Genia Schönbaumsfeld's research while affiliated with University of Southampton and other places
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Publications (17)
This paper aims to motivate a scepticism about scepticism in contemporary epistemology. I present the sceptic with a dilemma: On one parsing of the BIV (brain-in-a-vat) scenario, the second premise in a closure-based sceptical argument will turn out false, because the scenario is refutable; on another parsing, the scenario collapses into incoherenc...
Wittgenstein published next to nothing on the philosophy of religion and yet his conception of religious belief has been both enormously influential and hotly contested. In the contemporary literature, Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. This Element shows that all of these readings are m...
In this paper I respond to the objections and comments made by Ranalli, Williams,
and Moyal-Sharrock, participants in a symposium on my book on scepticism called
The Illusion of Doubt.
The Illusion of Doubt shows that radical scepticism is an illusion generated by a Cartesian picture of our evidential situation—the view that my epistemic grounds in both the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ cases must be the same. It is this picture which issues both a standing invitation to radical scepticism and ensures that there is no way of getting out o...
The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven less by independently plausible arguments and more by a fear of epistemic limitation which can be overcome. By developing the Kierkegaardian insight that knowledge requires courage, I show that we are not, as potential knowers, just passive recipients of a...
One of the most intractable issues in Kierkegaard scholarship continues to be the question of what one is to make of the relation between infinite resignation and faith in Fear and Trembling. Most commentators follow Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author in claiming that progression to faith is a “linear” process that requires infinite resignation as a...
In this paper I distinguish between ‘local’ and ‘global’ forms of ‘envatment’. I show that recent envatment arguments (the ‘local’ variety) work similarly to arguments from perceptual illusion and that neither of them are able, by themselves, to get us ‘global’ scepticism. Consequently, motivating the radical sceptical idea that all of our perceptu...
In this paper, I am going to propose a new reading of Wittgenstein’s cryptic talk of ‘accession or loss of meaning’ (or the world ‘waxing and waning’ as a whole) in the Notebooks that draws both on Wittgenstein’s later work on aspect-perception, as well as on the thoughts of a thinker whom Wittgenstein greatly admired: Søren Kierkegaard. I will the...
The overarching claim that I intend to defend in this paper is that while widespread local error is conceivable, we cannot, in the end, make sense of the radical sceptical idea that all our perceptual beliefs might be false- that no one has, as it were, ever been in touch with an 'external world' at all. To this end, I will show that an asymmetry e...
According to “disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism”—a position Duncan Pritchard develops in a recent book—it is possible to know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses, even though it is conversationally inappropriate to claim such knowledge. In a recent paper, on the other hand, Pritchard expounds an “überhinge” strategy, according to which one canno...
It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical work. Rather, the decisive, scepticism-frien...
Mozart's great opera, Don Giovanni, poses a number of significant philosophical and aesthetic challenges, and yet it remains, for the most part, little discussed by contemporary philosophers. A notable exception to this is Bernard Williams's important paper, ‘Don Juan as an Idea’, which contains an illuminating discussion of Kierkegaard's ground-br...
In a series of recent articles, Duncan Pritchard argues for a “neo-Moorean” interpretation of John McDowell’s anti-sceptical strategy. Pritchard introduces a distinction between “favouring” and “discriminating” epistemic grounds in order to show that, within the radical sceptical context, an absence of “discriminating” epistemic grounds allowing on...
In this paper I develop an account of Wittgenstein's conception of what it is to understand religious language. I show that Wittgenstein's view undermines the idea that as regards religious faith only two options are possible – either adherence to a set of metaphysical beliefs (with certain ways of acting following from these beliefs) or passionate...
Books Reviewed:
Kristin Kaufmann,
Annemarie Pieper, Søren Kierkegaard
Citations
... I first drew these distinctions inSchönbaumsfeld (2019).3 In this respect, a RE scenario is like Descartes' dreaming argument: for as long as we are asleep, we cannot know anything about the world (even if it seems otherwise to us), but it does not automatically follow from this that, therefore, I cannot know anything when I am not asleep. ...
... This discussion will be much more detailed than the discussion in section 4.1, as the religious sphere has not been examined in any significant detail in the thesis. In this section, I will start to look at the idea of the religious trial as a psychological one, supporting my argument with an account found within Schönbaumsfeld's paper, 'The aesthetic as mirror of faith in Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling' (Schönbaumsfeld 2019). As the discussion progresses, I will also make it clear in which ways I think the aesthetic trial and the religious trial are portrayed in a similar light, with respect to the input that individuals must devote to these respective trials. ...
... But I take no stand on whether this result is a necessary or even useful component of the anti-skeptical ambitions of the epistemological disjunctivist. For an exchange on the connections between epistemological disjunctivism, anti-skepticism, and neo-Mooreanism, see Schönbaumsfeld (2013) and Pritchard (2009Pritchard ( , 2008Pritchard ( , 2012. 3 See especially Pritchard (2012). Note also that according to his most recent view (defended in his 2015a), Pritchard thinks that it is undesirable to respond to skepticism by claiming to know the denials of skeptical hypotheses, and he instead offers an account according to which the epistemological disjunctivist need not claim such knowledge. ...
