Francisco Pereira Gandarillas’s research while affiliated with Alberto Hurtado University and other places

Siegel's (2010) phenomenal contrast argument aims to ensure the admissibility of higher-level properties in the contents of perception. In particular, the argument supports the representational admissibility of natural kind properties such as being a pine tree and explains in this way the phenomenal contrast between those experiences we would have before and after learning to recognize pine trees. This article critically evaluates the commitments and assumptions of this argument with the purpose of identifying three difficulties that weaken Siegel's (2010) proposal. First, the argument assumes that perception is cognitively penetrable, a hypothesis for which no independent support is provided. Second, while there is reason to think that some higher-level proper-ties can be represented in perception, natural-kind properties like being a pine tree do not qualify. Finally, there are alternative explanations of the phenomenal contrast at play that do not require the admissibility of higher-level properties, much less cognitive penetrability.

Hume'sphilosophy has been traditionally interpreted as radically skeptical about the possibility of giving epistemic justification to our inductive beliefs about the future and the unobserved. In this article I willfocus on the inductive beliefs originated in custom and I willpoint out - against the exegetical tradition - that a rigorous analysis of the characteristics of the psychological mechanisms involved in the formation of this class of beliefs does allow us to grant them epistemic merit and attribute justification to them under an externalist reading.

One of the main challenges that representationalism must face is to consistently account for the possibility of scenarios in which covert attention alters the phenomenology of our visual experiences. The present work tries to highlight the internal commitments and difficulties of three different representational strategies to face this challenge: the strategy of indeterminate content, the strategy of mass illusion and the narcissistic project that appeals to relational properties indexed to attention. It will be argued that the latter has evident comparative virtues that the literature has ignored and that justifyits in-depth development.

In this paper I will contrast the standard conceptualist account that McDowell put forward in Mind and World with his current conceptualist theory that distinguishes between two kinds of content: the non-propositional intuitive content of perceptual experiences and the discursive propositional content of our empirical beliefs. I will argue that, even though McDowell characterizes both theories as "conceptualist", in fact his current proposal is conceptual in a less demanding sense than the previous one, because it lacks the ontological commitments that the classic version of Mind and World had regarding the constituents of the contents of perception. The variety of conceptualism regarding the content of perception that McDowell nowadays supports would even admit the presence of some non-conceptual constitutive features.

La interpretación estándar de la teoría humeana sobre la identidad personal suele aceptar dos tesis importantes: (T1) no existe un yo o mente dotada de simplicidad e identidad perfecta; (T2) Hume defiende una teoría metafísica específica acerca de la naturaleza del yo o de la mente, según la cual esta es solo un haz de percepciones. Se argumenta que ambas afirmaciones, son falsas. Su aceptación comprometería a Hume con una forma de dogmatismo epistémico y metafísico incompatible con su filosofía experimental.

The standard interpretation of Hume’s theory of personal identity usually accepts two important theses: (T1) there is no self or mind endowed with simplicity and perfect identity; (T2) Hume defends a specific metaphysical theory regarding the nature of the self or of the mind, according to which it is only a bundle of perceptions. The article argues that both of those statements are false. Accepting them would commit Hume to a form of epistemic and metaphysical dogmatism that is incompatible with his experimental philosophy.

En la actualidad la teoría de los datos sensoriales es frecuentemente descartada por los filósofos de la percepción como algo extravagante sin otorgar calificaciones adicionales o argumentos detallados, pese a su importancia histórica y a la influencia que aún tiene. En este artículo pretendo reevaluar adecuadamente sus compromisos básicos y consecuencias a la luz de nuevos desarrollos en las filosofías de la mente y la percepción. Examinaré con detalle la naturaleza de los datos sensoriales y señalaré que esta teoría no solo conlleva las inaceptables consecuencias ontológicas y epistemológicas que se identifican con frecuencia, sino también que esta no puede ser establecida o refutada conclusivamente solo en base a nuestra evidencia introspectiva como muchos autores han sugerido.

Algunos filósofos y científicos cognitivos piensan que la atención es necesaria para la conciencia visual. Ellos normalmente aceptan este requerimiento sobre la base de estudios sistemáticos de patologías perceptuales, como el síndrome de negligencia unilateral, o respaldados en experimentos psicológicos de ceguera inatencional en los que individuos con sus capacidades perceptivas intactas supuestamente no experimentan conscientemente elementos presentes en su campo visual cuando estos son desatendidos. En este artículo sugeriré que la estrategia de la ceguera inatencional es insuficiente y no nos fuerza a aceptar que la atención es necesaria para la conciencia visual por dos razones. Primero, la evidencia empírica disponible es consistente con interpretaciones alternativas que no apelan a la necesidad atencional. Segundo, hay buenas razones para pensar que la atención es independiente de la conciencia. Si esto es así, entonces posiblemente existen modos de conciencia que no requieren de atención.

Algunos filósofos aseguran que las experiencias visuales que tenemoscuando percibimos son del mismo tipo ontológico que aquellasexperiencias que tendríamos si alucináramos de manera perfecta.Si en ambos casos hay un máximo común denominadorontológico —una experiencia del mismo tipo— es claro que losobjetos distales no constituyen de manera fundamental las experienciasque tenemos. Una de las razones utilizadas para adoptaresta interpretación es la posibilidad de producir una alucinaciónperfecta, es decir, una alucinación introspectivamente indiscriminablede una percepción, mediante la activación de las mismascausas neurofisiológicas cercanas en el cerebro. En este artículoargumentaré que esta razón no es suficiente para aceptar las consideracionesanteriores. De hecho, sugeriré que existe una maneraalternativa de comprender la percepción como un fenómenonatural que sí otorga un rol constitutivo causal y no-causal a losobjetos distales. Si esto es así, las experiencias perceptuales sonfundamentalmente diferentes a las alucinaciones, a pesar de queno podemos discriminar introspectivamente entre ellas.

Nowadays philosophers of perception often dismiss sense-data theory as something extravagant, without further qualifications or detailed arguments, despite its historical importance and current infiuence. In this paper I will properly reassess its basic commitments and consequences in light of new developments in the philosophies of mind and perception. I will examine in detail the nature of sense-data and I will point out that sense-data theory not only carries the unacceptable ontological and epistemological consequences frequently identified, but that it also cannot be conclusively established or refuted solely on the basis of introspective evidence as many authors have previously suggested.