Fiery Cushman’s research while affiliated with Harvard University and other places

Many of the most interesting cognitive feats that humans perform require us to consider not just the things that actually occur but also alternative possibilities. We often do this explicitly (e.g., when imagining precisely how a first date could have gone better), but other times we do it spontaneously and implicitly (e.g., when thinking, “I have to catch this bus,” implying bad alternatives if the bus is not caught). A growing body of research has identified a core set of neural processes involved in explicit, episodic counterfactual thinking. Little is known, however, about the processes supporting the spontaneous, possibly implicit representation of alternatives. To make progress on this question, we induced participants to spontaneously generate counterfactual alternatives by asking them to judge whether agents were forced to make a particular choice or chose freely—a judgment that implicitly depends on their alternative options. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we found 14 clusters that were preferentially engaged when participants were making force judgments (which elicit the spontaneous consideration of alternatives) compared to judgments of what actually occurred (which do not elicit alternatives). These clusters were widely distributed throughout the brain, including in the bilateral prefrontal cortex, bilateral inferior parietal lobule, bilateral middle and inferior temporal gyri, bilateral posterior cingulate, and bilateral caudate. In many of these regions, we additionally show that variability in the neural signal correlates with trial-by-trial variability in participants’ force judgments. Our findings provide a first characterization of the neural substrates of the spontaneous representation of counterfactual alternatives.

It is widely agreed upon that morality guides people with conflicting interests towards agreements of mutual benefit. We therefore might expect numerous proposals for organizing human moral cognition around the logic of bargaining, negotiation, and agreement. Yet, while “contractualist” ideas play an important role in moral philosophy, they are starkly underrepresented in the field of moral psychology. From a contractualist perspective, ideal moral judgments are those that would be agreed to by rational bargaining agents—an idea with wide-spread support in philosophy, psychology, economics, biology, and cultural evolution. As a practical matter, however, investing time and effort in negotiating every interpersonal interaction is unfeasible. Instead, we propose, people use abstractions and heuristics to efficiently identify mutually beneficial arrangements. We argue that many well-studied elements of our moral minds, such as reasoning about others’ utilities (“consequentialist” reasoning) or evaluating intrinsic ethical properties of certain actions (“deontological” reasoning), can be naturally understood as resource-rational approximations of a contractualist ideal. Moreover, this view explains the flexibility of our moral minds—how our moral rules and standards get created, updated and overridden and how we deal with novel cases we have never seen before. Thus, the apparently fragmentary nature of our moral psychology—commonly described in terms of systems in conflict—can be largely unified around the principle of finding mutually beneficial agreements under resource constraint. Our resulting “triple theory” of moral cognition naturally integrates contractualist, consequentialist and deontological concerns.

For contractualist accounts of morality, actions are moral if they correspond to what rational or reasonable agents would agree to do, were they to negotiate explicitly. This, in turn, often depends on each party’s bargaining power, which varies with each party’s stakes in the potential agreement and available alternatives in case of disagreement. If there is an asymmetry, with one party enjoying higher bargaining power than another, this party can usually get a better deal, as often happens in real negotiations. A strong test of contractualist accounts of morality, then, is whether moral judgments do take bargaining power into account. We explore this in five preregistered experiments (n = 3,025; U.S.-based Prolific participants). We construct scenarios depicting everyday social interactions between two parties in which one of them can perform a mutually beneficial but unpleasant action. We find that the same actions (asking the other to perform the unpleasant action or explicitly refusing to do it) are perceived as less morally appropriate when performed by the party with lower bargaining power, as compared to the party with higher bargaining power. In other words, participants tend to give more moral leeway to parties with better bargaining positions and to hold disadvantaged parties to stricter moral standards. This effect appears to depend only on the relative bargaining power of each party but not on the magnitude of the bargaining power asymmetry between them. We discuss implications for contractualist theories of moral cognition and the emergence and persistence of unfair norms and inequality.

Prior work shows that when people try to think of things, such as solutions to a problem, the options that come to mind most often are those that they consider statistically common and valuable. Here, we ask whether ordinary people anticipate this and, therefore, infer that when uncommon solutions come to someone's mind, it is diagnostic of how much those solutions are represented as valuable. To illustrate, imagine your friend is brainstorming what to cook for a vegetarian couple and says aloud, “maybe pizza, burritos, or penne alfredo? No, let’s make a stir-fry.” While some of the options can be explained by both their value and statistical frequency (e.g., pizza or burritos), you might infer that only your friend’s unique love for penne alfredo explains why that option came to mind. Across four studies we demonstrate inferences of this kind, and our results suggest that participants are able to make such inferences by inverting their intuitive understanding of the option-generation process itself. Whereas many current models of our folk theory of mind focus on the core mechanics of deliberative choice – such as the use of beliefs and desires to plan rational action – our results show a much broader folk understanding of pre-deliberative aspects of thought, such as the very process of option generation.

Why do we punish negligence? Some current accounts raise the possibility that it can be explained by the kinds of processes that lead us to punish ordinary harmful acts, such as outcome bias, character inference, or antecedent deliberative choices. Although they capture many important cases, these explanations fail to account for others. We argue that, in addition to these phenomena, there is something unique to the punishment of negligence itself: People hold others directly responsible for the basic fact of failing to bring to mind information that would help them to avoid important risks. In other words, we propose that at its heart negligence is a failure of thought. Drawing on the current literature in moral psychology, we suggest that people find it natural to punish such failures, even when they do not arise from conscious, volitional choice. This raises a question: Why punish somebody for a mental event they did not exercise deliberative control over? Drawing on the literature on how thoughts come to mind, we argue that punishing a person for such failures will help prevent their future occurrence, even without the involvement of volitional choice. This provides new insight on the structure and function of our tendency to punish negligent actions.

Individual contributors to a collaborative task are often rewarded for going above and beyond—salespeople earn commissions, athletes earn performance bonuses, and companies award special parking spots to their employee of the month. How do we decide when to reward collaborators, and are these decisions closely aligned with how responsible they were for the outcome of a collaboration? In Experiments 1a and 1b (𝑁 = 360), we tested how participants give bonuses, using stimuli and an experiment design that has previously been used to elicit responsibility judgments (Xiang et al., 2023a). Past work has found that responsibility judgments are driven both by how much effort people actually contributed and how much they could have contributed (Xiang et al., 2023a). In contrast, here we found that participants allocated bonuses based only on how much effort agents actually contributed. In Experiments 2a and 2b (𝑁 = 358), participants allocated bonuses to agents who were instructed to exert a particular level of effort; participants rewarded these agents more for complying with instructions, and their rewards were less sensitive to the precise level of effort exerted. Together, these findings suggest that people reward collaborators based on their willingness to exert effort, and point to a difference between decisions about how to assign responsibility to collaborators and how to incentivize them. One possible explanation for this difference is that responsibility judgments may reflect causal inference about past collaborations, whereas providing incentives may motivate collaborators to keep exerting effort in the future. Our work sheds light on how we understand and formalize the cognitive capacities that underlie collaboration.

For contractualist accounts of morality, actions are moral if they correspond to what rational or reasonable agents would agree to do, were they to negotiate explicitly. This, in turn, often depends on each party’s bargaining power, which varies with each party’s stakes in the potential agreement and available alternatives in case of disagreement. If there is an asymmetry, with one party enjoying higher bargaining power than another, this party can usually get a better deal, as often happens in real negotiations. A strong test of contractualist accounts of morality, then, is whether moral judgments do take bargaining power into account. We explore this in five preregistered experiments (n = 3,025; US-based Prolific participants). We construct scenarios depicting everyday social interactions between two parties in which one of them can perform a mutually beneficial but unpleasant action. We find that the same actions (asking the other to perform the unpleasant action, or explicitly refusing to do it) are perceived as less morally appropriate when performed by the party with lower bargaining power, as compared to the party with higher bargaining power. In other words, participants tend to give more moral leeway to parties with better bargaining positions, and to hold disadvantaged parties to stricter moral standards. This effect appears to depend only on the relative bargaining power of each party, but not on the magnitude of the bargaining power asymmetry between them. We discuss implications for contractualist theories of moral cognition and the emergence and persistence of unfair norms and inequality.