David Colaço’s research while affiliated with Munich School of Philosophy and other places

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Publications (20)


When remediating one artifact results in another: control, confounders, and correction
  • Article
  • Full-text available

January 2024

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5 Reads

History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences

David Colaço

Scientists aim to remediate artifacts in their experimental datasets. However, the remediation of one artifact can result in another. Why might this happen, and what does this consequence tell us about how we should account for artifacts and their control? In this paper, I explore a case in functional neuroimaging where remediation appears to have caused this problem. I argue that remediation amounts to a change to an experimental arrangement. These changes need not be surgical, and the arrangement need not satisfy the criterion of causal modularity. Thus, remediation can affect more than just the factor responsible for the artifact. However, if researchers can determine the consequences of their remediation, they can make adjustments that control for the present artifact as well as for previously controlled ones. Current philosophical accounts of artifacts and the factors responsible for them cannot adequately address this issue, as they do not account for what is needed for artifact remediation (and specifically correction). I support my argument by paralleling it with ongoing concerns regarding the transparency of complex computational systems, as near future remediation across the experimental life sciences will likely make greater use of AI tools to correct for artifacts.

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Why have “revolutionary” tools found purchase in memory science?

December 2023

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31 Reads

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2 Citations

Philosophy and the Mind Sciences

The study of the neural basis of memory has advanced over the past decade. A key contributor to this memory “renaissance” has been new tools. On its face, this matches what might be described as a neuroscientific revolution stemming from the development of tools, where this revolution is largely independent of theory. In this paper, we challenge this tool revolution account by focusing on a problem that arises in applying it to this “renaissance”: it is centered around memory, but the tools were not developed for solving problems in memory science. To resolve this problem, we introduce an account that distinguishes tool development and tool uptake, and we argue that while theoretical considerations may not inform development, they do inform uptake. Acknowledging the distance between these stages of tool use draws our attention to the questions of why and how tool uptake occurs in the domains that it does.


Connecting Unconventional Cognition to Humans Unification and Generativity: Unification and Generativity

December 2023

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29 Reads

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1 Citation

JOLMA

The idea of applying cognitive kind terms and concepts to ‘unconventional’ systems has gained steam. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this idea also has been met with skepticism. There is an implicit worry amongst skeptics that the idea of applying cognitive kind terms and concepts to non-humans, or at least to non-humans that are anatomically quite unlike humans, amounts to a Mere Honorific Conclusion: to say that a system is cognitive is to say it is merely worthy of investigation. In this paper, I use this conclusion as a framing device for exploring how we ought to approach the idea of cognition in unconventional systems, and I explore two avenues for blocking it: unification and generativity.


Where memory resides: Is there a rivalry between molecular and synaptic models of memory?

October 2023

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70 Reads

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6 Citations

Philosophy of Science

Recent proposals that the substrate of memory is molecular raise questions about where this molecular model stands in relation to the dominant synaptic model of memory. In this paper, we address the perceived rivalry between these models and ask whether they can be integrated. We argue that addressing rivalry or integration requires delineating the explananda of synaptic and molecular models, as well as revisiting assumptions about how these models account for their explananda. The perceived rivalry between these models exemplifies epistemic costs that arise when we try to pit explanatory models as rivals or integrate them.



Why studying plant cognition is valuable, even if plants aren’t cognitive

November 2022

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118 Reads

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14 Citations

Synthese

Philosophers and scientists propose the idea that plants are cognitive, which has been met with criticisms. These criticisms focus on the fact that plants do not possess the properties traditionally associated with cognition. By contrast, several proponents introduce novel ways to conceptualize cognition. How should we make sense of this debate? In this paper, I argue that the plant cognition debate is not about whether plants meet a set of well-delineated and agreed-upon criteria according to which they count as cognitive. Rather, many proponents are hypothesizing about cognition. They construe COGNITION not as an expression of what cognition is, but rather as a conjecture about what cognition might be. These conjectures orient research that can uncover novel similarities amongst the phenomena to which these concepts extend. In defending this view, I argue that investigating plant cognition is valuable, even if the results of these investigations lead us to reject the claim that plants are cognitive.


Visualization of injury induction in Simard et al. (2007) versus Popovich et al. (2012) (image generated via biorender.com)
When should researchers cite study differences in response to a failure to replicate?

September 2022

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117 Reads

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1 Citation

Biology & Philosophy

Scientists often respond to failures to replicate by citing differences between the experimental components of an original study and those of its attempted replication. In this paper, we investigate these purported mismatch explanations. We assess a body of failures to replicate in neuroscience studies on spinal cord injury. We argue that a defensible mismatch explanation is one where (1) a mismatch of components is a difference maker for a mismatch of outcomes, and (2) the components are relevantly different in the follow-up study, given the scope of the original study. With this account, we argue that not all differences between studies are meaningful, even if they are difference makers. As our examples show, focusing only on these differences results in disregarding the representativeness of the original experiment’s components and the scope of its outcomes, undercutting other epistemic aims, such as translation, in the process.


On Second Thought: Reflections on the Reflection Defense

December 2021

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67 Reads

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29 Citations

This chapter sheds light on a response to experimental philosophy that has not yet received enough attention: the reflection defense. According to proponents of this defense, judgments about philosophical cases are relevant only when they are the product of careful, nuanced, and conceptually rigorous reflection. The chapter argues that the reflection defense is misguided: Five studies (N>1800) are presented, showing that people make the same judgments when they are primed to engage in careful reflection as they do in the conditions standardly used by experimental philosophers.



Contextual framing of loss impacts harm avoidance during risky spatial decisions

May 2020

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16 Reads

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Although the same decision to act can occur in multiple contexts, how these contexts differentially influence behavior is not well understood. In this paper, we investigate whether contextual framing affects individuals' behavior in spatial decision making. Although previous research suggests that individuals' judgments are sensitive to contextual (and particularly moral) factors of a scenario, no work has addressed whether this effect extends to spatial decisions. To investigate the impact of context on perceptual sensorimotor behavior, we superimposed two moral dilemmas (which we call help and harm) on a spatial decision‐making paradigm. The basic task required participants select a target area while avoiding an overlapping nontarget area. Although the visuospatial task was constant, the moral context was changed when participants had to execute either a drone missile strike on enemies in the harm context or deliver ammunition to allies in the help context. Participants more strongly avoided losses in the harm context, reflected by a greater selection bias away from the nontarget (i.e., allies) on drone strike trials. These findings suggest that the contextual framing of a subjective perceived loss on a spatial decision can drive avoidant motor execution behavior.


Citations (14)


... Philosophers of science have long emphasized that that conceptual change is a crucial mechanism for scientific progress, but their discussions focused mainly on theory change and cases from physics (Kuhn 1970, Nersessian 1992. More recently, however, philosophers of neuroscience have argued that change in neuroscience is primarily driven by developing experimental tools rather than theories, and that there are important relations between conceptual development and how tools are developed or used in research (Bickle 2016, Bickle et al. 2021, Haueis 2023, Colaço and Robins 2023. Since these discussions have mostly appeared in philosophical journals, one of our goals here is to demonstrate the utility of this novel literature to a neuroscientific audience. ...

Reference:

Philosophical tools to understand conceptual development in neuroscience
Why have “revolutionary” tools found purchase in memory science?

Philosophy and the Mind Sciences

... This molecular model of memory, which remains highly speculative, is compatible with mainstream neuroscience (e.g. Gershman, 2023;Colaço & Najenson, 2023). for instance, computes a ratio between the response of an individual neuron and the summed activity of a pool of neurons. ...

Where memory resides: Is there a rivalry between molecular and synaptic models of memory?

Philosophy of Science

... 15 "The instantiation of the function may not be very complex, and the implementation details may differ, but it is the function nevertheless" (Lyon, 2020: 409). Lyon, 2020;Colaço, 2022;Gyllingberg et al., 2024;Vallverdú et al., 2018). Such models aim at simulating, rather than duplicating, the causal powers of real phenomena. ...

Why studying plant cognition is valuable, even if plants aren’t cognitive

Synthese

... Proponents can argue that many of these cases are distinctions without a difference, as proponents and skeptics alike permit operational, functional, and mechanistic distinctions when comparing human cognition to those of other mammals like rodents (Colaço et al. 2022). Likewise, proponents can also appeal to analogical reasoning from humans to non-human animals and back. ...

When should researchers cite study differences in response to a failure to replicate?

Biology & Philosophy

... This debate has been going on for some time now, but we think the doubts have been answered convincingly. See, e.g.,(Alexander, 2012(Alexander, , 2016Alexander & Weinberg, 2007;Kneer et al., 2021;Horvath, 2010;Machery, 2011Machery, , 2017Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012Weinberg, Gonnerman, Buckner, & Alexander, 2010).Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved. ...

On Second Thought: Reflections on the Reflection Defense

... It should be noted that this characterisation of biological memory is both phyletically neutral, and it rules out just any temporally contingent response (e.g., a broken bone) from counting as memory due to its emphasis on stimulus specificity (cf. Colaço, 2022). Moreover, this characterisation does not distinguish memory as a cognitive capacity from memory that is not. ...

What Counts as a Memory? Definitions, Hypotheses, and “Kinding in Progress”
  • Citing Article
  • January 2020

Philosophy of Science

... It might therefore be that experimental philosophers are especially apt at avoiding hasty generalizations. Indeed, research found that many x-phi studies were more replicable (Cova et al. 2021), contained fewer statistical reporting inconsistencies (Colombo et al. 2017), and were less affected by common questionable research practices (e.g., phacking) than psychology studies (Stuart et al. 2019). Consequently, it has been suggested that experimental philosophers may be "more sensitive to certain methodological questions, such as what counts as strong evidence for a given claim" (Cova et al. 2021, 31). ...

P-curving x-phi: Does experimental philosophy have evidential value?
  • Citing Article
  • October 2019

Analysis

... One might refrain from calling them "deep theory, " as they look different from the traditional account of theory found in works by Popper or Kuhn, but they are nonetheless falsifiable, ampliative claims or representations about the target system that inform what we think about this target, its relation to other targets, and how we investigate it. This includes characterizations of phenomena, which might be revised over time (Colaço, 2020). These conceptualizations equally might persist over systematic theory change (Bollhagen, 2021;Colaço, 2020;Feest, 2010;Haueis, 2021). ...

Recharacterizing Scientific Phenomena
  • Citing Article
  • February 2020

European Journal for Philosophy of Science

... The first feature is that applying a neuroscientific concept involves a specific experimental or modeling technique. An experimental technique instructs researchers how to use a measurement or intervention device to produce a specific kind of experimental result (Colaço 2018). For example, using "receptive field" in electrophysiological experiments involves extracellular microelectrode recordings to produce spiking patterns in response to sensory stimuli (Hartline 1938, Chirimuuta andGold 2009). ...

Rethinking the role of theory in exploratory experimentation

Biology & Philosophy

... In an effort to improve the replicability, and cross-disciplinary comparability of this line of research on semantic intutions, we encourage researchers to consider quality assessment schemes from other disciplines (e.g., in medicine), in addition to other checks on research quality, like high-powered replication studies e.g., (Cova et al. 2018), checking for statistical reporting errors e.g., , and metascience tools for the uncovering publication bias and questionable research practices e.g., (Stuart et al. 2018). ...

P-curving x-phi: Does experimental philosophy have evidential value?