Felicity Vabulas’s research while affiliated with Pepperdine University and other places

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Publications (22)


When do member state withdrawals lead to the death of international organizations?
  • Article

July 2024

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14 Reads

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4 Citations

European Journal of International Relations

Inken von Borzyskowski

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Felicity Vabulas

Recent research has drawn attention to states’ backlash against international organizations (IOs), including whether member state withdrawals affect the longevity of IOs. We therefore ask when do member state withdrawals lead to the death of IOs? We are skeptical of a general link between withdrawal and IO death because on average, any one member is not critical for the survival of an IO. Also, withdrawal is often driven by one member state’s preferences diverging from remaining members; these remaining states may band together after withdrawal, ensuring or even enhancing the longevity of the IO. Even withdrawal by several states may not contribute to IO death because a smaller group of remaining members may better overcome collective action challenges. Nonetheless, exit by an important member may affect IO survival by removing resources, market power, and guidance. We test these arguments using survival models on an original dataset of withdrawals across 532 IOs from 1909 to 2014/2020 and illustrate the dynamics with case vignettes. The results support our arguments: withdrawals in general do not lead to IO death but the withdrawal of founding members can speed IO death. Interestingly, withdrawal by economically powerful states seems to facilitate IO survival (often through reform and/or re-entry). These findings contribute to a better understanding of the lifecycle of IOs as well as to the resilience and vulnerabilities of international cooperation.


Soft Pooling

May 2024

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3 Reads

Scholars often conflate the concepts of pooling (how states make collective decisions) and delegation (authorizing an international body to act) in examining the authority of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). We clarify the difference by showing how states “soft pool” decision-making through informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) without creating legal obligations or delegating authority. IIGOs such as the G-groups are growing in prevalence and importance because soft pooling allows states to make collective decisions that are politically binding in nonlegal ways. We examine organizational characteristics of IIGOs that allow states to minimize sovereignty costs while cooperating through soft pooling – including the use of consensus to express shared expectations through declarations and memoranda of understanding and administrative structures such as rotating chairs to avoid delegating to an independent secretariat. We review these understudied organizational alternatives, explaining how soft pooling makes IIGOs authoritative even as states retain sovereignty.


Withdrawal Frequency across US Administrations, 1945–2022
Framings of US Withdrawals and Withdrawal Threats (1919–2022)
Conjoint – Aggregate Results
Conjoint – Heterogenous Results
Baseline Differences between Republicans and Democrats (Vignette 1)

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Public support for withdrawal from international organizations: Experimental evidence from the US
  • Article
  • Full-text available

April 2024

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98 Reads

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7 Citations

The Review of International Organizations

The United States has helped create and lead many international organizations (IOs). Yet in the last six years, the US announced its withdrawal from several IOs including the World Health Organization, UNESCO, and the Universal Postal Union. Do Americans care about US withdrawals from IOs? When do Americans support withdrawing from IOs and support candidates who propose this? We argue that Americans’ support for multilateralism tends to divide along party lines, and that IO withdrawal can activate those preferences. We also argue that framing an IO withdrawal as benefiting US national interests can make Americans more likely to favor IO exit. Data from four US survey experiments during the 2016–2020 Trump administration support these arguments. Democrats tend to oppose IO withdrawals while Republicans tend to support them. Further, results show that IO withdrawal (and how it is framed) affects candidate choice and policy support. This suggests that announcing IO withdrawal can be used to rally domestic electoral support. Still, the data also show that a large proportion of the US public values remaining in IOs, even when IOs are imperfect or challenging. In these cases, we note that sunk cost fallacies, status quo bias, and loss aversion may pose friction points for supporting withdrawal. Our findings have important implications for research on public opinion about international cooperation, backlash against IOs, and their life cycles.

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The importance of rational institutionalism in the analysis of informal international institutions

July 2023

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79 Reads

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3 Citations

International Politics

The study of informal international institutions has advanced considerably over the past decade. Much of this work, including our own, has approached this phenomenon from the perspective of rationalist institutionalism. Yet, existing work has also been criticized from several conceptual, theoretical, and empirical angles. The recent special issue of International Politics on the “cascading dynamics” of informality by Cooper et al. (Int Politics, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-022-00399-4) offers an important example of such critiques. It builds on earlier work in the field, advancing our understanding of a number of processes and institutions, but also partly casts itself as a reaction to the approach we have adopted. We argue that key aspects of this critique are misguided and that Cooper et al. exaggerate the differences that divide us. Our aim in this article is to respond to their criticisms, clarify the key research issues at stake, emphasize the complementarities among approaches, and outline ways of moving forward.


When Do Withdrawal Threats Achieve Reform in International Organizations?

January 2023

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58 Reads

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9 Citations

Global Perspectives

International organizations often come under pressure when states desire their reform. Some states threaten to leave international organizations unless their reform demands are met. But how often is threatening to withdraw associated with states demanding institutional reform? And under what conditions do states’ withdrawal threats actually achieve institutional reform? We argue that withdrawal threats are more likely to result in institutional reform when they (1) are made by powerful states and (2) are limited reform demands rather than calls for broader reform. We examine whether threatening to exit institutions can be a catalyst for institutional reform using an original dataset of withdrawal threats from all international organizations and states since 1980 (N = 130). The analysis supports our argument that withdrawal threats are more likely to lead to reforms when their associated demands are made by powerful states and are limited in scope. Further, we find that less than half of exit threats are linked to reform demands: many states threaten to withdraw due to conflicts with another state or for face-saving purposes, without making reform requests. This contrasts with the conventional understanding that exit threats often represent a backlash against international organizations. Perhaps surprisingly, the dynamics of bargaining over reform suggest that some organizations may emerge more, rather than less, resilient after states threaten to withdraw. We conclude with policy implications for rethinking multilateralism.



Informality in International Political Economy

June 2021

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3 Reads

This handbook is currently in development, with individual articles publishing online in advance of print publication. At this time, we cannot add information about unpublished articles in this handbook, however the table of contents will continue to grow as additional articles pass through the review process and are added to the site. Please note that the online publication date for this handbook is the date that the first article in the title was published online. For more information, please read the site FAQs.


Informal IGOs as Mediators of Power Shifts

October 2020

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39 Reads

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26 Citations

Global Policy

In an era defined by shifting distributions of power, states are not only pushing for change in formal international organizations, they are increasingly using informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) to mediate change. Why and how do states use IIGOs – institutions without a treaty or secretariat – to manage global power shifts? IIGOs are useful for states on both sides of the power shift. Established powers use IIGOs for system management through ‘collaboration’ and strengthening the ‘hegemonic consensus’ to preserve their institutional privileges while adapting to changing power realities. Rising powers use IIGOs to redistribute through ‘power bargaining’ and ‘rhetorical coercion’ to strengthen their institutional roles without overly disrupting the current order. Established and rising powers also work together to use IIGOs for integrative strategies including ‘cooptation’ and ‘principled persuasion’, creating a mutually beneficial solution that accommodates both increased demands but also mounting responsibilities. IIGOs help states manage power transitions by providing flexible institutional arrangements that facilitate bargaining without freezing outcomes in permanent institutions while the power distribution evolves. We provide case vignettes of the G7 (system management) in the early phase of a power shift, BRICS (redistributive strategies) in the middle phase, and the G20 (integrative strategies) in the later phase.


Cooperation under autonomy: Building and analyzing the Informal Intergovernmental Organizations 2.0 dataset

October 2020

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116 Reads

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51 Citations

Journal of Peace Research

Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and G20 increasingly play a central role in governing international relations. IIGOs are based on recurrent meetings among high-level state representatives but are not legalized through a treaty and have no permanent secretariat. They allow states to organize internationally without sacrificing autonomy to a supranational entity. We present the IIGO 2.0 dataset, the most comprehensive compilation of these institutions to date, and illustrate the significance of IIGOs through several key empirical findings. First, while the creation of formal IGOs (FIGOs) has plateaued, states are increasingly creating IIGOs to address critical global issues. Second, states disproportionately use IIGOs for high politics issue areas including peace, security, and political agenda-setting which challenges conventional wisdom that IGOs (intergovernmental organizations) are less relevant in the security realm. Third, IIGOs are remarkably durable. Although states could readily formalize or abandon IIGOs, they generally organize cooperation informally for long periods. Finally, IIGOs are typically smaller than FIGOs and this design choice is increasingly used by states of all levels of development, power, and region. The availability of the IIGO 2.0 dataset will promote further analysis on the growing diversity of international institutions.


Citations (12)


... Studies that consider the sources and implications of economic crises focused on their domestic economic and, to a lesser extent, political repercussions (Gourevitch, 1986;Pepinsky, 2009). While the life cycle of IOs, and the sources of their demise in particular, are gaining much scholarly interest of late (von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019, 2024aEilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2020Gray, 2018Gray, , 2020, recent studies largely overlook the consequences of economic crises (for partial exceptions, see Debre & Dijkstra, 2021a, b;Haftel et al., 2020). By theoretically contemplating the relationships between these two phenomena, this study offers new insights to both research agendas. ...

Reference:

Economic crises and the survival of international organizations
When do member state withdrawals lead to the death of international organizations?
  • Citing Article
  • July 2024

European Journal of International Relations

... This discourse indicates that institutional performance is crucial in supporting the Service Leadership as the actor to implement policies and transitional governance that provides policies for guiding the operation of public service delivery (Caicedo et al., 2022). In addition, Vabulas and Lall, (2023) agrees that "micro-foundational incentives" for the state are effective institutional performance through investing in policy, and the author also stresses that the role of bureaucrats in public services enhances Service Leadership in the transitional governance. States transitioning from political fragility to political stability are ubiquitously faced with numerous systemic vulnerabilities during the transitional periods. ...

Ranjit Lall. 2023. Making International Institutions Work: The Politics of Performance. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
  • Citing Article
  • August 2023

The Review of International Organizations

... position vis-à-vis other member states with typically lesser institutional power (Lipscy, 2015(Lipscy, , 2017von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2023). To be sure, in order to succeed in inducing institutional changes that accommodate their demands and reduce their dissatisfaction, states in such a position of extensive negative institutional power still need to make their threats to use that negative power credible (Sebenius 1992;Fearon 1994;Schelling 1997;Lipscy 2015;Zangl et al. 2016). ...

When Do Withdrawal Threats Achieve Reform in International Organizations?

Global Perspectives

... Second, beyond power preponderance, flexible institutionalization is another condition which can be expected to contribute to the success of cooptation in taming great power rivalries. Flexible institutional settings as offered by, for example, institutional informality facilitate reaching and rescinding cooptation deals (Abbott & Snidal, 2000;Vabulas & Snidal, 2020). As informal institutions typically contain fewer veto points than formal institutions, it is easier for leading powers to coopt great power rivals. ...

Informal IGOs as Mediators of Power Shifts
  • Citing Article
  • October 2020

Global Policy

... But why would states opt for informality over formality when confronting a significant threat? Scholars suggest that states often favor informality due to its rational functionality [25]. In essence, meaningful coordination can occur without formal written provisions. ...

Cooperation under autonomy: Building and analyzing the Informal Intergovernmental Organizations 2.0 dataset
  • Citing Article
  • October 2020

Journal of Peace Research

... Internationale Organisationen (IOs) 1 (Gronau/Schmidtke 2016;Ecker-Ehrhardt 2018;Dingwerth et al. 2019;Dingwerth et al. 2020) sowie Legitimitätskrisen (Heupel und Zürn 2017;Sommerer et al. 2022). Sie zeigt sich darüber hinaus vor allem in verschiedenen Formen der Kontestation durch Mitgliedstaaten, welche etwa in Austrittsdrohungen, Budgetkürzungen oder der systematischen Missachtung institutioneller Normen besteht (Borzyskowski/Vabulas 2019;Hirschmann 2021b;Daßler et al. 2022). Die bisherige Forschung verdeutlicht, dass die Anfechtung von IOs unterschiedlich ausfällt, je nachdem ob es sich um etablierte Mächte (Kruck et al. 2022), sogenannte ‚rising powers' oder nichtstaatliche Akteure handelt (Stephen und Zürn 2019). ...

Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations?

The Review of International Organizations

... And the commitment to democracy, human rights, and good governance has become a typical condition for international trade agreements as well (Hafner-Burton, 2005). Even though these efforts have been applied and enforced rather inconsistently (Börzel, 2015;Bush, 2015;Kurlantzick, 2013;Tieku, 2009;Von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019), democracy promotion and other instruments of socialization contributed to democratization in a number of contexts (Börzel & Risse, 2009a, 2009bSchimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008;Vachudová, 2005), and at a minimum put pressure on illiberal leaders in both autocracies and democracies. 5 It was precisely these forms of democracy promotion which generated a more hopeful literature on what multilateral and regional organizations might accomplish. ...

Credible Commitments? Explaining IGO Suspensions to Sanction Political Backsliding
  • Citing Article
  • February 2019

International Studies Quarterly

... The company has been a large taxpayer in the region. During the crisis the company asked not for a financial assistance but for a possibility to postpone the payment of tax and penalty as a consequence [4][5][6]. ...

Nudging the Needle: Foreign Lobbies and US Human Rights Ratings
  • Citing Article
  • January 2019

International Studies Quarterly

... Centralisation refers to whether there is a single entity within the organisational structure of an arrangement that is responsible for core institutional tasks, also known as a secretariat, and is both independent and permanent (Koremenos et al., 2001;Westerwinter, 2021). MRGA can thus be classified as centralised MRGA-CFI, if they have independent and permanent secretariats; or non-centralised MRGA-CFIs, if they do not have a secretariat or if they have one but it is not permanently based in a country and/or depends on an external organisation (Vabulas and Snidal, 2013). Membership in centralised MRGA-CFI is controversial as it entails high sovereignty costs for the member states (Westerwinter, 2021). ...

Organization without Delegation: Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs) and the Spectrum of Intergovernmental Arrangements
  • Citing Article
  • June 2013

The Review of International Organizations