Emmy Eklundh’s research while affiliated with Cardiff University and other places

This article presents a methodological argument for examining the affective dimensions of political identity formation, with a pivotal focus on the role of practice. Grounded in a psychoanalytically inspired discourse theory framework, it advocates for expanding research beyond textual sources to investigate the affective investment inherent in political engagement and the process of collective identity formation. Through an examination of two empirical case studies-the Just Stop Oil movement in the United Kingdom and the ascent of Javier Milei in Argentinean politics-the article proposes four principles to study the articulation of political identities through practice: Signifiers are not just words; beyond counting words; policy is central, and fantasy is a cipher. By underscoring fantasy as a critical dimension in identity formation and, suggesting that, by transcending the conventional Schmittian friend/enemy divide, novel avenues for analysing collective identities will surface.

This article presents a methodological argument for examining the affective dimensions of political identity formation, with a pivotal focus on the role of practice . Grounded in a psychoanalytically inspired discourse theory framework, it advocates for expanding research beyond textual sources to investigate the affective investment inherent in political engagement and the process of collective identity formation. Through an examination of two empirical case studies — the Just Stop Oil movement in the United Kingdom and the ascent of Javier Milei in Argentinean politics — the article proposes four principles to study the articulation of political identities through practice: Signifiers are not just words; beyond counting words; policy is central, and fantasy is a cipher. By underscoring fantasy as a critical dimension in identity formation and, suggesting that, by transcending the conventional Schmittian friend/enemy divide, novel avenues for analysing collective identities will surface.

This article analyses how populism is conceptualized and studied in International Relations (IR) and argues that it should be seen as a political logic instead of a political ideology. It does so by demonstrating that ‘populist foreign policy’ looks radically different in analyses of the populist left, refuting the possibility of any distinctly ‘populist’ foreign policy positions. We argue that large parts of IR scholarship practise a form of concept-stretching that undermines the quality of analysis as well as the ability to make meaningful policy recommendations. Using the empirical case-studies of the politician Bernie Sanders in the United States and the political party Podemos in Spain, the article demonstrates that populism does not translate into any shared ideological positions, but is a way of formulating and performing—in these cases—leftist politics through which political actors can interpellate and mobilize different societal groups and demands behind their political projects. In particular, the analysis debunks common assumptions about populism's alleged effects on foreign policy and dangers to pluralist democracy, and shows that populism neither necessarily opposes multilateralism, migration and global public good provision nor formulates an authoritarian claim to power.

From the rise of populist leaders and the threat of democratic backsliding to polarizing culture wars and the return of great power competition, the backlash against the political, economic, and social liberalism is increasingly labeled “illiberal.” Yet, despite the increasing importance of these phenomena, scholars still lack a firm grasp on illiberalism as a conceptual tool for understanding societal transformations. The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism addresses this gap by establishing a theoretical foundation for the study of illiberalism and showcasing state-of-the-art research on this phenomenon in its varied scripts-political, economic, cultural, and geopolitical. Bringing together the expertise of dozens of scholars, The Oxford Handbook of Illiberalism offers a thorough overview that characterizes the current state of the field and charts a path forward for future scholarship on this critical and quickly developing concept.

This article analyzes how populism is conceptualized and studied in International Relations (IR) and argues that it should be seen as a political logic instead of a political ideology. It does so by demonstrating that populist foreign policy looks radically different when analyzing the populist left, refuting the possibility of any distinctly ‘populist’ foreign policy positions. We argue that large parts of IR scholarship practice a form of concept-stretching that undermines the quality of analysis as well as the ability to make meaningful policy recommendations. Using the empirical case studies of Bernie Sanders in the United States and Podemos in Spain, the article demonstrates that populism does not translate into any shared ideological positions but is a way of formulating and performing – in these cases – leftist politics through which political actors can interpellate and mobilize different societal groups and demands behind their political projects. In particular, the analysis debunks common assumptions about populism’s alleged effects on foreign policy and dangers to pluralist democracy and shows that “populism” neither necessarily opposes multilateralism, migration and global public good provision nor formulates an authoritarian claim to power.

This article analyzes how populism is conceptualized and studied in International Relations (IR) and argues that it should be seen as a political logic instead of a political ideology. It does so by demonstrating that populist foreign policy looks radically different when analyzing the populist left, refuting the possibility of any distinctly 'populist' foreign policy positions. We argue that large parts of IR scholarship practice a form of concept-stretching that undermines the quality of analysis as well as the ability to make meaningful policy recommendations. Using the empirical case studies of Bernie Sanders in the United States and Podemos in Spain, the article demonstrates that populism does not translate into any shared ideological positions but is a way of formulating and performing-in these cases-leftist politics through which political actors can interpellate and mobilize different societal groups and demands behind their political projects. In particular, the analysis debunks common assumptions about populism's alleged effects on foreign policy and dangers to pluralist democracy and shows that "populism" neither necessarily opposes multilateralism, migration and global public good provision nor formulates an authoritarian claim to power.

In the wake of the social movement mobilization after the 2008 financial crisis in Spain, many would like to argue that this has given rise to a new wave of left-wing political representation, such as the party Podemos. Left-wing populism is often seen as the natural continuation of protest movements and hailed as reinvigorating democracy by creating new forms of representation for the previously unrepresented. This article argues that the political subjectivity espoused by Podemos hails from a long European tradition built on rationality, masculinity, and nationalism. In opposition, the political subjectivities practiced by the many branches of the 15M provide a more novel critique of the European democratic system. The article questions the claims to democratic innovation by Podemos, and argues that without a closer engagement with how current party practices reinforce different forms of exclusion, the democratic promise of left-wing populism may be weaker than previously thought.

Much attention has been devoted to how right-wing populists in Europe challenge the consensus on the benefits of European integration, but left-wing resistance to the EU is less discussed. Existing analyses tend to distinguish between three constructions of political community: a postnational EU, the populist right invoking national sovereignty, and the populist left invoking popular sovereignty. However, empirical analyses struggle to find consensus on how left populists relate to the EU, and if they invoke claims to national or popular sovereignty. This article argues that this empirical impasse stems from that populism and Euroscepticism are performative categories and not simply analytical tools, and serve to produce exclusion. There are two dichotomies in this exclusionary frame: emotional populists/rational EU, and the postnational EU/nationalist populists. Through an analysis of Podemos in Spain and the UK Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, I show how the lines between the postnational EU, the national sovereign, and the popular sovereign are frailer than previously thought. The article concludes that these categories are less analytically astute than they are politically motivated, and analyses of the populist left in Europe must consider the performative dimension of its key terms.