Emily C. Parke’s research while affiliated with University of Auckland and other places

This paper addresses problems with a defensive turn in discussions of science and Indigenous ways of knowing, being and doing. Philosophers and practitioners of science have focused recent discussions on coarse-grained questions of demarcation, epistemic parity and identity—asking questions such as “Is Indigenous knowledge science?” Using representative examples from Aotearoa New Zealand, we expose rampant ambiguities in these arguments, and show that this combative framing can overlook what is actually at stake. We provide a framework for analyzing these problems and suggest better ways forward.

It is common in origins of life research to view the first stages of life as the passive result of particular environmental conditions. This paper considers the alternative possibility: that the antecedents of life were already actively regulating their environment to maintain the conditions necessary for their own persistence. In support of this proposal, we describe ‘viability-based behaviour’: a way that simple entities can adaptively regulate their environment in response to their health, and in so doing, increase the likelihood of their survival. Drawing on empirical investigations of simple self-preserving abiological systems, we argue that these viability-based behaviours are simple enough to precede neo-Darwinian evolution. We also explain how their operation can reduce the demanding requirements that mainstream theories place upon the environment(s) in which life emerged.

The question “What is life?” has been debated since antiquity and continues to confound scientists and philosophers today. There are more than 100 proposed answers to that question in the literature. Some authors continue to propose new answers, and others argue about whether or not we should just give up. Following several recent contributions to the latter “meta‐debate” about life, this chapter suggests a pluralist approach to characterizing life: multiple characterizations of life can coexist for different but often complementary purposes. After discussing the relevance of characterizing life for origin of life research, this chapter offers a new way to think about the landscape of characterizing life in terms of four conceptual dimensions: (1) treating life as an all‐or‐nothing phenomenon or as a matter of degree and characterizing life (2) materially or functionally, (3) at the individual or community level, and (4) minimally or inclusively. Depending on which agenda is at stake within origin of life research—for example, explaining the actual origin of life on Earth versus explaining how life could, in principle, emerge anywhere at all—the sorts of features we might want in a characterization of life can vary along these four dimensions.

Microbial factors have been implicated in cancer risk, disease progression, treatment and prevention. The key word, however, is “implicated.” Our aim in this paper is to map out some of the tensions between competing methods, goals, and standards of evidence in cancer research with respect to the causal role of microbial factors. We discuss an array of pragmatic and epistemic trade-offs in this research area: prioritizing coarse-grained versus fine-grained explanations of the roles of microbiota in cancer; explaining general versus specific cancer targets; studying model organisms versus human patients; and understanding and explaining cancer versus developing diagnostic tools and treatments. In light of these trade-offs and the distinctive complexity and heterogeneity on both sides of the microbiome-cancer relationship, we suggest that it would be more productive and intellectually honest to frame much of this work, at least currently, in terms of generating causal hypotheses to investigate further. Claims of established causal connections between the microbiome and cancer are in many cases overstated. We also discuss the value of “black boxing” microbial causal variables in this research context and draw some general cautionary lessons for ongoing discussions of microbiomes and cancer.

The global pandemic needs to mark a turning point for the peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand. How can we make sure that our culturally diverse nation charts an equitable and sustainable path through and beyond this new world? In a less affluent future, how can we ensure that all New Zealanders have fair access to opportunities? One challenge is to preserve the sense of common purpose so critical to protecting each other in the face of Covid-19. How can we centre what we have learnt about resilience within Māori and wider Pacific communities in our reforms? How can public understanding of Covid-19 science create a platform for the future social valuing of expertise? How can we ensure that the impact of Covid-19 in New Zealand results in a more sustainable, and inclusive workforce – for instance by expanding our perceptions of the value of our workers through promoting digital inclusion? To meet these challenges, we must reimagine our existing traditions of thought, breathing new life into perennial concepts and debates. Our paper indicates some of the ways that Philosophy is central to this collective reimagining, highlighting solutions to be found across our rich philosophical traditions.

Discussions of microbiome research increasingly refer to the microbiome’s impact on ‘what it means to be human’. These claims are rarely carefully explained or justified. Given the increasing importance of microbiome research across the life sciences, philosophy and the public sphere, it is worth exercising more care in these discussions. This paper offers a guide for doing so. There are many different ways to interpret the details of ambiguous claims about the microbiome and ‘what it means to be human’. I discuss some possible interpretations, and show how the resulting claims can range from trivial, to suggestive of interesting research, to controversial and overhyped. I recommend greater caution and clarity in ongoing discussions of microbiome research and its implications.

The question ‘What is life?’ has been debated since antiquity, and continues to confound scientists and philosophers today. There are over 100 proposed answers to that question in the literature. Some authors continue to propose new answers, and others argue about whether or not we should just give up. Following several recent contributions to the latter ‘meta-debate’ about life, this chapter suggests a pluralist approach to characterizing life: multiple characterizations of life can co-exist, for different but often complementary purposes. After discussing the relevance of characterizing life for origin of life research, this chapter offers a new way to think about the landscape of characterizing life in terms of four conceptual dimensions: (1) treating life as an all-or-nothing phenomenon or as a matter of degree, and characterizing life (2) materially or functionally, (3) at the individual or community level, and (4) minimally or inclusively. Depending on which agenda is at stake within origin of life research—for example, explaining the actual origin of life on Earth, versus explaining how life could, in principle, emerge anywhere at all—the sorts of features we might want in a characterization of life can vary along these four dimensions.

This chapter argues that the concept of “life” is used in several rather distinct ways: sometimes as an all-or-nothing phenomenon and other times as a matter of degree; sometimes referring to individual organisms and other times to communities; sometimes based on specific chemistries and other times on functions. In contrast to biologists in general, astrobiologists cannot take the status of their subject matter as living or nonliving for granted. There are at least two reasons to think astrobiologists need an understanding of what counts as life. The first is to set search criteria for finding “life as we don’t know it” in the universe. The second is to set success conditions conducive to agreement about when life has been found and when it has not. In addition to particular cases like the recent Mars finding by NASA, the meaning of “life” figures into a broader agenda in astrobiology: looking for biosignatures.