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In the last part of the 20th century antitrust was transformed from an internally conflicted regula-tory regime into a coherent one. Whereas thirty years ago there was no consensus on the ends that antitrust law should serve, today most agree that antitrust should aim to promote long-run con-sumer welfare. Conflicting goals—such as protecting small producers from the competition of larg-er, more-efficient firms, or keeping industries unconcentrated as a means of nurturing democratic values—are no longer taken seriously as appropriate aims of antitrust. of Chicago Law School taught generations of students (including Bork) that competitive forces are astonishingly robust. His outside-of-the-box (or, more precisely, outside-of-the-textbook) analyses of facts and institutions made clear two vital features of reality. First, actual methods of competition are enormously varied; they are far greater, and more creative, than those few methods depicted in textbooks. Second, competition is no fragile flower but, rather, a sturdy oak that finds sustenance in places and in ways unimaginable to professors, judges, politicians, and bureaucrats. Director's triumph was sealed with the 1978 publication of Bork's The Antitrust Paradox, which brilliantly applied Director's lessons to all major areas of antitrust policy. The impact of Bork's book was enhanced by the publication, two years earlier, of a more subdued and more tightly reasoned book: Posner's Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective. Though shar-ing Bork's dissatisfaction with the reigning antitrust jurisprudence, Posner seemed less exasperat-ed than Bork with the policy. The tone and the careful, constructive attention to detail that infused Posner's book indicated that he didn't see antitrust law as quite the mess that Bork thought it was. Bork wrote an exposé of the foolishness that motivated so many antitrust decisions during the first three-quarters of the 20th century; Posner patiently identified the various costs and benefits that should be considered by officials aiming to use antitrust to promote competition. Posner more than Bork carefully explained the types of economic theory and evidence that should guide the application of antitrust law. Although Bork never called for the outright repeal of antitrust legislation, his book persuaded many that a drastic shrinkage of the scope of antitrust was needed. No such radical spirit animated Posner's book. Posner endorsed (and continues, in the sec-ond edition, to endorse) significant changes in antitrust practice, such as aligning states' authority to bring antitrust suits with that of private plaintiffs. But he seems genuinely to believe in the neces-sity and promise of antitrust grounded in sound, Chicago economics.