Curtis D. Hardin’s research while affiliated with Brooklyn College and other places

This report introduces the Global Collectivism Index (GCI) – a measure covering 99.9% of the earth's population. The GCI includes six sub-scores (e.g., household living arrangements, ingroup favoritism). Collectivism is very high in Sub-Saharan Africa, very low in Western Europe, and intermediate in most other regions. Even after controlling for both national wealth and technological sophistication, national collectivism scores predict variables such as suicide rates, alcohol consumption, agricultural employment, and valuing child obedience. Further, this was true after directly pitting the GCI against several competing predictors of the major cultural outcomes examined in this report – from national wealth (GDP) and modernization to a seven-factor conceptualization of interdependence. The GCI is a much-needed, well-validated, historically updated measure that eliminates previous WEIRD biases and offers greatly increased statistical power in cross-cultural research.

We argue that rather than being a wholly random event, birthdays are sometimes selected by parents. We further argue that such effects have changed over time and are the result of important psychological processes. Long ago, U.S. American parents greatly overclaimed holidays as their children's birthdays. These effects were larger for more important holidays, and they grew smaller as births moved to hospitals and became officially documented. These effects were exaggerated for ethnic groups that deeply valued specific holidays. Parents also overclaimed well-liked calendar days and avoided disliked calendar days as their children's birthdays. However, after birthday selection effects virtually disappeared in the 1950s and 1960s, they reappeared after the emergence of labor induction and planned cesarean birth. For example, there are many fewer modern U.S. births than would be expected on Christmas Day. In addition, modern parents appear to use birth medicalization to avoid undesirable birthdays (Friday the 13th). We argue that basking in reflect glory, ethnic identity processes, and superstitions such as magical thinking all play a role in birthday selection effects. Discussion focuses on the power of social identity in day-to-day judgment and decision-making.

Research has identified many strategies people use to defend against belief-inconsistent information. However, little research has identified factors that predict which defense strategy people will use when more than one is available. Two experiments tested whether people choose to counter-argue belief-inconsistent information because they believe arguing will be successful, but resort to weaker defense strategies because they believe arguing will be unsuccessful. Exposure to strong versus weak belief-inconsistent information caused a decrease in counter- arguing and an increase in ignoring (Experiment 1) or claiming a belief to be a matter of opinion (untestable) rather than a matter of fact (testable; Experiment 2). Consistent with self-efficacy theory, expectations of successful counter-arguing was the mechanism responsible for both effects. When people feel less capable of successfully counter-arguing because the information is too difficult to refute, they resort to epistemically weaker defense strategies in order to preserve their belief.

What, in the 21st century, is our vision of the “good society,” and what are the obstacles to its realization? What is the ideal mix of equality and tradition, individual initiative and social welfare, economic prosperity and environmental responsibility, national unity and respect for diversity? Research suggests that liberals and conservatives differ considerably in the prioritization of these values, but nearly all of this research makes use of closed-ended responses to questionnaire items. To examine ideological similarities and dissimilarities in value expression and social representation when it comes to relatively open-ended communication in online social media networks, we used quantitative text-analytic methods to analyze more than 3.8 million messages sent by over 1 million Twitter users about what constitutes a good (vs. bad) society. Results revealed a fairly high degree of ideological divergence: Liberals were more likely to raise themes of social justice, global inequality, women’s rights, racism, criminal justice, health care, poverty, progress, social change, personal growth, and environmental sustainability, whereas conservatives were more likely to mention religion, social order, business, capitalism, national symbols, immigration, and terrorism, as well as individual authorities and news organizations. There were also some areas of convergence: Liberals, moderates, and conservatives were equally likely to prioritize economic prosperity, family, community, and the pursuit of health, happiness, and freedom.

Research has identified many strategies people use to defend against belief‐inconsistent information. However, little research has identified factors that predict which defense strategy people will use when more than one is available. Two experiments tested whether people choose to counter‐argue belief‐inconsistent information because they believe arguing will be successful, but resort to weaker defense strategies because they believe arguing will be unsuccessful. Exposure to strong versus weak belief‐inconsistent information caused a decrease in counter‐arguing and an increase in ignoring (Experiment 1) or claiming a belief to be a matter of opinion (untestable) rather than a matter of fact (testable; Experiment 2). Consistent with self‐efficacy theory, expectations of successful counter‐arguing was the mechanism responsible for both effects. When people feel less capable of successfully counter‐arguing because the information is too difficult to refute, they resort to epistemically weaker defense strategies in order to preserve their belief. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

Parker alleges that Wittgensteinian presuppositions of essentialism and relativism obscure the role of social power in linguistic discourse. Not only is this claim self-contradictory, it is wrong in each of its component counts. Strands of essentialism in Wittgenstein’s early writings were skewered effectively in his own later philosophy. Although Parker is not alone in charging Wittgenstein with relativism, we argue that a careful reading of Wittgenstein’s work belies such a claim. This is because the meaning of a given language-game is fixed by patterns of ongoing social interaction among people who share a particular ‘form of life’. Against Parker, we show that Wittgenstein’s (anti-)philosophy is in fact largely congenial to Marx’s (anti-)philosophy, with both writers allied against the doctrines of individualism, subjectivism, mentalism, idealism and metaphysicalism. Although it may be true that Wittgenstein the person was relatively silent about issues of social and political power, Parker has failed to establish that Wittgensteinian metatheory is incompatible with the analysis of power in social discourse. In sum, we argue that Wittgenstein, like Marx, was a social materialist (rather than a social constructionist) whose writings articulate the foundations of mind and meaning in terms of concrete social practice.

Building upon research on the social-cognitive foundations of ideological thinking, we argue that allegiance to attitudes that explain and justify the status quo is motivated in part by the human need to connect with others through feelings of mutual understanding. We review evidence that endorsing attitudes that justify the status quo not only preserves and regulates existing interpersonal relationships but also facilitates the establishment and regulation of new relationships, focusing in particular on ideologies involving religion and intergroup prejudice. In this light, ideologies function as prepackaged units of interpretation that help regulate social and political life.