalize South Korean economy and promote the country’s image abroad. One of his most memorable undertakings was the ratification of the 2008 South Korea—US free trade agreement. Many South Koreans viewed this as a hasty step and disliked the new leader’s overall pushiness, so mass protests ensued. The government responded by reinforcing its control over the media and society.As a true conservative, Lee Myung-bak viewed Seoul’s diplomatic options through the lens of the alliance with the US. Over the course of the term, relations with Japan deteriorated over historic disputes, although Lee Myung-bak maintained economic and political cooperation with Tokyo.By 2012, the Lee Myung-bak’s approval rating declined, and the conservative party struggled hard to keep the majority in the National Assembly and win the presidential elections.

Political relations between Russia and the Republic of Korea have remained rather stable in 2008–2020. The two countries exchanged top-level visits and maintained constant intergovernmental dialogue. The strong point of the bilateral relationship is that Moscow and Seoul have almost no issues to disagree upon, but the downside is that the drive to support each other politically is also rather weak. Both Russia and South Korea understand that the limits of their ties are defined by their relations with other, more important partners, so the 2008 declaration of willingness to move towards “strategic partnership” remains just that—a declaration. So, when Moon Jae-in proclaimed one of his main foreign policy goals would be developing ties with Russia, many experts rightfully remained sceptical: practical results turned out to be few. Still, over the years, bilateral relations reached certain milestones. Russia and South Korea abolished visas for short-term visits since 2014. In 2014, when the Ukrainian crisis broke out, Seoul did not support Western sanctions against Russia and South Korean businesses benefitted from this decision. Moscow and Seoul have shown time and again that they are ready to protect bilateral ties from external negative influences.

The end of Kim Jong-il’s reign (2008–2011 period is analysed) was marked by increasing confrontation of Pyongyang with the outside world due to nuclear and missile issues, while North Korea advanced by the road of creating its “nuclear deterrent.” The regime faced increasing internal challenges, including the issue of power transition and “line of succession” problem. This problem and internal intrigues associated with it as well as to Kim’s health issues brought about a certain confusion in the upper ruling class. It was only a short time before Kim Jong-il’s demise that he formally introduced Kim Jong-un as the future leader. However, Kim Jong-un quickly accessed to become an undisputable heir, thanks to the well-oiled internal coercion and propaganda mechanisms.The socio-economic situation in the country in the meantime was characterized by the attempts to “turn back the clock,” demarketize the economy and reintroduce centralized control. However, the attempts, especially the disastrous currency reform in 2009, failed. Still, the economic problems did not threaten the political regime, despite wide-spread expectations abroad.

Like many leaders before her, initially Park Geun-hye was seen as a morally impeccable politician, but the public soon grew disappointed in her, leading to the first and only impeachment in the country’s recent history. Her governing style was rather clumsy and heavy-handed; her reactions and statements were quite tone-deaf; and all these things, as well and corruption and nepotism allegations, factored heavily in this turnaround.In terms of foreign policy, Park Geun-hye continued the Conservative approach and intensified military and political co-operation with the United States. Her “trademark” idea was the campaign for Eurasian economic and political integration. Although widely promoted and publicized, it failed to yield any practical results, since “a turn to Eurasia” required that Seoul normalize relations with the North—a step Park Geun-hye was loath to do. She maintained friendly relations with China up until the point when the United States pushed for THAAD deployment on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul caved in and Beijing retaliated with harsh sanctions. Historical disputes paralysed political dialogue with Tokyo.Park Geun-hye’s numerous mistakes generated a significant amount of ill will among the Korean public, and mass protests that broke out in 2016 ousted her from power, opening the way for the Democrats to return.

North Korean nuclear programme has a long history. Launched in the 1950s, by the 1990s, it grew suspicious enough to attract international attention, but decades of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy ultimately failed to prevent Pyongyang from stealthily developing its missile and nuclear technology. Although the country conducted its first nuclear test as far back as 2006, its military nuclear capability remained questionable before Kim Jong-un’s reign.A sharp turn came in 2016–2017, when North Korea conducted a number of high-yield nuclear tests claiming it was a “hydrogen bomb” and later launched an assortment of long-range ballistic missiles (assumed to be intercontinental by many US experts). This was the fruit of labour of Pyongyang’s highly motivated scientists as well as a success of the country’s intelligence, who managed to acquire schematics of a Soviet RD250 missile engine from Ukraine in the mid-2010s. Although quite a few questions remain, the new technologies changed the military nature of the situation and highlighted the need for a diplomatic resolution.

Russian and South Korean economies are in many ways complementary, and both sides display great interest in developing practical co-operation. However, real results in terms of both trade and investment volume, while significant for the bilateral relations, are objectively rather modest. Lack of trust between Russian and Korean business partners, bureaucratic issues, Moscow’s and Seoul’s sometimes misaligned policies are often cited as hurdles to further success. A long-suffered, but still discussed idea is to develop economic co-operation within the broader context of regional integration. Energy and logistics are the key areas here, with proposed projects ranging from building gas pipelines and linking railroads to joint development of the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic. However, due to lack of political will, regional instability and high costs, such initiatives often remain on paper.

For Russian policy in the analysed period, the Korean nuclear issue became one of the “top ten” international issues, especially in discussions with key partners and in multilateral formats. However, the prospects for Russia-proposed diplomatic solution became increasingly dim after 2008. The Six-Party talks were paralysed, and the United States and South Korea switched to tactics of open pressure on North Korea. Russia adhered to diplomatic solutions in a multilateral format and produced many suggestions to this end, including the Russia-China roadmap of July 2017. Russia continued to insist that there should be a compromise, that the solution should be comprehensive, and the legitimate interests of all partners should be considered and offered its good services to bring the opponents closer. During the unexpected “thaw” of 2018–2019, Russia lost its clout in the unfolding events but in general supported the possible inter-Korean and US-DPRK reconciliation, as this corresponded with its aim of preserving the non-proliferation and peace in its neighbourhood. However, despite Russia’s justification for the need for counter-steps on the part of the United States in the negotiation process, American conservative figures essentially abandoned them. Russia from the very start (nuclear test of 2006) joined the international sanctions’ regime seeing it as a tool to provide impetus to an amicable solution of the Korean nuclear issue. Following China, Moscow reluctantly supported the comprehensive UN sanction package of 2016–2017, but the reality turned to be different, as sanctions proved their ineffectiveness. Russia, nevertheless, tried to observe the restrictions, while promoting the idea of modifying them.