November 2024
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1 Read
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November 2024
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1 Read
January 2024
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6 Reads
Anti-Semitism is on the rise in Europe. The inhumane Hamas attack on Israeli civilians on 7 October 2023 acted as a catalyst for hatred of Jews. The conflict in the Middle East may escalate permanently. This will also strengthen anti-Semitism in Europe. For this reason, this volume focuses on the new ideological dynamics that are intensifying in the new virtual spaces. The contributions provide a deeper understanding of what we need to tackle today: The vectors of the new antisemitism – Holocaust denial, the antisemitism of the far left, antisemitism in the Islamic world, anti-Zionism as antisemitism, even anti-racism as antisemitism – all have a long history. What has changed are the information technologies and the geopolitical context in which criticism of Israel is also rampant. With contributions by Wyn Brodersen | Maik Fielitz | Stefan Goertz | Gustav Gustenau | Florian Hartleb | Armin Langer | Armin Pfahl-Traughber | Lars Rensmann |Christoph Schiebel | Nina Scholz | Gabriel Weimann | Michael Wolffsohn
January 2024
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2 Reads
Anti-Semitism is on the rise in Europe. The inhumane Hamas attack on Israeli civilians on 7 October 2023 acted as a catalyst for hatred of Jews. The conflict in the Middle East may escalate permanently. This will also strengthen anti-Semitism in Europe. For this reason, this volume focuses on the new ideological dynamics that are intensifying in the new virtual spaces. The contributions provide a deeper understanding of what we need to tackle today: The vectors of the new antisemitism – Holocaust denial, the antisemitism of the far left, antisemitism in the Islamic world, anti-Zionism as antisemitism, even anti-racism as antisemitism – all have a long history. What has changed are the information technologies and the geopolitical context in which criticism of Israel is also rampant. With contributions by Wyn Brodersen | Maik Fielitz | Stefan Goertz | Gustav Gustenau | Florian Hartleb | Armin Langer | Armin Pfahl-Traughber | Lars Rensmann |Christoph Schiebel | Nina Scholz | Gabriel Weimann | Michael Wolffsohn
January 2024
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5 Reads
Anti-Semitism is on the rise in Europe. The inhumane Hamas attack on Israeli civilians on 7 October 2023 acted as a catalyst for hatred of Jews. The conflict in the Middle East may escalate permanently. This will also strengthen anti-Semitism in Europe. For this reason, this volume focuses on the new ideological dynamics that are intensifying in the new virtual spaces. The contributions provide a deeper understanding of what we need to tackle today: The vectors of the new antisemitism – Holocaust denial, the antisemitism of the far left, antisemitism in the Islamic world, anti-Zionism as antisemitism, even anti-racism as antisemitism – all have a long history. What has changed are the information technologies and the geopolitical context in which criticism of Israel is also rampant. With contributions by Wyn Brodersen | Maik Fielitz | Stefan Goertz | Gustav Gustenau | Florian Hartleb | Armin Langer | Armin Pfahl-Traughber | Lars Rensmann |Christoph Schiebel | Nina Scholz | Gabriel Weimann | Michael Wolffsohn
November 2023
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32 Reads
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2 Citations
Russia’s war against Ukraine has been an overriding issue in German politics since the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022. The idea of this article is to compare left-wing and right-wing populist opposition to military support for Ukraine to defend itself against the Russian invasion. We analyze and compare communications of the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the socialist party The Left. Both parties have often been accused of populism. Our article shows that, despite distinct motivations, there is a huge overlap in political positions regarding the Russian war against Ukraine. Both parties call for immediate peace negotiations and a willingness to concessions on Ukraine’s part. They are against German deliveries of weapons. Nonetheless, the Alternative for Germany tends more toward isolationism, whereas The Left is located somewhere between pacifism and anti-militarism. Hence, the AfD is rooted in a nationalist ideology. The Left is more of an internationalist force. We show that both parties differ to varying degrees and are not always polar opposites.
September 2023
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6 Reads
August 2023
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23 Reads
May 2023
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18 Reads
May 2023
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12 Reads
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1 Citation
May 2023
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30 Reads
... resulting in sanctions and diplomatic tensions (Hartleb and Schiebel 2023). In a remarkable departure from its longstanding foreign policy stance, Germany finds itself at the centre of a geopolitical Zeitenwende (political paradigm shift), as it takes unprecedented steps to support Ukraine in the face of the Russian invasion (Blumenau 2022;Fröhlich 2023;Mader and Schoen 2023;Masch et al. 2023). ...
November 2023
... Antisemitische und rassistische Verschwörungstheorien werden auf 8chan und ähnlichen Imageboards, Foren und sozialen Medien geteilt. Dies schließt die Gamingplattform "Steam" ein (Hunold/Peschke 2022;Hartleb 2023). Diese Kommunikationselemente werden sogar in der analogen Welt verbreitet. ...
November 2022
... For instance, radical rightwing actors and their supporters demanded the implementation of the "people's" court-martial against the former German chancellor Angela Merkel and the virologist Christian Drosten as a response to their suggestions regarding anti-Covid-19 measures which were framed by RPAs as characteristic of a dictatorship (Stolz 2020). Other instances of violent articulation were a murder plot against Saxony minister-president Michael Kretschmer and other members of the Saxony cabinet in the Telegram-chat of a group associated with Querdenker (Heinke 2022;Hartleb 2022) and the murder of a cashier by a Covid-19 denier in Idar-Oberstein, which reportedly followed the cashier's demand to respect masks-wearing requirements (Hövermann 2021). These requirements were often framed as the "antidemocratic" measures of an "authoritarian" government in the right-wing populist narratives (see the "Covid-19 crisis" in Pegida's narratives below). ...
January 2022
... Differences within digital parties explain why cases such as the Five Star Movement are sometimes conceptualised in studies as movement parties (Della Porta et al. 2017) or associated with the concept of a business-firm party run by a political entrepreneur (Hartleb, Tsutsumi, and Chen 2021). Similarly, pirate parties are sometimes defined as a specific phenomenon related to their origins and programmatic outlook. ...
October 2021
... The evidence of the existence of a lone wolf attacker suggests that such a changing role may challenge the stereotypical notion of women as merely victims of VE. However, for the disconnected-disordered type of lone wolf radicals, they may move to violence not only from radical ideas of grievance but from elements of unfreezing, escape, and status-seeking (Hartleb, 2020;McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014). ...
January 2020
... In Estonia, a country regarded as a digital pioneer (Hartleb, 2020) with E-voting on the national and local level since 2005, a value aspect comes into the debate. "Trust" is the central currency to enforce digital tools and e-services and to create a unique platform such as the "X-road" and secure authentication systems (Solvak and Vassil, 2016;Vinkel and Krimmer, 2017). ...
December 2019
... However, the old traditional means of mobilisation are also holding their ground, such as door-to-door campaigns. The Christian Democratic Union Deutschlands (CDU Deutschlands) has been successful in this door-to-door campaign, but has also made use of new communication technologies (Initiative Connect 2017) [13]. ...
November 2017
European View
... Para facilitar a visão dos dados, adaptações foram realizadas, assim, partidos de extremaesquerda e centro-esquerda foram considerados de esquerda, a mesma lógica foi aplicada às variações de partidos alinhados à direita. (Fergusson et al., 2021;Silva, 2013;Wilpert, 2007) quanto à direita (Hartleb, 2015;Mcdonnell;Newell, 2011;, e há uma série de trabalhos que consideram a estratégia desses partidos focada em discursos radicalizados (à direita ou à esquerda) e no sentimento anti-establishment político, como uma característica muito mais marcante e definidora de sua atuação política do que a ideologia partidária (Fella;Ruzza, 2013;Hartleb, 2015;Schedler, 1996;. (Borel, 2019;Navia, 2004 La iniciativa tiene por finalidad establecer un sistema electoral mayoritario, que dé expresión, fundamentalmente, a las grandes corrientes de opinión, que tenga um cierto efecto reductivo en el número de partidos, que no reitere la nefasta experiencia electoral y partidista del pasado, que ofrezca claridad al elector sobre el significado y consecuencias de su voto y que introduzca el pragmatismo en las decisiones en bien del país, favoreciendo la moderación de todos los actores políticos (Historia de la Ley 18799, p. 39 appud (Borel, Chilenas continuaram a obter a grande maioria dos votos (Borel, 2019;Gamboa; Morales, 2020). ...
June 2015
European View
... There is a relative consensus among scholars that the categories of left and right or inclusionary versus exclusionary are useful to discriminate among the diverse manifestations of populism, even though some parties may escape this classification axis 1 (see Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013;Mouffe, 2018;Katsambekis, 2017;Ivaldi et al., 2017;March, 2017;della Porta, 2017;Roch, 2021). There is also abundant research on the Eurosceptic profile of radical right parties (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002;Hartleb, 2012;Werts et al., 2012;McDonnell and Werner, 2018). Yet, the question of how RLP articulate their discourses on Europe and the European Union (EU) together with populism remains unclear, even though some scholars have addressed the relevance of the topic and the analytical problems to classify these parties as Eurosceptic (Usherwood and Startin, 2013;Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014;della Porta et al., 2017). ...
September 2012
... The development of ICT has led to the emergence of parties whose internal processes and communication are based on digital participatory tools that draw from the logic of corporate entities (Gerbaudo 2019). These parties have been described in various ways as cyber-parties (Margetts 2006), anti-elitist cyber-parties (Hartleb 2013), connective parties (Bennett et al. 2018), and digital parties (Gerbaudo 2019(Gerbaudo , 2021. Deseriis (2020a) in his essay differentiates digital parties into platform and network, with platforms characterized as centralized and networks as decentralized. ...
November 2013
Journal of Public Affairs