Hongshik Lee’s research while affiliated with Korea University and other places

We study the impact of Aid for Trade (AfT) and analyze whether aid recipients participate in bilateral vertical specialization. Using data from 15 donors and 106 recipients for the years 2002 to 2018, we investigate whether bilateral AfT increases bilateral vertical specialization. To focus on the variation between donors and recipients over time, we absorb other sources of variation through donor–year, recipient–year and donor–recipient fixed effects. Our findings show that AfT helps expand bilateral vertical specialization for a particular group of countries, upper middle‐income countries. Subsequent analysis reveals that AfT improves the infrastructure of upper middle‐income countries, which promotes participation in vertical specialization. Our findings suggest that to promote vertical specialization in lower income countries, AfT should be provided more directly to improve their infrastructure.

This paper examines the effects of participating in the KIC on firms’ productivity using firm-level data from 1998 to 2012, focusing on the textile sector. To do this, we implemented PSM estimations employing the radius matching method with 0.01 caliper and 10nearest-neighbor matchings with replacement. We found 100 matched firms in control groups(domestic firms) that corresponded to each of the 10 treated firms. For analysis, we used a difference-in-differences (DID) framework and extended the basic DID framework to the event study framework of Gathmann et al. (2018). The results reported that the treated firms experienced the increased sales but the improvement in sales had not lead to improvements in productivity. These results can be found in the DID event study as well as the DID analysis. That is, improvement in productivity through FDI cannot be found in the empirical results.

Recent empirical evidence suggests that U.S. protectionist lobbying expenditures rose while U.S. trade barrier fell. We find that the same result holds in our panel data sample from 28 countries between 1995 and 2011. We find two economic drivers cause the paradox between increasing protectionist lobbying and decreasing trade barrier. First, trade barriers decline as country capital-labour ratio endowments rise because of the rising political and economic power of capital that lobbies for free-trade. Second, factor intensities in production become more similar as factor-intensity convergence. This flattens the production possibility curve between exportable and import-competing production so that changes increased magnification in both factor rewards. In our panel, the magnification parameters are twice as high for capital as for labour (8.6 vs. 5.1). And, the elasticity of the capital return with respect to country capital-labour factor endowment ratios (.59) is nearly twice those of labour (.22). Increased magnification causes thus labour’s increased lobbying for protection to be more than offset by increased capital lobbying against protection. In short, while an increasing labour lobbies for protection as countries advance, combined tariff and non-tariff protection (OTRI) decline significantly as advanced countries get richer. This explains the tariff-protectionist-lobbying paradox.

We study the role of foreign affiliate productivity in the operations of multinational firms. We use the panel data of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) headquartered in South Korea during 2006–2013 and exploit the significant variation in affiliate productivity and its operation. With other variables held constant, including the parent firm or affiliate fixed effects, we find that a more (less) productive affiliate exports less (more) to the parent and sells more (less) to other unaffiliated entities. We then provide a possible theoretical scenario that is based on the MNC's optimal integration strategy literature. By allowing foreign affiliates to have varying productivity levels, the model bears predictions consistent with the empirical findings.

Purpose The existing literature on aid for trade (AfT) tends to support the effectiveness of AfT in improving trade capacities and enhancing the export performance of recipient countries. While aid directed at trade-related infrastructure (e.g. ports and roads) is reported to drive the overall effect of AfT, the increasing importance of labor market flexibility and informal labor in export environment has been largely overlooked. The purpose of this paper is to test two hypotheses regarding the relationship between labor market flexibility, exports and AfT. First, flexible labor regulation promotes exports by reducing adjustment costs related to the export process. Second, for informal labor-intensive export sectors, AfT effectiveness may be compromised by the contraction of the informal sector due to labor deregulation as it deteriorates comparative advantage that supports recipients’ export competitiveness. Design/methodology/approach Since first introduced by Tinbergen (1962), the gravity model has been widely used to analyze bilateral trade, and its usefulness has been verified in several prominent empirical studies (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Helpman et al., 2008). However, despite the empirically successful framework of the gravity model, the standard gravity equation may not be appropriate for estimating the effect of AfT in the paper. The main interest lies in whether aggregate AfT flows enhance the export “performance” of individual recipients, that is, whether they improve the recipients’ total exports rather than their bilateral exports. For this purpose, the authors took aggregated approach to the gravity model from Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Findings The findings suggest that while both AfT and labor market flexibility are positively associated with higher export levels, the export-promoting effect of AfT is marginally reduced by the contraction of informal workforce. These findings, however, only hold for export sectors that heavily rely on informal labor force, that is, primary commodities and resource/labor-intensive goods. The authors also find that these effects are stronger in low-income countries, indicating that the AfT initiative has been effective where it is needed the most. Originality/value This paper is the first attempt to analyze the relationship between AfT and exports with consideration of labor market flexibility. Using the data for 85 recipient countries, the authors test the following hypotheses. First, labor market flexibility promotes exports by reducing adjustment costs related to the exporting process. Second, the contraction of the informal sector due to labor deregulation deteriorates developing countries’ comparative advantage in certain export sectors. Hence, while both AfT and labor market flexibility are expected to enhance the export volume of developing countries, the loss from weaker comparative advantage in a form of smaller informal labor force can exceed the gains from AfT in certain sectors.

Even though there is a well-known empirical and theoretical link between lobby and the free-rider problem, the existing literature only attributes its findings to the free-rider rather than the measurement of its extent. We develop broader theoretical micro-foundations for measuring free-riding and investigate the determinants of tariff rates from the perspective of corporate lobbying and free-riding. Our estimation result shows that the degree of free-riding not only varies across industries but is particularly high in larger industries indicating the underutilization of lobbying. The tariff rates under monopoly are about 8 times higher than under perfect competition in most industries suggesting that stakeholders should maintain higher industry protection levels through lobbying.

A substantial number of studies have suggested that global outsourcing can induce wage inequality. As Feenstra and Hanson [(1996a) Foreign investment, outsourcing, and relative wage, in: R. C. Feestra, G. M. Hanson, and D. A. Irwin (Eds.) Political Economy of Trade Policy: Essays in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati (Cambridge: The MIT Press), pp. 89–127] argued, global outsourcing is comparable to skill-biased technological change in that global outsourcing is more likely to increase the wage of skilled workers rather than their unskilled counterparts. We examine the effects of outsourcing on wage of skilled and unskilled workers in Korea's manufacturing sector with a focus on the dissimilar effects of outsourcing to developed countries (DCs) and less developed countries (LDCs) on relative wage. The results of system and difference GMM estimation based on manufacturing data from 1992 to 2006 indicate that outsourcing to DCs and LDCs have opposite (and significant) effects on relative wage, that is, outsourcing to DCs (LDCs) decreases the wage of skilled (unskilled) workers. © 2015 Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul