Dimiter Toshkov’s research while affiliated with Leiden University and other places

This article studies the impact of immigration from Central and Eastern Europe on support for Eurosceptic parties. The analysis covers 30 national and European Parliament elections in seven Western, Northern and Southern European countries (2004 to 2019). For each election, I analyse how the local-level share of the vote for right- and left-wing Eurosceptic parties varies as a function of the levels and changes in the local-level share of Central and Eastern European immigrants from the population, controlling for the influence of relevant demographic, social and economic variables. I find that higher levels of immigration from Central and Eastern Europe are systematically related to higher voting shares cast for right-wing Eurosceptic parties at the local level in all of these countries, net of the influence of non-Western immigration, in elections for the European Parliament and in national elections as well. The effects on left-wing Euroscepticism are heterogeneous: positive in the Netherlands, Austria and Portugal, but negative in Italy, Denmark and Sweden. The effects have not diminished significantly over the past 15 years and are most visible in mid-sized localities.

Governments often face social protests contesting their policies and reform plans. In liberal democracies, governments are expected to listen to and consider the demands of the protesters. But in reality, there is often a trade-off between accommodating protesters and enacting timely and effective policies. We study the preferences of citizens for government actions in the context of significant social protests – from canceling and delaying the policies to pushing through with the reforms ignoring protesters to banning protests altogether. To do that, we conduct a survey experiment in the Netherlands in which we manipulate the level of government enacting reforms contested by social protests and whether the reforms are supported or opposed by a majority of the citizens. We also measure whether respondents agree with the substance of the reforms and their trust in government. The results indicate that people are more likely to support governments pushing through with reforms and ignoring social protests when the reforms enjoy majority support and respondents agree with the direction of the reform proposal. Trust in government has a similar effect, but the level of government does not matter. There is very little support for banning protests altogether, and none of the factors we consider predict this attitude. These findings suggest that – even in well-established democracies – citizens’ views on whether governments should listen to, rather than ignore, social protests are contingent on the policy content of the contested government reforms and the existence of majority support for such reforms in society; hence, on a mixture of instrumental and principled reasons, with the principle reflecting a majoritarian view of democracy.

While the increasing relevance of political polarization for the well-established multi-party democracies of Western Europe is recognized, we still know relatively little about how the different dimensions of polarization interact in this setting. We focus on the question whether policy attitudes contribute to affective polarization beyond the effects of ideological positions, partisanship and perceptions of polarization levels. To study this question, we run a comprehensive survey of public policy attitudes and political polarization on a quota-representative sample of public opinion in South Holland in the Netherlands. The results provide strong evidence that people having divergent policy preferences are much more likely to show affective polarization towards parties and voters, on top of what ideology and party affiliation predict. Conversely, policy priority incongruence does not have the hypothesized association. While, on average, levels of affective polarization in the Netherlands are relatively low, perceptions of big and increasing polarization are widely shared and significantly associated with affect.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0282308.].

While there is a large literature studying the determinants of public support for European integration, we know much less about the factors shaping attitudes towards various international cooperation initiatives. In this article, we study the possible influence of framing, a mechanism linking pre-existing values and causal beliefs, on preferences for cooperation with the EU. We develop six thematic frames related to the context of international cooperation: economic benefits, security, shared identity, traditional and liberal values, and rules and norms of governance. We test the effects of these frames using a survey experiment conducted in three countries in Eastern Europe—Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine—that are targeted by the integration projects of both the EU and Russia. We find that thematic framing has only small effects on international cooperation preferences: priming liberal values and governance increases slightly support for cooperation with the EU, but the effects of the remaining frames are too small and heterogeneous to be estimated precisely with our sample. Contrary to expectations, some of these effects are exercised by changing the relevant causal beliefs of citizens, even if the thematic frames were not designed to do so.

Background Women have been significantly more likely than men to express hesitancy toward COVID-19 vaccination and, to a lesser extent, to refuse vaccination altogether. This gender gap is puzzling because women have been more likely to perceive higher risks from COVID-19, to approve more restrictive measures to fight the pandemic and to be more compliant with such measures. Methods This article studies the gender gap in COVID-19 vaccination attitudes using two nationally representative surveys of public opinion fielded in February 2021 and May 2021 in 27 European countries. The data are analyzed using generalized additive models and multivariate logistic regression. Results The data analyses show that hypotheses about (i) pregnancy, fertility and breastfeeding concerns, (ii) higher trust in Internet and social networks as sources of medical information, (iii) lower trust in health authorities and (iv) lower perceived risks of getting infected with COVID-19 cannot account for the gender gap in vaccine hesitancy. One explanation that receives support from the data is that women are more likely to believe that COVID-19 vaccines are unsafe and ineffective and this leads them to perceive the net benefits of vaccination as lower than the associated risks. Conclusions The gender gap in COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy results to a large extent from women perceiving higher risks than benefits of the vaccines. While accounting for this and other factors decreases the gap in vaccine hesitancy, it does not eliminate it completely, which suggests further research is needed.

In the wake of mass COVID-19 vaccination campaigns in 2021, significant differences in vaccine skepticism emerged across Europe, with Eastern European countries in particular facing very high levels of vaccine hesitancy and refusal. This study investigates the determinants of COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy and refusal, with a focus on these differences across Eastern, Southern and Western Europe. The statistical analyses are based on individual-level survey data comprising quota-based representative samples from 27 European countries from May 2021. The study finds that demographic variables have complex associations with vaccine hesitancy and refusal. The relationships with age and education are non-linear. Trust in different sources of health-related information has significant associations as well, with people who trust the Internet, social networks and 'people around' in particular being much more likely to express vaccine skepticism. Beliefs in the safety and effectiveness of vaccines have large predictive power. Importantly, this study shows that the associations of demographic, belief-related and other individual-level factors with vaccine hesitancy and refusal are context-specific. Yet, explanations of the differences in vaccine hesitancy across Eastern, Southern and Eastern Europe need to focus on why levels of trust and vaccine-relevant beliefs differ across regions, because the effects of these variables appear to be similar. It is the much higher prevalence of factors such as distrust of national governments and medical processionals as sources of relevant medical information in Eastern Europe that are relevant for explaining the higher levels of vaccine skepticism observed in that region.