Ehud Lamm’s research while affiliated with Tel Aviv University and other places

This paper examines ways in which cultural evolution theory can treat collective knowledge in human evolution, focusing on how collective knowledge complements high-fidelity copying. We distinguish between two schematic aspects of high-fidelity copying: (1) that cultural learning consists of transmission between individuals, and (2) that cumulative culture requires high-fidelity copying or imitation. After discussing these aspects and reviewing suggestions regarding the need to adapt them, we consider approaches to cultural adaptation that address the first aspect and go beyond high-fidelity copying-based social learning; in particular the notion of Distributed Adaptation (DA), in which knowledge is stored at the group level. We argue that DAs are a subset of collective knowledge phenomena, that they may take part in cumulative culture, and that high-fidelity copying is neither necessary nor sufficient for DA. Finally, we briefly discuss what collective knowledge adds to existing ideas on human evolution and the research avenues that it opens. We show that attention to collective knowledge affects the kinds of cognitive functions that are considered, specifically that it highlights cognitive functions that promote aggregation of information, and that it has the potential to affect the hypotheses about the timing and trajectory of human cultural evolution that are entertained.

Decision making is a fundamental aspect of cognition that lies at the heart of theories about behaviour, learning, and mental processing. It spans multiple levels of complexity, from high-level planning to low-level movement control and perceptual recognition. Tracking the evolutionary trajectory of this elementary cognitive process can illuminate the foundations of behaviour and brain functions. This paper highlights a previously understudied defining feature of decision mechanisms: the ways in which mutual exclusion between alternatives is achieved. We argue that any decision is defined by a set of mutually exclusive alternatives, and this exclusivity – rather than the specific identity of the alternatives – requires specialized mechanisms. We demonstrate how the physical body of simple decision-making entities can serve as such a mechanism, and that the detachment of these mechanisms from bodily and environmental constraints enabled complex decision-making. Furthermore, while many theories emphasize how the evolution of neural circuits enhanced integration and control through associative structures, we propose that the evolution of mutual exclusion requires non-associative constructions. We conclude that understanding the evolution of these mechanisms is crucial for studying cognitive evolution, and we propose a potential evolutionary trajectory.

Binz et al. highlight the potential of meta-learning to greatly enhance the flexibility of AI algorithms, as well as to approximate human behavior more accurately than traditional learning methods. We wish to emphasize a basic problem that lies underneath these two objectives, and in turn suggest another perspective of the required notion of “meta” in meta-learning: knowing what to learn.

Heyes presents a compelling account of how cultural evolutionary processes shape and create “rules,” or norms, of social behavior. She suggested that normativity depends on implicit, genetically inherited, domain-general processes and explicit, culturally inherited, domain-specific processes. Her approach challenges the nativist point of view and provides supporting evidence that shows how social interactions are responsible for creating mental processes that assist in understanding and behaving according to rules or norms. We agree. In our commentary, we suggest that it is not only that mental processes for grasping norms are recreated in each generation but also that social interactions shape the kinds of social groups that are recognized (for a more extensive discussion, see Kish Bar-On & Lamm, 2023). We highlight evidence showing that accounts of norm psychology thus require a richer notion of human groups.

Since the ENCODE project published its final results in a series of articles in 2012, there is no consensus on what its implications are. ENCODE's central and most controversial claim was that there is essentially no junk DNA: most sections of the human genome believed to be «junk» are functional. This claim was met with many reservations. If researchers disagree about whether there is junk DNA, they have first to agree on a concept of function and how function, given a particular definition, can be discovered. The ENCODE debate centered on a notion of function that assumes a strong dichotomy between evolutionary and non-evolutionary function and causes, prevalent in the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis. In contrast to how the debate is typically portrayed, both sides share a commitment to this distinction. This distinction is, however, much debated in alternative approaches to evolutionary theory, such as the EES. We show that because the ENCODE debate is grounded in a particular notion of function, it is unclear how it connects to broader debates about what is the correct evolutionary framework. Furthermore, we show how arguments brought forward in the controversy, particularly arguments from mathematical population genetics, are deeply embedded in their particular disciplinary contexts, and reflect substantive assumptions about the evolution of genomes. With this article, we aim to provide an anatomy of the ENCODE debate that offers a new perspective on the notions of function both sides employed, as well as to situate the ENCODE debate within wider debates regarding the forces operating in evolution.

Human societies are no doubt complex. They are characterized by division of labour, multiple hierarchies, intricate communication networks and transport systems. These phenomena and others have led scholars to propose that human society may be, or may become, a new hierarchical level that may dominate the individual humans within it, similar to the relations between an organism and its cells, or an ant colony and its members. Recent discussions of the possibility of this major evolutionary transition in individuality (ETI) raise interesting and controversial questions that are explored in the present issue from four different complementary perspectives. (i) The general theory of ETIs. (ii) The unique aspects of cultural evolution. (iii) The evolutionary history and pre-history of humans. (iv) Specific routes of a possible human ETI. Each perspective uses different tools provided by different disciplines: biology, anthropology, cultural evolution, systems theory, psychology, economy, linguistics and philosophy of science. Altogether, this issue provides a broad and rich application of the notion of ETI to human past, present and perhaps also future evolution. It presents important case studies, new theoretical results and novel questions for future research. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Human socio-cultural evolution in light of evolutionary transitions’.

Distributed adaptations are cases in which adaptation is dependent on the population as a whole: the adaptation is conferred by a structural or compositional aspect of the population; the adaptively relevant information cannot be reduced to information possessed by a single individual. Possible examples of human-distributed adaptations are song lines, traditions, trail systems, game drive lanes and systems of water collection and irrigation. Here we discuss the possible role of distributed adaptations in human cultural macro-evolution. Several kinds of human-distributed adaptations are presented, and their evolutionary implications are highlighted. In particular, we discuss the implications of population size, density and bottlenecks on the distributed adaptations that a population may possess and how they in turn would affect the population's resilience to ecological change. We discuss the implications that distributed adaptations may have for human collective action and the possibility that they played a role in colonization of new areas and niches, in seasonal migration, and in setting constraints for minimal inter-population connectivity. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Human socio-cultural evolution in light of evolutionary transitions’.

People's attitudes towards social norms play a crucial role in understanding group behaviour. Norm psychology accounts focus on processes of norm internalization that influence people's norm-following attitudes but pay considerably less attention to social identity and group identification processes. Social identity theory in contrast studies group identity but works with a relatively thin and instrumental notion of social norms. We argue that to best understand both sets of phenomena, it is important to integrate the insights of both approaches. Social status, social identity and social norms are considered separate phenomena in evolutionary accounts. We discuss assumptions and views that support this separation, and suggest an integrated view of our own. We argue that we should be open to the early origins of human social complexity, and conjecture that the longer that the human social world involved multi-level societies the more probable it is that norm psychology and social identity interacted in rich ways. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Human socio-cultural evolution in light of evolutionary transitions’.