Ellen M. Markman’s research while affiliated with Stanford University and other places

How we reason about objectivity—whether an assertion has a ground truth—has implications for belief formation on wide-ranging topics. For example, if someone perceives climate change to be a matter of subjective opinion similar to the best movie genre, they may consider empirical claims about climate change as mere opinion and irrelevant to their beliefs. Here, we investigate whether the language employed by journalists might influence the perceived objectivity of news claims. Specifically, we ask whether factive verb framing (e.g., "Scientists know climate change is happening") increases perceived objectivity compared to nonfactive framing (e.g., "Scientists believe [...]"). Across eight studies (N = 2,785), participants read news headlines about unique, noncontroversial topics (studies 1a–b, 2a–b) or a familiar, controversial topic (climate change; studies 3a–b, 4a–b) and rated the truth and objectivity of the headlines’ claims. Across all eight studies, when claims were presented as beliefs (e.g., “Tortoise breeders believe tortoises are becoming more popular pets”), people consistently judged those claims as more subjective than claims presented as knowledge (e.g., “Tortoise breeders know…”), as well as claims presented as unattributed generics (e.g., “Tortoises are becoming more popular pets”). Surprisingly, verb framing had relatively little, inconsistent influence over participants’ judgments of the truth of claims. These results demonstrate how, apart from shaping whether we believe a claim is true or false, epistemic language in media can influence whether we believe a claim has an objective answer at all.

Across development, young children reason about why social inequities exist. However, when left to their own devices, young children might engage in internal thinking, reasoning that the inequity is simply a justified disparity explained by features internal to social groups (e.g., genetics, intellect, abilities, values). Internal thinking could lead them to support and reinforce the inequity (e.g., by blaming the disadvantaged). In contrast, structural thinking, which appeals to relatively stable features external to social groups (e.g., environments, policies, economic systems), could lead to more prosocial outcomes (e.g., support for social interventions). While researchers have examined adolescents' and adults' structural thinking about social inequities, in this article, we review recent research that suggests that even children as young as 5 can engage in structural thinking. We conclude with suggestions for future studies, particularly research related to how to foster young children's structural thinking in the context of real‐world social inequities.

Much of the richness of human thought is supported by people's intuitive theories-mental frameworks capturing the perceived structure of the world. But intuitive theories can also contain and reinforce dangerous misconceptions. In this paper, we take up the case of misconceptions about vaccine safety that discourages vaccination. These misconceptions constitute a major public health risk that predates the coronavirus pandemic but that has become all the more dire in recent years. We argue that addressing such misconceptions requires awareness of the broader conceptual contexts in which they are embedded. To build this understanding, we examined the structure and revision of people's intuitive theories of vaccination in five large survey studies (total N = 3,196). Based on these data, we present a cognitive model of the intuitive theory surrounding people's decisions about whether to vaccinate young children against diseases like measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR). Using this model, we were able to make accurate predictions about how people's beliefs would be revised in light of educational interventions, design an effective new intervention encouraging vaccination, and understand how these beliefs were affected by real-world events (the measles outbreaks of 2019). In addition to presenting a promising way forward for promoting the MMR vaccine, this approach has clear implications for encouraging the uptake of COVID-19 vaccines, especially among parents of young children. At the same time, this work provides the foundation for richer understandings of intuitive theories and belief revision more broadly. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Much of the richness of human thought is supported by people’s intuitive theories---mental frameworks capturing the perceived structure of the world. But intuitive theories can also contain and reinforce dangerous misconceptions. In this paper, we take up the case of misconceptions about vaccine safety that discourage vaccination. These misconceptions constitute a major public health risk that predates the coronavirus pandemic but that has become all the more dire in recent years. We argue that addressing such misconceptions requires awareness of the broader conceptual contexts in which they are embedded. To build this understanding, we examined the structure and revision of people’s intuitive theories of vaccination in five large survey studies (total N = 3196). Based on these data, we present a cognitive model of the intuitive theory surrounding people’s decisions about whether to vaccinate young children against diseases like measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR). Using this model, we were able to make accurate predictions about how people’s beliefs would be revised in light of educational interventions, design an effective new intervention encouraging vaccination, and understand how these beliefs were affected by real-world events (the measles outbreaks of 2019). In addition to presenting a promising way forward for promoting the MMR vaccine, this approach has clear implications for encouraging the uptake of COVID-19 vaccines, especially among parents of young children. At the same time, this work provides the foundation for richer understandings of intuitive theories and belief revision more broadly.

Much of the richness of human thought is supported by people’s intuitive theories---mental frameworks capturing the perceived structure of the world. But intuitive theories can also contain and reinforce dangerous misconceptions. In this paper, we take up the case of misconceptions about vaccine safety that discourage vaccination. These misconceptions constitute a major public health risk that predates the coronavirus pandemic but that has become all the more dire in recent years. We argue that addressing such misconceptions requires awareness of the broader conceptual contexts in which they are embedded. To build this understanding, we examined the structure and revision of people’s intuitive theories of vaccination in five large survey studies (total N = 3196). Based on these data, we present a cognitive model of the intuitive theory surrounding people’s decisions about whether to vaccinate young children against diseases like measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR). Using this model, we were able to make accurate predictions about how people’s beliefs would be revised in light of educational interventions, design an effective new intervention encouraging vaccination, and understand how these beliefs were affected by real-world events (the measles outbreaks of 2019). In addition to presenting a promising way forward for promoting the MMR vaccine, this approach has clear implications for encouraging the uptake of COVID-19 vaccines, especially among parents of young children. At the same time, this work provides the foundation for richer understandings of intuitive theories and belief revision more broadly.

Seminal work by Knobe, Prasada, and Newman (2013) distinguished a set of concepts, which they named "dual-character concepts." Unlike traditional concepts, they require two distinct criteria for determining category membership. For example, the prototypical dual-character concept "artist" has both a concrete dimension of artistic skills, and an abstract dimension of aesthetic sensibility and values. Therefore, someone can be a good artist on the concrete dimension but not truly an artist on the abstract dimension. Does this analysis capture people's understanding of cornerstone social categories, such as gender, around which society and everyday life have traditionally been organized? Gender, too, may be conceived as having not only a concrete dimension but also a distinct dimension of abstract norms and values. As with dual-character concepts, violations of abstract norms and values may result in someone being judged as not truly a man/woman. Here, we provide the first empirical assessment of applying the dual-character framework to people's conception of gender. We found that, on some measures that primarily relied on metalinguistic cues, gender concepts did indeed resemble dual-character concepts. However, on other measures that depicted transgressions of traditional gender norms, neither "man" nor "woman" appeared dual-character-like, in that participants did not disqualify people from being truly a man or truly a woman. In a series of follow-up studies, we examined whether moral norms have come to replace gender role norms for the abstract dimension. Implications for the evolution of concepts and categories are explored.

How do children learn gender stereotypes? Although people commonly use statements like "Girls are as good as boys at math" to express gender equality, such subject-complement statements subtly perpetuate the stereotype that boys are naturally more skilled. The syntax of such statements frames the item in the complement position (here, boys) as the standard for comparison or reference point. Thus, when the statement concerns ability, listeners infer that this item is naturally more skilled than the item in the subject position (here, girls). In 2 experiments, we ask whether subject-complement statements could not only reinforce preexisting gender stereotypes, but also teach them. The participants were 288 adults (51% women, 49% men) and 337 children ages 7 to 11 (50% girls, 50% boys; of the 62% who reported race, 44% self-declared as White; from primarily middle-class to upper middle-class families). Participants were provided with subject-complement statements about either novel abilities (e.g., "Girls are as good as boys at trewting") or nonstereotyped activities (e.g., "Boys are as good as girls at snapping"). Both adults and children inferred that the gender in the complement position was naturally more skilled than the gender in the subject position. Using subject-complement statements to express gender equality (e.g., "Girls are as good as boys at math") could thus backfire and teach children that boys have more natural ability. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Paltering is a form of deception whereby true statements are used to mislead and is widely employed in negotiations, marketing, espionage, and ordinary communications where speakers hold ulterior motives. We argue that paltering is accomplished through strategic violations of communicative norms such as the Gricean cooperative principles of relevance, quantity, quality and manner. We further argue that, just as genuine paltering deceives by deliberately violating communicative norms, inadvertent violations of these norms may be just as misleading. In this work, we demonstrated that educational information presented prominently on the American Diabetes Association website violated the Gricean communicative principles and disrupted readers’ performance on a test of diabetes knowledge. To establish the effects of these communicative violations, we revised the ADA's information to preserve the original content while better adhering to pragmatic principles. When these ADA explanations were judiciously revised to minimize pragmatic violations, they were transformed from misleading to educational.

Despite the numerous positive benefits of consuming nutritious food, American breakfasts are notoriously unhealthy. Recent research with U.S. adults found that the resistance to include nutritious foods at breakfast is due in part to misconceptions about what “breakfast” should be. Here, we assessed the development of these misconceptions in 4- and 5-year-old children. Similar to American adults, U.S. children perceive typical breakfast foods as especially appropriate for breakfast and believe that alternatives typically consumed at lunch or dinner are less suitable for breakfast. This leads them to be unwilling to add nutritious alternatives to their breakfast repertoire. Unlike U.S. children, Chinese children are not as likely to hold these mistaken beliefs and are more motivated to try healthy alternatives at breakfast. Our findings cast light on the developmental roots of Americans’ tendency to consume unhealthy breakfasts and have implications for interventions to boost healthy eating behaviors from early on.