Gilbert Rozman’s research while affiliated with Princeton University and other places

The decade of the 1980s is considered by many to be a triumph not only for US diplomacy and Asian reconciliation, but also for IR theory. More than the 1950s–1970s, it offers telling lessons at the intersection of theory and Asian transformation. There were intense efforts at normalizing relations, fundamental reforms aimed at more regional integration, far-reaching and accelerating trends toward openness and democratization, and an atmosphere conducive to moving beyond the Cold War toward a regional order subsumed by a new international order. Yet, in retrospect, the forces behind balancing the power of others and making IR conditional on more assertive national identities were not in hibernation. Contrary to some simplistic conclusions about US victory in the Cold War, vindicating both its strategy and the theory behind the strategy (for conservatives, some form of realism, and for others, some variant of economic liberalism), IR theories failed to anticipate the primary developments in the region or to predict how they were continuing to take shape. If a majority were caught flat-footed by unanticipated change, the insights garnered for revising IR theory often proved inadequate for the turbulent times in progress.

As we consider how history matters for ongoing international relations in East Asia, we should not overlook the impact of Communism in China, Russia, and North Korea. These three countries each claimed to be a distinct model of Communism in the 1960s–1980s. With Xi Jinping showcasing the “China Dream,” Vladimir Putin trumpeting “Eurasianism” as a way to revive a sphere of influence and civiliza-tional uniqueness, and Kim Jong-un in full pursuit of a dynastic mandate, some may not notice the Communist identity elements in their respective endeavors. In this chapter, I analyze the national identity inherited from traditional and even reform Communism and, following the precedent of my recent book, argue that a Communist Great Power National Identity Syndrome that has so far evolved through Transition 1 (CGP T1 NIS) is in evidence.1 I focus on how the syndrome impacts foreign relations today, taking note of Sinocentrism and Eurasianism with brief mention of North Korea. In this approach, I differ from the realist strain of IR theory, which has denied the importance of national identities, as well as the liberal strain preoccupied with building trust through economic integration as well as multilateral institutions, rather than confronting identity gaps directly. Although the constructivist approach includes within its broad scope perceptions and identities, it cuts too wide a swath, including often pressing for democratization, rather than honing in unwaveringly on gaps in worldviews that drive countries toward greater distrust, mutual accusations, and rejection of pragmatic diplomacy.

Looking back at the critical transformation of the international system in the 1980s–1990s, we should pay attention not only to IR theory in the West, but also look through the prism of IR theory in the Soviet Union and China, as this transformation was in progress, and in Russia and China, as they later reinterpreted what had changed and related it to theory aimed at explaining ongoing developments, of special interest in the 2010s. This leads to comparisons of IR theory in the two countries, comparisons across time in each country, and assessments of how their theories have performed in explaining developments with far-reaching consequences across Asia. Through the 1980s Soviet IR theory stood as the main alternative to IR theory in the West. Recently Chinese IR theory warrants consideration as the alternative drawing the widest attention. There are striking differences between the two, but there are also some little-noticed similarities, which may be indicative of a parallel impact. What is meant here by theory is not what is presented as such, but what takes the form of generalizations and predictions about how Asian relations are developing rooted in assumptions about the driving forces in how relationships among countries evolve.

Whereas in the 1970s–1980s there was great hesitation to review theories validated as befitting the Cold War and in the 1990s–2000s a limited set of theoretical revisions cautiously reflected overall confidence in Asian developments, IR theories faced new skepticism in the 2010s amid growing pessimism. Unlike the previous periods, Sino-US relations were on a collision course, North Korea was acting with near impunity, Sino-Russian relations grew much closer, as clashing efforts to reorganize Asia were advancing quickly. As the ferment intensified, IR theories lagged in interpreting its meaning. Liberal theory suffered a serious setback. Realist theory gained ground, but it faced many puzzles that only national identity perspectives seemed to explain, even if many doubted they provide the desired theoretical rigor, that is, how to make single-country analysis suitable for predictions about bilateral and other relations.

Confidence building starts not with idealism, but with existing national identity trends and geopolitical divisions. Previous restraints are gone. In a more charged atmosphere, US leadership must take account of identity gaps between nations. This starts with comparisons of attitudes toward regionalism and China’s rise in Southeast and Northeast Asia. Extended deterrence is the first requirement for confidence building. Transparency in military actions and intentions is another. Strengthening ASEAN and refocusing on a trilateral community of the United States, Japan, and South Korea have promising potential. These steps can accompany more outreach to China, as long as progress is repeatedly tested by clear-headed analysis.

Australia is a middle power caught between rising dependence on China, which seeks a sinocentric region, and growing security reliance on the U.S., which strives for a trans-Pacific community supporting universal values. In light of the Sino-U.S. identity gap and different concepts of regionalism, its response becomes clearer.

In 2010–12, Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated without the Yasukuni Shrine or Chinese human rights violations in the forefront. To improve relations, attention should turn to what I label the ideological, sectoral, and horizontal dimensions of a national identity gap between these countries. They have each figured in the decline and offer more promise than the temporal dimension, with its symbols of wartime memories, and the vertical dimension, where sensitive Chinese internal affairs are at stake. The sectoral dimension comprises political, economic, and also cultural national identity, each of which has grown more intense in China, while cultural identity is still a force in Japan. Establishing an East Asian community is now the centerpiece in the hope that the horizontal dimension will be an impetus for mutual understanding, yet the notion of community is repeated with no sign of a shared vision of the outside world, whether the US role or the international arena and regionalism. With South Korea, their partner in trilateralism and North Korea's transformation at the crux of all three of these dimensions, this paper emphasizes the way divergent views of the peninsula keep growing in importance for bilateral relations. It suggests ways to reframe relations through cooperation over Korea. As difficult as Korean relations are for both states, it is a test case for their identity gap.

Chinese writings on international relations increasingly invoke history. In the past Chinese and foreigners alike have seen China’s foreign policies through the lens of history, but recent Chinese stress on the “harmonious world” resulting from Confucianism has shifted the discussion. It serves as a guide to resurgent claims for leadership, a source of legitimation for why China deserves leadership, and a warning of how its leadership may be abused to the detriment of countries agreeing to regionalism or multilateralism. Claims to superiority raise tensions in Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere where hopes had existed for a shared view of history. They arouse controversy among advocates of socialist ideology who fear that Confucianism will eclipse communism. The increasingly hereditary elite of Party leaders continues to bridge the gap between these two types of memory, but they face an ideological challenge at home and a credibility challenge abroad.