David Duemler’s research while affiliated with University of California, Santa Barbara and other places

J. Baron (see record 1990-27432-001) makes two assertions concerning our research on reflectiveness in scientific reasoning (D. Duemler and R. E. Mayer; see record 1989-14366-001): (a) His theory, particularly as stated in Baron (1988), predicts our findings, and (b) we have misnamed the independent variable in our study as reflectiveness. In this essay, we briefly respond to each assertion and call for three improvements in theories of scientific reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

J. Baron (see record 1990-27432-001) makes two assertions concerning our research on reflectiveness in scientific reasoning (D. Duemler and R. E. Mayer; see record 1989-14366-001): (a) His theory, particularly as stated in Baron (1988), predicts our findings, and (b) we have misnamed the independent variable in our study as reflectiveness. In this essay, we briefly respond to each assertion and call for three improvements in theories of scientific reasoning.

We tested a prediction of Baron's (1985) rationality theory: that reflectiveness is directly related to creative problem-solving performance. In two experiments, subjects solved a series of four induction problems involving conventional rules, followed by an induction problem involving an unconventional rule. Subjects who had been extremely reflective or extremely impulsive on successfully solving conventional problems performed more poorly on solving the unconventional problem than did subjects who had been moderately reflective or moderately impulsive on conventional problems. This U-shaped relationship between degree of reflectiveness/impulsiveness on conventional problems and problem-solving performance on an unconventional problem conflicts with predictions of rationality theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

We tested a prediction of Baron's (1985) rationality theory: that reflectiveness is directly related to creative problem-solving performance. In two experiments, subjects solved a series of four induction problems involving conventional rules, followed by an induction problem involving an unconventional rule. Subjects who had been extremely reflective or extremely impulsive on successfully solving conventional problems performed more poorly on solving the unconventional problem than did subjects who had been moderately reflective or moderately impulsive on conventional problems. This U-shaped relationship between degree of reflectiveness/impulsiveness on conventional problems and problem-solving performance on an unconventional problem conflicts with predictions of rationality theory.