Ethan Porter’s research while affiliated with George Washington University and other places

Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) posits that people share misinformation online if it promotes gist mental representations, cuing motivationally relevant values. Most people value the truth. Thus, per FTT, people decide to share messages that they perceive as true. FTT also predicts that messages will be more effective if they communicate a simple gist. We test these predictions by examining the roles of mental representation and epistemic quality in decisions to share misinformative articles on Facebook across two experiments and two correlational studies. In Studies 1 and 2, we use Facebook data to test the hypothesis that gist proxies in text are associated with online sharing. In Study 3, we experimentally manipulate subjects’ exposure to a gist-based intervention that explains why a misinformative article is false, a simple debunk stating only that the article is false (but not explaining why) and a verbatim condition providing relevant detailed information but allowing subjects to draw their own conclusions. We found that the gist condition decreased intentions to share misinformation. Finally, in Study 4, we replicated this finding and showed that the gist condition also reduces misinformation endorsement. Results provide support for FTT’s predictions regarding reducing sharing and endorsement of misinformation on social media.

We report results from simultaneous experiments conducted in late 2022 in Belarus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. The experiments focus on correcting misinformation supportive of Russia in the Russia-Ukraine War. Meta-analysis makes clear that correcting misinformation reduces belief in pro-Russian false claims. Effects of corrections are not uniform across countries; our meta-analytic estimate is reliant on belief accuracy increases observed in Russia and Ukraine. While corrections improve belief accuracy, they do not change respondents' attitudes about which side to support in the War. War does not render individuals hopelessly vulnerable to misinformation---but correcting misinformation is unlikely to change their views toward the conflict.

Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT) posits that people share misinformation online if it promotes mentalrepresentations cuing motivationally-relevant values. Most people value the truth. Thus, perFTT, people decide to share messages that they perceive as true. FTT also predicts that messageswill be more effective if they communicate a simple gist. We test these predictions by examiningthe roles of mental representation and epistemic quality in decisions to share misinformativearticles on Facebook across four experiments and two correlational studies. In studies 1 and 2,we use Facebook data to test the hypothesis that gist proxies in text are associated with onlinesharing. In study 3, we experimentally manipulate subjects’ exposure to articles facilitating gistextraction to different degrees, and find distinct indirect effects of epistemic quality judgmentsand gist endorsements on sharing. Study 4 disentangles these mechanisms, manipulating sharingvia a debunk and by changing gist endorsements. In study 5, we developed a gist-basedintervention that explains why a misinformative article is false, which reduced sharing. Finally,in study 6, we replicated this finding, and show that the gist condition also reducesmisinformation endorsement. Results provide support for FTT’s predictions regarding reducingsharing and endorsement of misinformation on social media.

What can be done to reduce misperceptions about COVID-19 vaccines? We present results from experiments conducted simultaneously on YouGov samples in ten countries (N = 10,600), which reveal that factual corrections consistently reduce false belief about the vaccines. Globally, exposure to corrections increases belief accuracy by .16 on a 4-point scale, while exposure to misinformation decreases belief accuracy by .09 on the same scale. Neither misinformation nor factual corrections affect intent-to-vaccinate or vaccine attitudes. We find modest evidence that the effects of fact-checks endure, with 39% of the original correction effect in the direction of greater accuracy still detectable two weeks after initial exposure. These findings illustrate both the possibilities and limitations of factual corrections. Across ten highly diverse populations, exposure to factual information reliably reduces belief in falsehoods about vaccines, but has minimal influence on subsequent behaviors and attitudes.

In American politics, the truth is rapidly losing relevance. The public square is teeming with misinformation, conspiracy theories, cynicism and hubris. Why has this happened? What does it mean? What can we do about it? In this volume, leading scholars offer multiple perspectives on these questions, and others, to provide the first comprehensive empirical examination of the “politics of truth”—its context, causes, and potential correctives. Combining insights from the fields of political science, political theory, communication, and psychology and offering substantial new arguments and evidence, the experts in this volume draw compelling (if sometimes competing) conclusions regarding this rising democratic threat.

Attitudes toward social out-groups can be improved through “analogic perspective-taking,” whereby respondents are encouraged to use an analogy to take the perspective of the group. It is unclear, however, whether analogic perspective-taking can improve attitudes toward political organizations; how perspective-taking fares compared to the provision of narrative alone; and the limits of the attitude changes it creates. We report results from an experiment that tested analogic perspective-taking exercises about members of teachers’ unions. While perspective-taking improves attitudes toward unions, union members, and willingness to pay more in education taxes, it also increases support for some antiunion policies. A second study suggests that the bidirectional policy effects are attributable to subjects’ difficulty distinguishing pro- from antiunion policies. Analogic perspective-taking can improve attitudes toward social and political groups. But narrative exchange is not always superior to narrative provision, and both approaches may yield mixed effects on policy attitudes.