Glen Newey’s research while affiliated with Leiden University and other places

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Publications (33)


Modus vivendi, Toleration and Power Modus vivendi, Toleration and Power
  • Article
  • Full-text available

June 2017

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134 Reads

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7 Citations

Philosophia

Glen Newey

This article deals with modus vivendi, toleration and power. On the face of it toleration and modus vivendi are in tension with each other, because of the power condition on toleration: that an agent is tolerant only if they have the power to engage in an alternative, non- or intolerant form of behaviour, and this seems to be absent in modus vivendi. The article argues that the scope of the power condition is unclear, but might be thought much more extensive than usually supposed. This becomes clear when the agent’s thoughts are subjected to a counterfactual test, concerning what would occur in their ideal world. However it is in the nature of ideals that they cannot usually be subject to a counterfactual variation here, since they determine the ideal world’s content. The article concludes that only a commitment to the other party’s freedom for its own sake proves robust in the face of counterfactual idealisation, but that it is questionable whether the dispositions that characterise toleration should be subject to so demanding a test.

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Figure 1: Tolerance and power. Horizontal axis: effects of tolerance. Vertical axis: tolerance's relation to power. 
What is important in theorizing tolerance today?

February 2015

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4,919 Reads

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11 Citations

Contemporary Political Theory

Wendy Brown

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Rainer Forst



Just politics

March 2012

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20 Reads

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2 Citations

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

This paper asks whether political justice can be encapsulated by procedures. It examines John Rawls’s tripartite distinction between perfect, pure and imperfect procedural justice, concluding that none gives a satisfactory account of procedural justice. Imperfect procedural justice assumes that there could be an authoritative source of justice other than procedures, while perfect procedural justice takes a double-minded view of procedure-independent standards of justice. That leaves pure procedural justice as an apparently decisionistic mode of deciding which outcomes are just. This at least avoids the confusion between having authoritative procedures and procedure-independent standards that are also purportedly authoritative. However, it is argued that even a political procedure that defines the extension of a term such a ‘justice’ will lack authority over it once its reference is fixed. Since Rawls’s categories of procedural justice are jointly exhaustive, the problem of determining justice via political procedures appears insoluble.



How Not to Tolerate Religion

November 2011

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18 Reads

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1 Citation

This chapter argues that the contrast in attitudes among the political classes towards religious freedom and multiculturalism, as witnessed by the recent backlash against multiculturalism, is hard to justify. Those who accept religious toleration but reject multiculturalism deny that the liberal state should permit the formation of self-sufficient cultural groups within society. If there is a relevant and valid distinction to be drawn here, it must rest on the view that minority cultures’ relation to the state is qualitatively different from that of religious groups, amounting to a state within the state – hence the incendiary effect of the claim that certain groups might be able to make law for themselves. Via a re-examination of Locke’s and Hobbes’s arguments for religious toleration, I question the basis for this distinction, arguing that there is no reason why religion, as a comprehensive world-view, should accept that churches must yield to law made by the secular magistrate. This fact poses a fundamental dilemma for the state in dealing with religious malcontents.


Toleration as sedition

June 2011

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22 Reads

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3 Citations

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

This paper examines and criticizes the defence of toleration due to John Rawls in Political Liberalism, and similar strategies mobilized in defence of toleration. It argues that the notion of the burdens of judgement, used by Rawls to defend his doctrine of reasonable pluralism, faces incoherence: schematically, either disagreement succumbs to reason, or vice versa. On similar grounds, reasonable disagreement defences of neutrality fail because of a double-mindedness about the relation between private judgements and public reason. This problem arises, it is argued, from an attempt to make private judgements determinative in the formation of political and legal outcomes, even while subjecting the latter’s justification to norms of public reason. Deference to private judgements in political justification tends to countenance sedition, and this applies also to modern liberal attempts such as Rawls’s to ground toleration in private judgements.


Toleration in Political Conflict

January 2011

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30 Reads

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40 Citations

Political disputes over toleration are endemic, while toleration as a political value seems opposed to those of civic equality, neutrality and sometimes democracy. Toleration in Political Conflict sets out to understand toleration as both politically awkward and indispensable. The book exposes the incoherence of Rawlsian reasonable pluralist justifications of toleration, and shows that toleration cannot be fully reconciled with liberal political values. While raison d'état concerns very often overshadow debates over toleration, these debates - for example about terrorism - need not be framed as a conflict between toleration and security. Framing them in this way tends to obscure objectionable behaviour by tolerators themselves, and their reliance on asymmetric power. Glen Newey concludes by sketching a picture of politics as dependent on free speech which, he argues, is entailed by the demands of free association. That in turn suggests that questions of toleration are inescapable within the conditions of politics itself.


Two Dogmas of Liberalism

October 2010

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53 Reads

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45 Citations

European Journal of Political Theory

This article is on political normativity. It urges scepticism about attempts to reduce political normativity to morality. Modern liberalism leaves a question about how far morality can be accommodated by the form of normativity characteristic of politics. The article casts doubt on whether individual moral norms carry over to collective, for example, political, action, and whether the former ‘trump’ other kinds of reasons in politics. It then sketches an alternative view of politics as an irreducibly collective enterprise. Reasons for acting politically, including the understandings on which perceptions of legitimacy rest, are largely artefacts of the political culture and thus only marginally subject to generic conditions of validity: this is true in particular of liberal acceptability-conditions. Thus legitimacy, though not a redundant notion, must be geared to local political norms.


Citations (13)


... Realitas itu berkembang bersamaan dengan minimnya pemahaman banyak pihak akan risiko penggunaan media sosial (Newey, 2001). Karena itu, ketika pemicu yang disebut politik kekuasaan masuk di dalamnya, hoaks terjadi dengan amat banal. ...

Reference:

Hoaks, Politik dan Risiko Masyarakat Modern
After Politics, The Rejection of Politics in Contemporary Liberal Philosophy
  • Citing Article
  • January 2001

... Of all the power component analyses, Newey's (2013Newey's ( , 2017 is, without a doubt, the most developed. 4 In summary, he argues that S demonstrates the power to tolerate when she displays the right attitude to power: she would not prevent the disapproved of practice out of respect for moral principles, particularly out of respect for other people's freedom. ...

Modus vivendi, Toleration and Power Modus vivendi, Toleration and Power

Philosophia

... Una ética de la contingencia como modus vivendi tiene una dimensión negativa y otra positiva. Negativamente es consecuencia de la diferenciación estructural, semántica e individual de la sociedad contemporánea ; reconoce la legitimidad de su diferenciación como unidad de la diferencia moderna; contingencia como modus vivendi es coexistencia de lo diferenciado (Cvijanovic, 2006; Horton, 2006; Horton y Newey, 2007), lo que se obtiene por medio de la negación de la necesidad o imposibilidad de determinadas vivencias, acciones, expectativas o instituciones sociales. Positivamente, en tanto, una ética de la contingencia como modus vivendi es un universal que sostiene e incluso promueve el pluralismo de valores, aunque solo hasta el punto en que ellos buscan imponer necesidades o imposibilidades. ...

The Political Theory of John Gray
  • Citing Book
  • January 2007

... On the other hand, deliberation and consensus have also faced debate (Blue, 2015;Goodin, 2018;Newey, 2001). Deliberation aims to change peoples' preferences through reflection and persuasion (Dryzek, 2002), and can thus be argued to refuse diverse perspectives and conflict. ...

Rawls and Habermas: Liberalism versus Politics
  • Citing Chapter
  • January 2001

... Of all the power component analyses, Newey's (2013Newey's ( , 2017 is, without a doubt, the most developed. 4 In summary, he argues that S demonstrates the power to tolerate when she displays the right attitude to power: she would not prevent the disapproved of practice out of respect for moral principles, particularly out of respect for other people's freedom. ...

Toleration in Political Conflict
  • Citing Article
  • January 2011

... As a result, there are suggestions to increase surveillance and regulate this minority community (Britton 2019;Busher et al. 2019). Others (Abbas 2011;Kundnani 2015;Modood 2011) contend that Muslims in Britain have unjustly suffered from increasing intolerance and suspicion because of terrorist attacks committed by a small number of radicals who, essentially, marginalise and scapegoat Muslim communities (Berglund 2015;Dobbernack and Modood 2015;Najib and Hopkins 2020). ...

What is important in theorizing tolerance today?

Contemporary Political Theory

... It admits morality as one source (among many) of political normativity, yet holds that the specific circumstances, concerns, pressures, and constraints of political action make the latter irreducible to the former. Philp's (2010) dismissals of liberal theory as a benchmark for political action because of its inattentiveness to the practicalities of political choices, Newey's (2010) claim that moral considerations do not always trump considerations of other kinds, and more recent contentions from other political realists are in line with this moderate position -as Sleat (2022) recently pointed out. ...

Two Dogmas of Liberalism
  • Citing Article
  • October 2010

European Journal of Political Theory

... In epistemological terms, a reasonable disagreement is a situation in which two or more people "have a disagreement and each is reasonable (or justified) in his or her belief" 253 (Feldman 2007, 201). According to Glen Newey (2001), the reasonable disagreement thesis of essential contestability assumes that "[t]he concepts' interpretations may be (a) mutually inconsistent (b) individually reasonable, and (c) such that there is none which is justifiably regarded as superior to its rivals." Newey criticizes it of requiring "an untenable account of the conditions of concept-possession for contested concepts themselves" (Newey 2001, 247-8). ...

Philosophy, politics and contestability
  • Citing Article
  • October 2001

Journal of Political Ideologies

... competing proposals, since " politics just is the public decision-making mechanism deployed when justification fails to provide definitive guidance for public policy " (Newey 2002, 81). The deliberative model, however, lacks criteria determining how or by whom a democratically legitimate decision can be taken in the face of persisting disagreement. ...

Discourse Rights and the Drumcree Marches: A Reply to O’Neill
  • Citing Article
  • June 2008

British Journal of Politics & International Relations