Glenn H. Snyder’s scientific contributions

... However, it is worth adding that a body of literature looking at the intersections between domestic and foreign policy exists. For example, in the late 1970s, Snyder and Diesing noted that the prediction of international outcomes is significantly improved by understanding internal bargaining, especially with respect to minimally acceptable compromises [26]. The role of domestic factors in international politics were very well articulated by Halperin and Kanter. ...

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Approaches to Decision Making in Foreign Policy: Literature Review

... The Double Deterrence Game is a three-person noncooperative game model that fully captures what Snyder and Diesing (1977) refer to as the "precipitant-challengeconfrontation scheme." As Figure 1 shows, in this game Challenger 1 begins play at Node 1 by deciding whether to Demand a change in the Status Quo, or to Concede the issue by doing nothing. ...

Reference:

Two Against One: Deterrence in the Triad

... Снайдер и Дизинг применяют игровые модели, исследуя 16 исторических кейсов для анализа переговоров/торга во время международных кризисов. Их техника заключается в реконструкции игровой структуры, лежащей в основе каждого кризиса из подробного исторического анализа событий [24]. ...

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Game Modeling of the Political Space: Analysis of Foreign Literature

... The anticipation of potential support from an external power, in contrast, will shift the leader's perception of these costs downward. This alters the intra-regime balance of power, leading to the moral hazard identified long ago by Snyder and Diesing (1977) and others in the alliance literature (Altfeld and de Mesquita 1979;Snyder 1984;Smith 1995). The problem arises in situations of extended deterrence in which the defender seeks to protect a client state, or protégé, in a potential war with a third party. ...

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Coup-Proofing in the Shadow of Intervention: Alliances, Moral Hazard, and Violence in Authoritarian Regimes

... Crises entail a "sequence of interaction between actors" (Snyder and Diesing 1977) in "a noisy, dangerous, and unavoidable learning process" (Fearon 1992). The particular type of learning that we seek to identify is when and how an actor learns to cooperate with its opponent in order to reinforce democracy. ...

Reference:

Learning to Consolidate Democracy