February 1964
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7 Reads
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2 Citations
Philosophical Studies
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February 1964
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7 Reads
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2 Citations
Philosophical Studies
November 1961
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1 Read
Philosophical Studies
July 1960
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10 Reads
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25 Citations
Philosophy of Science
In his The Uses of Argument (Cambridge University Press, 1958), S. Toulmin presents serious charges against ordinary logical theory, e.g., that it does not distinguish between analytic or formally valid or conclusive or warrant-using arguments, that the distinction between premises and conclusion is a bad oversimplification, that “major premise” conceals the distinction between inference-warrant and inference-backings, that logicians have been mistakenly working under an ideal of geometrical form. The paper argues that none of the charges is proven, that most of them cannot be proven, that Toulmin's new logic is at best only vaguely hinted at and that his suggestions are positively obscure or mistaken.
August 1959
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4 Reads
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8 Citations
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
February 1959
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3 Reads
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5 Citations
Philosophical Studies
January 1957
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6 Reads
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3 Citations
Philosophical Studies
... This distinction is not straightforward -there are different possible relationships between warrants and backing (e.g. Castaneda, 1960;Simpson, 2015) -but in this form it is useful when we consider explanations students give to justify their choices between counterexamples and corrected statements. ...
July 1960
Philosophy of Science
... Castañeda [1959], p. 414.14 Castañeda [1959], p. 415. ...
August 1959
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
... And, in the second case, what catches our attention is not the plainly non-contradictory encoded content, but its clash with the fact that, in performing that utterance, the speaker has employed 'I', a personal pronoun. 14 14 For a fuller discussion of these cases see (Predelli 2013); see also certain relevant anticipations in (Castaneda 1957), (Hintikka 1962), and (Kaplan 1989). Discourse, then, involves more than the exchange of encoded content. ...
Reference:
Fictional Tellers
January 1957
Philosophical Studies