Evan Stewart’s research while affiliated with University of Massachusetts Boston and other places

Americans generally celebrate the abstract principle of diversity, but research suggests that they have a comparatively lower (1) favorability towards policies that promote diversity and (2) sense of personal closeness with others from diverse backgrounds. The current study analyzes nationally representative survey data to assess such “principle-policy gaps” and “principle-personal gaps” in Americans’ diversity attitudes. We find that these attitudinal gaps indeed exist and are substantial in the general population. We also consider how individual-level factors relate to these attitudinal gaps. Following common findings in previous research, we find that participant racial identity and political partisanship have statistically significant relationships with these attitudinal gaps. But our overall findings illustrate that principle-policy gaps and principle-personal gaps in diversity attitudes are fairly substantial and prevalent across Americans who vary by race, politics, and several other individual-level factors. We consider our findings in the current social and political context, and we discuss directions for future inquiry.

Is civic disengagement correlated across institutions? One case of this question is a long-observed “secular voting gap” where religiously unaffiliated Americans are less likely to vote than their affiliated counterparts. This work often uses self-reports or exit polls that cannot measure variation within the unaffiliated. Using an improved measure of validated voter turnout in four presidential election years (2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020), I find estimates of the secular voting gap are attenuated by demographic controls. More importantly, the mechanism that explains this finding is that more frequent church attendance associates with a lower probability of turnout among respondents who are unaffiliated, and results vary by voting method. These results support a theory of civic disengagement as a domain-specific process and demonstrate the substantive value of revisiting classic findings about religion and political behavior amid social change.

Do religious commitments hinder support for gender equality and contribute to the stalled gender revolution as a social problem? Answering this question requires specifying what kinds of religious commitments affect what specific gendered attitudes. Using a cultural approach to the study of religion, we distinguish personal religious commitments (piety and practice) from public religious commitments (preferences for religious order in social life). Using a large national survey, we demonstrate (1) that support for public religious authority has a stronger positive relationship with support for separate gender roles and ambivalent sexism than does personal piety; (2) that these relationships do not hold for gender identity salience; and (3) that support for separate gender roles mediates the relationship between support for public religious order and support for a gender-equitable policy: paid family leave. We argue that public religious commitments in the United States are semi-autonomous from personal religiosity, and we identify one specific public religious repertoire that provides support for a public order based on a binary and complementary understanding of gender.

The meanings and definition of “diversity” can change across different applications and contexts, but many such meanings have implications for racial difference and racial ideology in the United States. We provide a nationally representative analysis of how everyday Americans assess “diversity” in their own communities. We test how county-level racial, religious, economic, and political heterogeneity predict the view that one lives in a highly diverse locale; we also test how individual-level factors predict such a view. Among the four indicators of local difference, racial difference is most strongly and consistently associated with Americans’ assessments of local diversity. Individual-level factors do not weaken this relationship; rather, local context and individual-level factors conjointly predict assessments of local diversity. Despite the flexible, hyperinclusive nature of diversity discourse, local racial difference is salient in Americans’ assessments of “diversity” in their communities, and this pattern is not simply a product of individual-level factors. Our findings illustrate another dimension of the flexible-yet-racialized nature of diversity discourse in the United States. We also show that Americans are particularly aware of racial difference in their locale, which has implications for social and ideological responses to changing communities and a changing nation.

Set against the background of mid-twentieth-century institutional changes analyzed by Jürgen Habermas, we provide an account of new social conditions that compose “the public sphere” in the contemporary United States. First, we review recent developments in theorizing the public sphere, arguing they benefit from renewed attention to institutional changes in how that sphere operates. Second, we identify and summarize three lines of recent sociological research that document a new structural transformation of the contemporary public sphere: (1) civic communication through new media; (2) the professionalization of social movements; and (3) new, hybrid institutions such as think tanks, nonprofit foundations, and other public-private partnerships. Third, we argue that these new formations define a uniquely autonomous, interstitial social field. We conclude by discussing the implications of this synthesis for sociological theories of public life, arguing it can inform more effective study of the social infrastructure of democratic practice.

Sociological theories of symbolic boundaries (understandings of who belongs to in-groups and out-groups) and social boundaries (material stratification) argue both are related, but empirical analyses often focus on one or the other. Using survey data from 2014, we replicate and validate earlier research describing patterns in how Americans draw symbolic boundaries against a range of minority groups. We then go beyond this work by demonstrating a new link between boundary-drawing and attitudes about inequality and civil liberties with material implications. Drawing symbolic boundaries is not a benign practice; rather, it is associated with willingness to draw social boundaries that support material and political inequality.

Many scholars argue that evangelical Christian beliefs and traditions are central to dominant conceptions of American national identity, but most empirical studies in this area focus on the activities and identities of evangelical Christians themselves. Missing is an assessment of how evangelical-infused understandings of national belonging shape the views of people outside the white evangelical subculture. We analyze how Americans of all religious backgrounds evaluate a secularized evangelical discourse (SED) - a repertoire of political statements that are phrased in religiously nonparticularistic terms, but have roots in evangelical Christian history and epistemologies and have been politicized through social movements and party politics. Using latent class analysis and nationally representative survey data, we identify four prevailing profiles of support for claims about public religious expression anchored in this repertoire: ardent opposition, moderate opposition, moderate support, and ardent support. We find that a majority of Americans, not just evangelicals, respond positively to propositions that employ SED. Consequently, we argue that conservative Christianity influences contemporary politics not only by furnishing individuals with beliefs and identities, but also by providing a durable and flexible source of boundaries around a culturally specific vision of national belonging that resonates far beyond the boundaries of the evangelical subculture. © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. All rights reserved.

While some research argues that religious pluralism in the United States dampens conflict by promoting tolerance, other work documents persistent prejudice toward religious out-groups. We address this ambiguity by identifying a distinct cultural style that structures Americans’ attitudes toward religious others: support for public religious expression (PRE). Using data from a recent nationally representative survey, we find a strong and consistent relationship between high support for PRE, negative attitudes toward religious out-groups, and generalized intolerance. Addressing the previously overlooked public aspects of religion and cultural membership in the United States has important implications for studies of civic inclusion.

Across many social contexts, women are found to be more religious than men. Risk preference theory proposes that women are less likely than men to accept the existential risks associated with nonbelief. Building on previous critiques of this theory, we argue that the idea of risk is relevant to understanding the relationship between gender and religiosity if risk is understood not as existential, but as social. The research on existential risk focuses on religious identification as solely a matter of belief; as part of the movement away from this cognitivist bias, we develop the concept of social risk to theorize the ways that social location and differential levels of power and privilege influence women’s nonreligious choices. We show that women’s nonreligious preferences in many ways mirror those of other marginalized groups, including nonwhites and the less educated. We argue that nonreligion is socially risky, that atheism is more socially risky than other forms of nonreligion, and that women and members of other marginalized groups avoid the most socially risky forms of nonreligion.