David S. Siroky's research while affiliated with University of Essex and other places

... Witnessing human rights violations by state agents can alter the political preferences and voting choices of bystanders in post-transition countries and thus reduce the risk of (re-)autocratization. Second, the paper contributes to a burgeoning literature on the short-and longterm attitudinal effects of exposure to political violence and repression (Bauer et al., 2016;Davenport et al., 2019;Walden & Zhukov, 2020). Most of this research has focused on the effects of violence committed by outgroup members, such as civilians' victimization at the hands of rebel groups or minorities' experiences of state repression (Lyall et al., 2013;Siroky et al., 2022). We show how atrocities committed against an outgroup can shift the political preferences of ingroup members. ...

... Among others, this concerns the principal-agent and proxy warfare frameworks (see, e.g. Ahram, 2011;Bar-Siman-Tov, 1984;Karlén et al., 2021;Mumford, 2013;Rauta, 2021aRauta, , 2021bSalehyan, 2009;Salehyan et al., 2014). They are relatively interrelated with the patron-client concept, and, as such, they are likely to provide additional valuable insights. ...

... Other scholars seem to agree. For instance, Siroky et al (2022) find that "haram" (locations where certain behaviors are interpreted as being forbidden by Islam) targeting is a mechanism for overcoming collective action problems among mixed-ethnicity Salafists, while enhancing internal cohesion on the basis of the religion as a superordinate guiding force. This is supported by Braun and Genkin's (2014) finding that collectivist culture reduces the cost of suicide bombing. ...

... To be sure, social science work on slowmotion variables in world politics is not as rooted in rigorous science as structural engineering. But it offers grounds for optimism that experts could do something analogous: (a) identify chronic riskamplifiers and attenuators for nuclear proliferation (Bas & Coe, 2016;Bell, 2015;Carless et al., 2021;Cimbala, 2017;Kaplow & Gartzke, 2016;Solingen, 2007Solingen, , 2018, secession (Black, 2004;Levinson, 2017;Siroky & Abbasov, 2021) and interstate border disputes (Carter & Poast, 2016;Goemans & Schultz, 2016;Huth, 1996); (b) synthesize evidence into causal-propensity assessments for the initial 5 years and convert those assessments into probability judgments on a bounded 0-1.0 scale; (c) adjust their initial probability judgments as time widens to 10 and 25 years; (d) average individual forecasts into composites to further enhance accuracy. ...

... Other factors that can influence states' behaviour regarding their decision to recognize are related to the hierarchy mentioned above and competition among Great Powers. In their study on Kosovo, Siroky et al (2021) found that military and economic ties (arms sales and investments) from the US and Russia were good predictors of recognition (or non-recognition). ...

... Ivanishvili initially become Prime Minister and, though he resigned in 2013, he has remained the dominant force in Georgian politics running the country like a CEO by placing former employees from his companies into key state offices, including three out of four of the Prime Ministers who followed him, all without Ivanishvili holding a formal political role. 89 The result is a parallel informal structure, with high-ranking officials responsible to Ivanishvili and his inner circle rather than to formal institutions. 90 ...

... Here, there is room for exploring an additional dimension -the type of citizen-party linkages characterizing the movement (Kitschelt 2000). Clientelist secessionist parties may be in a better position to control the process of de-escalation than programmatic ones where the linkages between parties and citizens are more fluid and less predictable (Siroky et al. 2021). ...

... This explains why decision-making in national security entails careful management of competing and conflicting interests, and countries with complex and complicated arrangements of identity groups find them challenging to navigate. The relative deprivation theory also posits that national security is vulnerable to competition and conflict among ethnic and religious groups, who often evaluate themselves for traces of inequality, injustice and marginalisation or unfair treatment in comparison with other groups and seek redress through mobilisation that may include instruments of violence (Aaron 2015; Agbiboa 2013; Bauman and Leech 2012; Kunst and Obaidi 2020;Siroky et al. 2020). In similar ways, social conflict theory shows that competition for power and resources of the state, especially by ethnic and religious groups, is likely to undermine national security, especially when their interests and mobilisations are pursued with instruments of violence (Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray 2012;Schlee 2010;Szczecinska-Musielak 2016). ...

... This is in line with earlier findings on the dominance of English corpora in textual research (Pang & Lee, 2008). However, other languages were assessed as well, either as part of multilingual projects (e.g., de Leeuw et al., 2020;Maier et al., 2022) or in single-language studies usually focusing on a specific country or region (Bustikova et al., 2020;El-Masri et al., 2021;Yang & Fang, 2021). ...

... The main strand of literature, informed with constructivist approaches, focuses on so-called small groups of decision-makers and their ideas, values, perceptions, and identities (Davtyan 2021;German 2015;Gvalia et al. 2013;Kakachia and Minesashvili 2015;Kakachia, Minesashvili, and Kakhishvili 2018;Kolstø and Rusetskii 2012;Minesashvili 2021;Naskidashvili and Kakhishvili 2016;Ó Beacháin and Coene 2014). Another strand in the literature, informed with neoclassical realism, focuses more on structural factors, such as perceived relative power capabilities in the international context (Oskanian 2016), and factors such as elite cohesion and state capacity (Gvalia, Lebanidze, and Siroky 2019). More recently, Lebanidze and Kakachia (2023) have argued that, during 2012-2022, elite ideas led Georgia to choose Russia-accommodating policies, but this was limited by overwhelmingly pro-Western public opinion. ...