Hollie Nyseth Brehm’s research while affiliated with The Ohio State University and other places

Although past research has addressed why civilians are targeted, we know less about why non-state actors escalate violence against civilians at particular times. This article seeks to identify the events that trigger spikes in violence against civilians committed by non-state actors. We employ an innovative method to identify 24 such escalations in Africa committed by 20 different non-state groups between 1989 and 2015. Rigorous case studies reveal three major types of triggers, including situations in which (1) groups lose relative power, (2) groups gain relative power, and (3) opponents attack civilians. Specifically, we find that opponent military advances—which results in a relative loss of power for the non-state actor—are the most common trigger. More broadly, 75 percent of all escalations are tied to a group’s relative loss in power. These results improve understandings of civilian targeting by non-state actors and may inform efforts to forecast such violence before it occurs.

This case study of heroic deviance focuses onHutu who did not participate in the genocidal violence in 1994 Rwanda and instead risked their lives to rescue Tutsi. Drawing from 45 in-depth interviews, we examine how these deviant heroes invoke religion to narrate their actions. We find that interviewees often neutralize their acts of rescue by attributing responsibility to God. We also theorize why those who engaged in rescue may use religion to neutralize their actions, including coping with trauma, mitigating stigma, and managing impressions. These findings have important implications for the study of deviance and for atrocity prevention policy.

This article critically examines oversimplified categories—especially binary categorization—in analyses of collective violence. Researchers often use categories to make sense of complex situations. While they are necessary, these categories can oversimplify people’s lived experiences and can even directly harm individuals and communities during or after collective violence. Thus, we suggest that researchers continually assess their use of categories, and especially binary or otherwise oversimplified categories framed as mutually exclusive. To illustrate this argument, we focus on two major kinds of categories that researchers and others assessing collective violence often use: person categories (e.g., victim/perpetrator, civilian/combatant) and event categories (e.g., war/genocide, terrorism/insurgency). After highlighting issues tied to person and event categories based on our collective fieldwork experience, we propose that researchers can mitigate some of these issues through critical data collection and assessment, the triangulation of narratives, and the careful communication of research findings. We hope that this will help research on collective violence produce a more comprehensive understanding of suffering and resilience worldwide.

During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, some individuals risked their lives to save others. While much research has analyzed why people rescue during genocide, no studies have systematically analyzed the post-conflict consequences of engaging in such actions. This article begins to fill this gap by treating rescue as a case of behavioural boundary crossing, or individual defection from the expectations of a behavioral script. We rely upon 45 in-depth interviews with Rwandan Hutu who rescued Tutsi and who also did not participate in genocidal violence. Our findings indicate that rescue may be tied to both positive and negative social and economic consequences, from gifts and public recognition to stigma and threats. We suggest that many of these consequences result from the fact that Hutu who rescued went against the expectations of their group. As the positive consequences were often driven by Tutsi and the negative consequences were driven by Hutu, we also suggest that such consequences are tied to fault lines between groups in Rwandan society. Our work consequently aligns with and extends previous research finding that the genocide produced, reinforced, and augmented social cleavages in Rwanda.

In April 1994, in one of the most Christian nations in Africa, genocidal violence erupted culminating in the deaths of upwards of one million people. While thousands participated in mass killings, others choose not to, and rescued persecuted individuals instead. Relying on 45 in-depth interviews with individuals who rescued others in Rwanda, we demonstrate that religion is tied to rescue efforts in at least three ways: 1) through the creation of cognitive safety nets that enabled high-risk actions; 2) through religious practices that isolated individuals from the social networks of those committing the violence; and 3) through religious social networks where individuals encountered opportunities and accessed resources to rescue. The case of rescue in Rwanda illustrates how religiosity can support high-risk collective action, buffer individuals from recruitment to violent social movements, and can connect individuals in ways that enable them to save lives during extreme political violence.

Research has found that participation in transitional justice (TJ) is associated with increased social capital and decreased well-being. This article extends this scholarship by examining how TJ mechanisms affect the social capital and well-being of the people who implement them via interviews with 135 Rwandan gacaca court judges. In terms of well-being, judges discuss pride and confidence yet also highlight stress and trauma. In terms of social capital, many judges are now mediators and local leaders, though numerous judges have also experienced grudges from the families of those they sentenced. These negative consequences were particularly prominent among judges with more authority.

Although economic sanctions have become a prominent response to mass atrocity, there has been relatively little scholarship assessing the impact of economic sanctions on genocidal violence. This article examines whether and how economic sanctions are associated with both the magnitude and the duration of state-led genocide. We analyze 39 genocides that occurred between 1955 and 2005. Results indicate that economic sanctions are not significantly associated with decreased magnitude or duration of genocide. These findings contribute to theory regarding the impact of sanctions on state behavior and hold significance for policy decisions in the face of genocide.

Surprisingly, scholars studying mass atrocity and genocide have frequently sidelined criminological theories and concepts. Other disciplines have addressed these crimes while mostly ignoring criminological insights and theories. In this review, we assess the potential of criminological theories to contribute to explaining and preventing mass atrocities and genocide, highlight criminological insights from the study of these crimes, and unlock the existing criminological knowledge base for application in the context of these crimes. We begin by outlining how mass atrocities and genocide are similar to other crimes that criminologists have routinely studied. We then turn toward frameworks of structural causation, focusing on the state and community levels. Subsequently, we address microlevel theories that inform why individuals commit such violence, ranging from theories of choice, the life course, and techniques of neutralization to social learning theory and theories of desistance from crime. Finally, we address the victims of genocide and mass atrocity, including the factors associated with victim labels and victimhood itself. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 4 is January 13, 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.