Gary M. Anderson’s research while affiliated with California State University, Northridge and other places

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Publications (59)


The Economic Theory of Clubs
  • Chapter
  • Full-text available

January 2004

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8,870 Reads

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13 Citations

Gary M. Anderson

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Clubs, whether one speaks of the Girl Guides, the All England Lawn Tennis and Croquet Club, a homeowners’ association, or the Republican Party, are private organizations whose members collectively consume (and often produce) at least one good or service that no one person has the capacity unilaterally to finance. Clubs are thus of interest to public choice scholars because they must solve the same kinds of collective action problems government faces in the provision of public goods. Moreover, while there are exceptions to the rule (e.g., closed union shops), clubs solve these problems voluntarily rather than coercively.

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Linguanomics: Official Language Laws, Entry Barriers and Public Goods

October 2000

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7 Reads

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1 Citation

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice

Recently, the pros and cons of so-called ‘Official English’ laws have been a matter of contention. These laws vary, but all seek to mandate the language used in public transactions. We consider such regulations from the standpoint of entry barriers which both generate restriction rents and (possibly) may mitigate congestion of local public goods. Using standard econometric techniques, we examine the various factors which might tend to determine whether a state will have a law, including measures of the political clout of organized labor and the degree of congestion of local public goods within the jurisdiction.


Regulatory barriers to entry in the healthcare industry: The case of alternative medicine

February 2000

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4,096 Reads

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29 Citations

The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance

To the extent that alternative medicine offers a substitute for mainstream physician services, physicians’ incomes are reduced by the incursion of alternative providers into the medical marketplace. State regulations restricting the practice of alternative medicine create rents for physicians whose incomes are protected from competition with alternative providers. Focusing on homeopathy as representative of an alternative therapeutic that potentially substitutes for conventional medicine, a cross-state empirical analysis reveals that mainstream physicians’ incomes are higher in states with more restrictive regulations governing the practice of homeopathy. This finding suggests that regulatory barriers to alternative medicine are motivated more by the interests of orthodox physicians in seeking protection from competition than by the interests of consumers in quality assurance.



Celestial marriage and earthly rents: Interests and the prohibition of polygamy

February 1998

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62 Reads

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12 Citations

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Just prior to the Civil War, the US government set out on a relentless campaign to eliminate polygamy within the Mormon Church. This paper offers evidence that the political restrictions on the practice of polygamy were the result of rent seeking by potential beneficiaries of such laws (the Edmonds Act of 1882). Polygamy created benefits for women, but reduced the welfare of most men, in a time period when only adult males had the franchise.


Soviet Venality: A Rent-Seeking Model of the Communist State

February 1997

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456 Reads

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95 Citations

Public Choice

While the recent fall of communism has focused the interest of economists on the admittedly fascinating problems associated with the ongoing economic reform process, the study of the functioning of actual communist economies still seems mired in the conventional model of central planning. This model is predicated on the assumption that communist rulers are unselfish drones who single-mindedly maximize the public interest. The authors' article proposes an alternative, public choice model. They suggest that the Soviet-style system represents a modern incarnation of the mercantilist economies of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe and that venality, not ideology, drives these economies in practice. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers


Monasteries as Agents of the Corporate Church

October 1996

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The Church dominated society in the Middle Ages and functioned as a quasi-government, providing public and private goods. This book is the first to examine specific institutions in the Church in the Middle Ages in economic terms. Other books have argued generally that the Church either had a positive or negative effect on economic development. The authors of this book look more closely at the actual Church institutions and practices and describe how each functioned as a part of the larger economy of the time. They focus especially on marriage, usury, heresy, the crusades, and the monasteries. It is not their purpose to reject or impugn religious motives that may be advanced by theologians and historians. Their goal is to bring a fresh perspective to the role of institutions of the medieval Church in economic development.


Product Innovation in a Doctrinal Firm

October 1996

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3 Reads

The Church dominated society in the Middle Ages and functioned as a quasi-government, providing public and private goods. This book is the first to examine specific institutions in the Church in the Middle Ages in economic terms. Other books have argued generally that the Church either had a positive or negative effect on economic development. The authors of this book look more closely at the actual Church institutions and practices and describe how each functioned as a part of the larger economy of the time. They focus especially on marriage, usury, heresy, the crusades, and the monasteries. It is not their purpose to reject or impugn religious motives that may be advanced by theologians and historians. Their goal is to bring a fresh perspective to the role of institutions of the medieval Church in economic development.


Citations (35)


... These may, in turn, be construed to be yet another form of coercive advantage, insofar as the cultural signifiers embraced by governmental entities are adhered to by the remainder of society by dint of legal and regulatory edicts. An example of this is the assumption of an official national language by public sector agencies that is used in all political communications with citizens and which, as noted by Anderson et al. (2000), may have the effect of raising access barriers to public services for those individuals who are insufficiently familiar with the official language. Similarly, a heavy reliance upon esoteric jargon or technical terms by bureaucrats (or, in the case of the judiciary, a reliance upon Latin in the conduct of legal cases) may have the effect of reducing public accessibility to government, hence providing opportunities for those skilled in "bureaucratese" several advantages in accessing coercive advantages. ...

Reference:

Coercive advantage
Linguanomics: Official Language Laws, Entry Barriers and Public Goods
  • Citing Article
  • October 2000

Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice

... Unlike Anderson et al. (1992a and1992b), Davidson and Ekelund (1997) and Ekelund et al. (1989Ekelund et al. ( , 1992Ekelund et al. ( and 1996, then Iannaccone (1992 and1998) and Zdeski and Zech (1992) who put forward the maximization of the profit or well-being of the members of the church, we first consider that the household-pastor maximizes satisfaction. Thus, the preferences of the household-pastor are described by a concave utility function, differentiable twice: ...

An Economic Interpretation of the Medieval Crusades

The Journal of European economic history

... In a competitive market, religious participation is high, and each believer can find a religious supplier to suit them. On the other hand, in a market with a small number of religious service providers, participation tends to shrink as applicants for religious products do not find their needs met (Anderson and Tollison, 1992;Simonnot, 2008). ...

Morality and Monopoly: The Constitutional Political Economy of Religious Rules
  • Citing Article
  • January 1992

Cato Journal

... Concentrated political power is usually associated with monopolistic behavior. Anderson and Tollison (1988) and Rogers and Rogers (2000) find evidence that governments are smaller in states where power is concentrated in one political party. Lipford and Yandle (1990) find that state governments make up a larger share of public sector if a single party controls a larger share of the state government, a pattern which they attribute to cartelizing by the state legislatures. ...

Legislative Monopoly and the Size of Government
  • Citing Article
  • January 1988

Southern Economic Journal

... For this chapter is focused upon the interaction-between the role of capital from the point of view of an individual (i.e. that part of the "stock which a man possesses" which is to yield a profit to this individual) and the role of capital from the point of view of society (i.e. that part of the "general stock of any country or society" which is to yield a profit to the 2 The distinction between relative and positive profit has been rather neglected in the literature on Steuart's thought either in the sense of being ignored to the benefit of other aspects of Steuart's multi-faceted exposition, or just as a curiosity without relevant implications. See, in this connection, the works by Sen (1957), Chamley (1962Chamley ( , 1963, Yang (1994), Tortojada (1999); and, more in particular, Schumpeter (1954, 176), Taylor (1957), Meek (1954Meek ( , 1958Meek ( , 1973, Eagly (1961), Akhtar (1978Akhtar ( , 1979, Skinner (1979Skinner ( , 2006, Anderson and Tollison (1984), Perelman (1983), Vickers (1959Vickers ( , 1970, Skinner (1962Skinner ( , 1966Skinner ( , 1981Skinner ( , 1988Skinner ( , 1993, Eltis (1986), Perelman (1983), Hutchison (1988), Karayannis (1988), Perlman (1990), Schefold (1993), Doujon (1994), Urquhart (1996), Brewer (1997), Bentemessek (2012). For a more comprehensive view of this literature, see Tortajada (ed.) (Tortajada 1999, 302-317). ...

Sir James Steuart as the Apotheosis of Mercantilism and His Relation to Adam Smith
  • Citing Article
  • October 1984

Southern Economic Journal

... One area that can help us to consider the nature of motivation within a social context is that of the military that offers metaphorical and literal insights into some of the leadership and motivational challenges facing today's managers and management researchers. Some examples include: comparing historically successful/unsuccessful systems of military incentivisation and control (eg Allen 2001;Forester 1968), internal hierarchical influences/motivations (Benjamin & Thornberg 2007) and private enterprise in the military both historical (Anderson and Gifford 1991;Sechrest 2001) and current (Leander 2005). This paper seeks to draw from this body of work in order to help make sense of such managerial and organisational challenges (theoretical and practical) from an alternative perspective. ...

Privateering and the private production of naval power
  • Citing Article
  • January 1991

Cato Journal

... Similar to this case,Anderson et al. (1988) note how the Fed favored member over nonmember banks with its policies during the Great Contraction.24 Selgin (2020, p. 8) notes that the Fed can benefit specific groups even when the Fed conducts QE by purchasing treasury securities, as this can be used to finance government spending. ...

A public choice theory of the great contraction

Public Choice

... There are many reasons for a state to have conscription, such as economic benefits (Ben-Ari et al., 2023;Hosek et al., 1994;Levy, 2007;Margulies, 2021), cultural or ideological reasons (Ben-Eliezer, 1995; kant, [1795] 1991kubik, 2001;kuemmel, 2006;Leander, 2004;Røislien, 2013;Rousseau & Frankel, 1947), foreign influences (Djankov et al., 2002;Hadass, 2004;Margulies, 2021), or security considerations (Anderson et al., 1996;Asal et al., 2017;Choi & James, 2008; Haltiner, 1998;Stephens & Baker, 2006). ...

Drafting the competition: Labor unions and military conscription
  • Citing Article
  • July 1996

Defence and Peace Economics

... The crucial entity bringing about the end of the Corn Laws was the Anti-Corn Law League. Anderson and Tollison (1985) argue that the League was a special interest representing, primarily, "the British cotton textile industry" (p. 201). ...

Ideology, Interest Groups, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws
  • Citing Article
  • January 1985

Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft = Journal of institutional and theoretical economics