Diane Carmeliza N. Cuaresma’s research while affiliated with Shizuoka University and other places

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Publications (5)


The extinction probability P and the critical fertility bcr
(A) P versus fertility b (r=0.5), (B) P versus sex ratio r (mm=mf=0), (C) Optimal sex ratio r versus fertility b, and (D) bcr versus r for mm,mf=0,0,0.1,0,0,0.1 and. 0.1,0.1.
The population with subcritical fertility goes extinct except for a few exceptions that keep growing
(A, B) r=0.5,b=2.1, (C, D) r=0.5,b=2.05. Among 100 independent replicates, only six runs in (A, B) and one run in (C, D) survive to grow. (mm=mf=0, 100 trajectories overlapped).
The ratio of extinct populations is plotted against generation number
(A) b=1.7,1.9,2.1 and 2.3, and (B) r=0.4 and 0.5 for b=2.1. For a subcritical fertility (b<bcr≃2.7), most populations do not survive a few generations. (mm=mf=0, 10,000 replications).
The histogram of survived generations for the population with subcritical fertility
(A) b=1.5, and (B) b=2.1. (r=0.5,mm=mf=010,000 replications).
Threshold fertility for the avoidance of extinction under critical conditions
  • Article
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April 2025

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31 Reads

Diane Carmeliza N. Cuaresma

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The developed countries now face a low fertility crisis. The replacement level fertility (RLF) is conventionally considered to be 2.1 children per woman, in which demographic stochasticity arising from random variations in individual offspring numbers is ignored. However, the importance of demographic stochasticity casts doubts on the adequacy of the replacement level fertility of 2.1, especially in a small population. Here, we investigate the extinction threshold for the fertility rate of a sexually reproducing population caused by demographic stochasticity. The results indicate that the fertility rate should exceed 2.7 to avoid extinction. The extinction threshold is reduced by a female-biased sex ratio. We argue that the present results explain the observed phenomena of female-biased births under severe conditions as an effective way to avoid extinction. Furthermore, since fertility rates are below this threshold in developed countries, family lineages of almost all individuals are destined to go extinct eventually.

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Stable and unstable equilibria plotted against predation intensity (F=3,K=400)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$(F=3, K=400)$$\end{document}. If the initial population size is above (below) the unstable equilibrium, the population approaches the stable equilibrium (goes extinct). If the predation intensity is beyond a critical value (c>390\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$c>390$$\end{document}), the equilibria cease to exist, and the population will always become extinct.
Simulated population dynamics of a single brood. (a) c=250\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$c=250$$\end{document} and N0=100\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${N}_{0}=100$$\end{document}. (b) c=350\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$c=350$$\end{document} and N0=100\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${N}_{0}=100$$\end{document}. (c) c=250\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$c=250$$\end{document} and N0=50\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${N}_{0}=50$$\end{document}. (d) c=350\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$c=350$$\end{document} and N0=50\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${N}_{0}=50$$\end{document} (F=3,K=400\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$F=3, K=400$$\end{document}). Being the only case where the initial population size is below the unstable equilibrium, extinction occurs only in the case of c=350\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$c=350$$\end{document} and N0=50\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${N}_{0}=50$$\end{document}, whereas stable equilibria are reached after t=187\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$t=187$$\end{document} in the other three cases.
Simulated population dynamics of main and straggler broods. (a) The initial population size of a straggler brood is JT+y=60\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${J}_{T+y}=60$$\end{document}. (b) JT+y=\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${J}_{T+y}=$$\end{document} 70. (c) JT+y=\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${J}_{T+y}=$$\end{document} 80. (d) JT+y=\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${J}_{T+y}=$$\end{document} 90 (c=250,F=3,K=400,T=187,y=13)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$(c=250, F=3, K=400, T=187, y=13)$$\end{document}. In so far as the straggler population is small, they did not survive and are eliminated after some generations. However, given a sufficient initial population, the stragglers can reach a stable equilibrium.
Predation-driven geographical isolation of broods in periodical cicadas

November 2024

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89 Reads

Periodical cicadas are remarkable for their incredibly long, prime-numbered life cycles and almost perfectly synchronized mass emergence. Synchronized emergence is a generally localized event, referred to as a “brood”. Broods are separated in space and time, or parapatric; adjacent broods emerge on different schedules, whereas some cicadas emerge off schedule, called stragglers. Straggling can potentially erode brood boundaries; thus, the mechanism allowing broods to maintain nonoverlapping distributions is highly puzzling. Here, we propose that predation may allow broods to exclude each other. Our model and numerical simulations show that predation could act as an important factor for maintaining the nonoverlapping distributions. The proposed mechanism is most effective in the vicinity of the critical strength of predation, beyond which the population is doomed to extinction. An increase in predation intensity increases resistance to settlement of a minority brood, while suppressing the main brood population.


A schematic diagram of the n-player weightlifting game. In this game, players decide whether to cooperate or defect in carrying the weight. Cooperators need to pay a cost. The weightlifting can either succeed or fail. In case of success, all players receive a benefit. In case of failure, all players receive nothing. The player's pay-off depends on the benefit, cost and probability of success. Each player decides whether to cooperate or defect so as to maximize the expected gain.
Equilibria and optimal strategies of the four-player weightlifting game. Nash equilibria (a1,b1,c1,d1,e1) and Pareto optimal strategies (a2,b2,c2,d2,e2). (a1,a2) μ=10\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mu =10$$\end{document}. (b1,b2) μ=20\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mu =20$$\end{document}. (c1,c2) μ=30\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mu =30$$\end{document}. (d1,d2) μ=40\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mu =40$$\end{document}. (e1,e2) μ=50\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mu =50$$\end{document}. The parameter regions for Nash equilibria and Pareto optimal strategies are as hatched in the i-c/b\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$c/b$$\end{document} plane, where i is the number of cooperators and c/b\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$c/b$$\end{document} is the cost-to-benefit ratio. We set σ=50\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\sigma =50$$\end{document} in all cases. All players cooperate for a small value of c/b\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$c/b$$\end{document} (CT), while they defect for a large value (DT).
Equilibria and optimal strategies of the four-player weightlifting game. Nash equilibria (a1,b1,c1,d1,e1) and Pareto optimal strategies (a2,b2,c2,d2,e2). (a1,a2) μ=60\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mu =60$$\end{document}. (b1,b2) μ=70\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mu =70$$\end{document}. (c1, c2) μ=80\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mu =80$$\end{document}. (d1, d2) μ=90\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mu =90$$\end{document}. (e1, e2) μ=100\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mu =100$$\end{document}. See Fig. 2 and the text for details.
Optimal strategies and cost-benefit analysis of the nn{\boldsymbol{n}}-player weightlifting game

May 2022

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162 Reads

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4 Citations

The study of cooperation has been extensively studied in game theory. Especially, two-player two-strategy games have been categorized according to their equilibrium strategies and fully analysed. Recently, a grand unified game covering all types of two-player two-strategy games, i.e., the weightlifting game, was proposed. In the present study, we extend this two-player weightlifting game into an nn-player game. We investigate the conditions for pure strategy Nash equilibria and for Pareto optimal strategies, expressed in terms of the success probability and benefit-to-cost ratio of the weightlifting game. We also present a general characterization of nn-player games in terms of the proposed game. In terms of a concrete example, we present diagrams showing how the game category varies depending on the benefit-to-cost ratio. As a general rule, cooperation becomes difficult to achieve as group size increases because the success probability of weightlifting saturates towards unity. The present study provides insights into achieving behavioural cooperation in a large group by means of a cost–benefit analysis.


The weight-lifting game. (a) Two players lift the baggage (weight). A cooperator (C, white) pays a cost c, while a defector (D, black) does not. Each player receives either a reward b or nothing depending on whether the lifting is successful. The success probability pnc depends on the number of cooperators (nc = 0, 1 and 2). (b) We define Δp1 and Δp2 as the differences p1 − p0 and p2 − p1, respectively. Each of Δp1, Δp2 and Δp1 + Δp2 takes a numeric value between 0 and 1. (c) The payoff matrix of the weight-lifting game.
The success probability p(E, nc). (a) p(E, nc) is plotted against nc for E = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1 (δ = 1/3). (b) pnc=p(E, nc) for nc = 0, 1 and 2 are shown on a line of unit length for E = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1 (δ = 1/3).
Trajectory in the game phase diagram as the environmental value E varies from 0 to 1. (a) c/b = 1/2 and δ = 1/3. (b) c/b = 1/3 and δ = 1/3. (c) c/b = 1/2 (solid) and 1/3 (dashed) for δ = 1/3. (d) c/b = 1/2 and δ = 1/5. (e) c/b = 1/3 and δ = 1/5. (f) c/b = 1/2 (solid) and 1/3 (dashed) for δ = 1/5. The coloured areas represent all kinds of pairwise games, i.e. the prisoner's dilemma (PD: blue), the chicken game (CH: green), the stag hunt game (SH: red), D-dominant trivial (DT: purple) and C-dominant trivial (CT: yellow).
Change in game structure as the environmental value E varies. (a) Trajectories in the E–c/b diagram. (b) Trajectories in the E–b/c diagram. b/c = 3/(β − E)² for β = 1.5 (blue) and 1.3 (orange) (δ = 1/5). (c) How the game varies as the environmental value E changes from 0 to 1. The coloured areas represent all kinds of pairwise games, i.e. the prisoner's dilemma (PD: blue), the chicken game (CH: green), the stag hunt game (SH: red), D-dominant trivial (DT: purple) and C-dominant trivial (CT: yellow).
Improving environment drives dynamical change in social game structure

May 2021

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99 Reads

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1 Citation

The development of cooperation in human societies is a major unsolved problem in biological and social sciences. Extensive studies in game theory have shown that cooperative behaviour can evolve only under very limited conditions or with additional complexities, such as spatial structure. Non-trivial two-person games are categorized into three types of games, namely, the prisoner's dilemma game, the chicken game and the stag hunt game. Recently, the weight-lifting game has been shown to cover all five games depending on the success probability of weight lifting, which include the above three games and two trivial cases (all cooperation and all defection; conventionally not distinguished as separate classes). Here, we introduce the concept of the environmental value of a society. Cultural development and deterioration are represented by changes in this probability. We discuss cultural evolution in human societies and the biological communities of living systems.


Figure 1: Philippine map presenting the locations of the 28 PAGASA weather stations
Figure 2: Rainfall histogram for Casiguran Station and selected fitted probability distributions with corresponding parameters
Figure 3: Gamma Distribution for the Daily Rainfall in Science Garden Quezon City Station
Figure 4: Gamma Distribution for the Daily Rainfall in Dumaguete Station using Different Time Scales
Chi-Square Statistic, Gamma Parameters, Mean and Variance of the Daily Rainfall
Probability Distribution of Philippine Daily Rainfall Data

December 2017

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1,513 Reads

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3 Citations

Philippines as an archipelago and tropical country, which is situated near the Pacific ocean, faces uncertain rainfall intensities. This makes environmental, agricultural and economic systems affected by precipitation difficult to manage. Time series analysis of Philippine rainfall pattern has been previously done, but there is no study investigating its probability distribution. Modeling the Philippine rainfall using probability distributions is essential, especially in managing risks and designing insurance products. Here, daily and cumulative rainfall data (January 1961 - August 2016) from 28 PAGASA weather stations are fitted to probability distributions. Moreover, the fitted distributions are examined for invariance under subsets of the rainfall data set. We observe that the Gamma distribution is a suitable fit for the daily up to the ten-day cumulative rainfall data. Our results can be used in agriculture, especially in forecasting claims in weather index-based insurance.

Citations (2)


... The pay-off of the cooperators is bp i − c , and the pay-off of the defectors is bp i ( Table 2). In terms of the parameters p 1 = p 1 − p 0 and p 2 = p 2 − p 1 , which represents the increase in the probability of success due to an additional cooperator, the following inequalities are obtained for the pay-offs R, T, S , and P (Table 1): 1 studied the evolution of cooperation in society by incorporating environmental value in the weightlifting game. They found that the evolution of cooperation seems to follow a DT to DT trajectory, which can explain the rise and fall of human societies. ...

Reference:

Optimal strategies and cost-benefit analysis of the n\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\varvec{n}}$$\end{document}-player weightlifting game
Improving environment drives dynamical change in social game structure

... In this sense, there are several distributions to be adjusted to the temporal record of hydrological variables. In the present context, in which it is proposed to estimate the total amounts of probable rainfall in the city of Cruzeiro do Sul, State of Acre, Brazil, contextualized in monthly and annual intervals, the Gamma distribution presents assumptions that give it prominence among the others (Teixeira et al., 2013;Bermudez et al., 2017;Abreu et al., 2018). ...

Probability Distribution of Philippine Daily Rainfall Data