Ethan Bueno’s scientific contributions

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Publications (1)


Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs
  • Article

August 2010

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48 Reads

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18 Citations

American Political Science Association

De Mesquita

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Ethan Bueno

doi:10.1017/S0003055410000274 Istudy how a revolutionary vanguard might use violence to mobilize a mass public. The mechanism is informational—–the vanguard uses violence to manipulate population member’s beliefs about the level of antigovernment sentiment in society. The model has multiple equilibria, one equilibrium in which there may be revolution and another in which there is certain not to be. In the former, structural factors influence expected mobilization, whereas in the latter they do not. Hence, the model is consistent with structural factors influencing the likelihood of revolution in some societies but not others, offering a partial defense of structural accounts from common critiques. The model also challenges standard arguments about the role of revolutionary vanguards. The model is consistent with vanguard violence facilitating mobilization and even sparking spontaneous uprisings. However, it also predicts selection effects—–an active vanguard emerges only in societies that are already coordinated on a participatory equilibrium. Hence, a correlation between vanguard activity and mass mobilization may not constitute evidence for the causal efficacy of vanguards—–be it through creating focal points, providing selective incentives, or communicating information. Imagine a citizen with antiregime feelings who is

Citations (1)


... Whether these individuals engage in dissent depends on whether they believe they have a sufficient threshold to effectively mobilize and impose change from below (De Mesquita 2010;Kuran 1991;Lohmann 1993;Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2011). Given the role of preference falsification in authoritarian politics (Kuran 1991;Lohmann 1993Lohmann , 1994, we expect that citizens who are willing to engage in collective action are more likely willing to engage in future protests. ...

Reference:

Street-level Repression: Protest, Policing, and Dissent in Uganda
Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs
  • Citing Article
  • August 2010

American Political Science Association