Emil Aslan Souleimanov’s research while affiliated with Charles University in Prague and other places

As an embedded sociocultural code, blood revenge is present in many societies where civil wars occur. Whereas evidence from other social sciences attests to its enduring global significance, security studies scholarship has largely neglected the custom of blood revenge. This article is the first to investigate its relevance for understanding the inception, dynamics, and aftermath of armed conflicts, and to present a comprehensive account of how blood revenge may shape civil wars. Drawing upon multidisciplinary scholarship, cross-case qualitative evidence, and a newly compiled dataset, this proof-of-concept article illustrates how blood revenge influences key dynamics in civil wars—specifically, the processes of violent mobilization, target selection, recruitment, defection, and disengagement. Setting the stage for further inquiries into the causes, mechanisms, and consequences of blood revenge in civil war, this conceptual article suggests why and how this sociocultural code continues to influence civil wars across the world.

Why do some countries harbor pro-government militias (PGMs), while others do not? We assert that the deployment of PGMs depends on topographic, social, and political structures within which governments and rebels operate. Drawing on the concept of opportunity structures, we postulate that structural conditions within which governments are embedded in constitute a contributing factor to the existence and multiplicity of PGMs. Data from the Pro-Government Militia Dataset along with a two-stage hurdle model reveal that personalist regime type and civil wars increase the likelihood of PGM emergence. In contrast, ethnic fractionalization, onshore oil fields, drug production, number of rebel groups, and military prowess influence the number of PGMs.

Drawing on original interviews with ex-insurgents and eyewitnesses of the Second Chechen War (1999–2009), this article develops a theory of “kin killing,” defined as the use of lethal violence against insurgents’ relatives as a deliberate counterinsurgency tactic. Family-based targeting works by coercing insurgents to surrender or defect, deterring insurgents’ relatives from retaliation, and discouraging prospective recruits from joining or supporting insurgents. Because it targets a small number of individuals who have strong ties to insurgents, kin killing is the most selective form of collective violence. The tactic is most likely to be used by illiberal regimes that know the identity of the insurgents, but not their location, and operate in traditional societies with large, tightly knit families. Most would consider kin killing—and its nonlethal counterpart, kin targeting—ethically reprehensible, but numerous countries have employed it with varying degrees of success, including Russia, the United Kingdom, and China. Militarily dominant regimes who employ kin killing can turn family members from force multipliers into pressure points for insurgents, as regimes “flip the network” and make restraint, rather than revenge, the best way to protect one’s family.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, political commentators and students of international relations alike have been puzzled by an increasingly cordial relationship between Israel and Azerbaijan, a Muslim‐majority republic in the South Caucasus. Indeed, the unfolding alliance of the Jewish state and a tiny, energy‐rich, post‐Soviet country sandwiched between Iran and Russia has been by many seen as an anomaly. Particularly puzzled have been constructivists and adepts of geopolitics for whom the shared Shiite identity of Azerbaijan and Iran pre‐ordained a close relationship. In reality, Tehran's suspicions of Azerbaijan's economic rise, coupled with concerns over pan‐Turkic sentiments spread through Iran's northwest, and Iran's own imperial nostalgia have exacerbated an adversarial relationship. Against this backdrop, Azerbaijan's efforts to counterbalance those of Iran and Russia in the Caspian‐South Caucasus region have brought Baku to forge closer ties with Israel.

Drawing on original interviews with ex-insurgents and eyewitnesses of the Second Chechen War (1999-2009), this article develops a theory of “kin killing,” defined as the use of lethal violence against the relatives of insurgents as a deliberate counterinsurgency tactic. Family-based targeting works by coercing insurgents to surrender or defect, deterring insurgents’ relatives from retaliation, and discouraging prospective recruits from joining or supporting insurgents. Because it targets a small number of individuals who have strong ties to insurgents, kin killing is the most selective form of collective violence. The tactic is most likely to be used by illiberal regimes that know the identity of the insurgents, but not their location, and operate in traditional societies with large, tightly knit families. Most would consider kin killing—and its non-lethal counterpart, kin targeting—ethically reprehensible, but numerous countries have employed it with varying degrees of success, including Russia, the United Kingdom, and China. Militarily dominant regimes who employ kin killing can turn family members from force multipliers into pressure points for insurgents, as regimes “flip the network” and make restraint, rather than revenge, the best way to protect the family.

The literature on delegated rebellion has treated principals (external states) and their agents (rebel groups) as the main factors in the inception of rebellion. Intriguingly, no attention has been paid to subnational elites as a separate, third actor. This article takes a novel perspective on delegated rebellion by ascribing agency to subnational elites. It introduces the theoretical concept of strategic entrapment, which shows that even subnational elites unwilling to follow the path of rebel violence may be trapped between the incipient rebel groups and a principal. As a result, subnational elites are sidelined and replaced by the principal’s rebel proxies.