Daniel J. Simmons’s research while affiliated with Saint Michael's College and other places

Context: As COVID-19 vaccines were rolled out in early 2011, governments at all levels in the US faced significant difficulty in consistently and efficiently administering injections in the face of vaccination resistance among a public increasingly political polarized on vaccination preferences prior to the beginning of the mass vaccinations. Methods: Using an original conjoint experiment fielded to a nationally representative sample prior to the mass proliferation of COVID-19 vaccines, we examine how different incentives (e.g., employer mandates, state-organized or health care provider-organized vaccination clinics, or financial incentives) affect the public's preference to get vaccinated. We also test how financial incentive preferences correlate with self-reported vaccination intention using observational data from the Kaiser Family Foundation June 2021 Health Tracking Poll. Findings: We find financial incentives positively influence vaccine preferences among the mass public and all partisan groups, including Republicans initially "unlikely" to be vaccinated. Using the observational data, we replicate our experimental findings showing positive financial incentive attitudes positively correlate with self-reported vaccination disclosures. Conclusions: Our results provide support for direct financial incentives, rather than other incentives, as being a valuable tool for policymakers tasked with alleviating vaccination resistance among a US mass public increasingly polarized along partisan lines.

Vaccines are the most effective means at combating sickness and death caused by COVID-19. Yet, there are significant populations within the United States who are vaccine-hesitant, some due to ideological or pseudo-scientific motivations, others due to significant perceived and real costs from vaccination. Given this vaccine hesitancy, twenty state governors from May 12th to July 21st 2021 implemented some form of vaccination lottery aiming to increase low vaccination rates. In the aftermath of these programs, however, the critical question of whether these lotteries had a direct effect on vaccination remains. Previous literature on financial incentives for public health behaviors is consistent: Financial incentives significantly increase incentivized behaviors. Yet, work done specifically on state vaccine lotteries is both limited in scope and mixed in its conclusions. To help fill this gap in the literature, we use synthetic control methods to analyze all 20 states and causally identify, for eighteen states, the effects of their lotteries on both first-dose and complete vaccination rates. Within those eighteen states, we find strong evidence that all but three states’ lotteries had positive effects on first-dose vaccination. We find for complete vaccinations, however, over half the states analyzed had negative or null effects. We explore possibilities related to these mixed results including the states’ overall partisanship, vaccine hesitancy, and the size of their lotteries finding null effects for each of these explanations. Therefore, we conclude that the design of these programs is likely to blame: Every state lottery only incentivized first-doses with no additional or contingent incentive based on a second dose. Our findings suggest that the design of financial incentives is critical to their success, or failure, but generally, these programs can induce an uptake in vaccination across diverse demographic, ideological, and geographic contexts in the United States.

Objective We examine the role of how a hostile discourse toward Islam influences American public opinion regarding U.S. foreign policy actions toward Muslim populations and Muslim‐majority nations. Methods Using a survey experiment with two vignettes, we test how Americans’ foreign policy preferences are affected by Islamic identity. In the first vignette, a minority group is facing ethnic cleansing. Second, a country is developing chemical weapons. Results We find that Americans are less likely to see Muslim minorities abroad as under threat or to support costly foreign policy actions to assist them. We also find that Americans are more likely to see Muslim countries as threatening and to support the use of military force against Muslim states. Conclusion Our evidence suggests that the political effects of Islamophobia are not restricted to domestic policy but include foreign policy preferences too.

What factors shape public opinion about government solutions to address police violence? We address this question by conducting a survey in which respondents express their opinions about actual proposals to reform police practices. Within the survey, we randomly assign respondents to receive the positions of traditional advocates (Black lawmakers) and/or opponents (law enforcement) of police reform efforts. Our results reveal broad bipartisan support for the proposals, but that information about groups that support or oppose these proposals polarizes partisans’ opinions. However, Democrats and even Republicans who support Black Lives Matter (BLM) express high levels of support for the proposals regardless of the information they receive. These results suggest that partisanship in the mass public is not necessarily a barrier to police reform efforts. A bipartisan majority of the public supports meaningful reforms, and any polarizing effects of elite signals are muted by Democrats’ and Republicans’ support for BLM.