Eduardo C. Rodes’s research while affiliated with Autonomous University of Barcelona and other places

Theoretical debate suggests at least three strategies for firms to provide training to employees in the same job position: individualized and egalitarian with or without adaptation to the abilities of the recruited employees. The article provides a formal framework for deriving distinctive empirical implications regarding the relationship of these strategies with the firms’ selection policies, which are tested using a dataset of blue-collar workers in Spanish industrial plants. The evidence is consistent with the empirical implications of the egalitarian strategy with adaptation. This strategy entails providing the same level of training to all workers in the same job position and setting this level according to the average ability of recruited workers. Paradoxically, this strategy has not been used to interpret the results of the existing empirical literature. JEL CLASSIFICATION M53; M54; M21; J24

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of an under-explored consequence of granting autonomy to workers: monitoring. In the principal-agent model that we develop, granting autonomy allows workers to carry out innovative tasks in the workplace. Given that innovative tasks are more difficult to monitor, the model predicts a positive relationship between autonomy and monitoring. Relying on information about blue-collar workers coming from a dataset of Spanish industrial plants, we provide strong support for this prediction.

This paper examines the influence of working through temporary help agencies (know as Empresas de Trabajo Temporal, ETT) on individuals' employment opportunities. Based on the theory of labor market signalling we explain why ETT workers will enjoy better opportunities of achieving permanent contracts than those who are looking for a job without the aid of those intermediaries. This prediction is confirmed for the Spanish labor market when the self-selection bias arising from the individual's decision of whether to work or not for an ETT is controlled for. The analysis is tackled with a database containing Social Security records of two groups of workers, one of which has been employed through ETT. These results are consistent with the idea that workers who have been employed through those intermediaries are providing a positive signal to potential employers. The accumulated experience with temporary jobs through the intermediary would, the, be perceived as an indicator of good performance and productivity in the future Este artículo estudia la influencia que presentan las experiencias de empleo por medio de Empresas de Trabajo Temporal (ETT) sobre las carreras laborales de los trabajadores. Basándonos en la teoría de la señalización explicamos por qué los contratados por ETT disfrutarán de mejores posibilidades al alcanzar contratos de carácter indefinido en comparación con aquellos que no acuden a estos intemediarios. Esta predicción se confirma para el mercado de trabajo español cuando se tiene en cuenta la endogeneidad en torno a la decisión del individuo de recurrir o no a las ETT para buscar empleo. El análisis se realiza utilizando los registros de la Seguridad Social de dos grupos de individuos, uno de los cuales ha sido contratado por ETT. Los resultados obtenidos son consistentes con el papel de las ETT como mecanismos de señalización de la "calidad" de sus trabajadores. Los potenciales empleadores perciben la experiencia acumulada por los empleados a través de estas agencias en sucesivas cesiones como un indicador de su buena productividad y rendimientos futuros