Francis Bloch’s research while affiliated with Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University and other places

... In this linear-quadratic framework, the Nash equilibrium strategy is proportional to the players' Bonacich centrality, 2 and the key player is identified using the intercentrality measure. 3 This model and its extensions have inspired theoretical investigations (e.g., de Marti and Zenou, 2015;Bloch and Shabayek, 2023), as well as empirical studies concerning a variety of social and economic issues, such as crime (Ballester et al., 2010;Liu et al., 2012), education (Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009Hahn et al., 2015), R&D , and finance (Battiston et al., 2012;Cabrales et al., 2016;Demange, 2018). However, one common feature of these empirical studies is that they examine cases where a single external actor has a monopoly on targeting. ...

Reference:

Competing for Influence in Networks Through Strategic Targeting

... Olckers and Walsh (2023) survey the literature on impartial mechanisms. In related settings, Bloch et al. (2023), Kattwinkel (2020), and Kattwinkel et al. (2022) consider mechanisms that are not necessarily impartial but which nevertheless provide the applicants with incentives for truthful reports; 13 for example, they allow for mechanisms where the grantmaker cross-checks reports across applicants or with external reviewers. ...

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Designing Scientific Grants

... In our model's framework, those existing models can be regarded as the best responses of followers (local agents) under myopic behavior in the absence of leader intervention. By applying concepts from existing equilibrium measures in network/spatial econometric models (Katz, 1953;Bonacich, 1987;LeSage, 2008;Bloch et al., 2023), we delineate how changes in a follower's characteristic lead to immediate adjustments in their own or other followers' activities (short-run impacts). Moreover, our model and the established SDPSE models can be interpreted alongside SVAR models, as discussed by Elhorst et al. (2021), who outline the commonalities and distinctions between spatial dynamic models and SVAR models. ...

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Dynamic spatial interaction models for a leader's resource allocation and followers' multiple activities

... In a recent paper, Bloch, Chatterjee, and Dutta [1] introduce a game theoretic model that captures such scenarios. In the model, an attacker (node 0) and n defenders are all connected in a fixed network. ...

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Computation of Nash Equilibria of Attack and Defense Games on Networks

... In contrast, our ranking-based mechanisms works well for general models of peer information and even when there is only one slot to allocate, as long as agents are informationally small. Olckers (2021, 2022) and Baumann (2023) study models in which agents hold information about their neighbors' allocation values in a social network. Olckers (2021, 2022) assume that agents observe ordinal comparisons between their neighbors' values. ...

Reference:

Optimal Allocation with Peer Information

... This is a good start and proves that change is necessary. Internationally, in order to address the above difficulties, the OECD launched a new work program in May 2019 to replace the permanent establishment rules with new contact points that are more suitable for the digital economy and define new profit split accounting rules [6,7]. At the same time, in order to put pressure on the platforms, some countries decided to unilaterally implement digital service taxes. ...

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The Impact of E-commerce Platform Tax Governance on Economic Development

... This restriction is reasonable as the deviation by S to level k has no impact on players with higher status. 5 Once we accept this property of the resulting hierarchies, the rest of the definition comes naturally. In words, a set of feasible hierarchies V is a weakly stable set if for any deviation from V by S to level k and any hierarchy that can result from this deviation, there is a further deviation by some coalition T to level k, and this latter deviation is credible in the sense that there are indeed weakly stable hierarchies in V that have T in level k and that can result after T 's deviation. ...

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Power, Status, and the Stability of Hierarchies

... Employees at a firm may exchange tasks, shifts, or equipment [Yu and Zhang, 2020]. University students exchange course schedules, while universities exchange students for semester-long exchange programs [Bloch et al., 2020]. Teams in professional sports leagues trade players' contract rights [Coreno and Balbuzanov, 2022]. ...

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Some Characterizations of TTC in Multiple-Object Reallocation Problems

... A two-level analysis of the network was used to confirm the findings (i.e., at the network level and node-level). Analyzing the position of the nodes also, provides an in-depth understanding of the network (Bloch, Dutta, et al., 2019;Jackson, 2010;Mesgari et al., 2015). Below some features of the network at the node level are highlighted. ...

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Populism, jihad, and economic resistance: Studying the political discourse of Iran's supreme leader

... We note that although the SPCS and the vNM FSS do not coincide in the Prisoners' Dilemma problem, they do coincide in some other instances of two-person normal form games. For example, Bloch and van den Nouweland (2021) have proven that, for two-person normal form games, (i) if a strategy profile  is a Nash equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated by any other strategy profile, then {} is a singleton farsighted stable set (Corollary 4.9 therein), and (ii) if s Pareto dominates all other strategy profiles, then {} is a singleton farsighted stable set and it is also the unique farsighted stable set (Corollary 4.10 therein). Then, it can be shown that our Theorem 4.1 implies that in case (i), {} is also a singleton SPCS for -person normal form games, and that in case (ii), {} is also the unique SPCS for -person normal form games. ...

Reference:

Subgame Perfect Farsighted Stability