Christina Connell’s scientific contributions

This paper explores the likely impact of different estimation methods in key components of hydro-economic models such as hydrology and economic costs or benefits, using the CALVIN hydro-economic optimization for water supply in California. In perform our analysis using two climate scenarios: historical and warm-dry. The components compared were perturbed hydrology using six versus eighteen basins, highly-elastic urban water demands, and different valuation of agricultural water scarcity. Results indicate that large scale hydroeconomic hydro-economic models are often rather robust to a variety of estimation methods of ancillary models and components. Increasing the level of detail in the hydrologic representation of this system might not greatly affect overall estimates of climate and its effects and adaptations for California's water supply. More price responsive urban water demands will have a limited role in allocating water optimally among competing uses. Different estimation methods for the economic value of water and scarcity in agriculture may influence economically optimal water allocation; however land conversion patterns may have a stronger influence in this allocation. Overall optimization results of large-scale hydro-economic models remain useful for a wide range of assumptions in eliciting promising water management alternatives.

The Nile River has been the center of water resources development tensions among four main riparian actors: Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and other upstream nations. Each player has a desire to meet its national demands under increasingly stressed limited resources. Egypt, the most powerful of the actors, strives to maintain the status quo: securing the water supply that is barely sufficient for its growing population. Sudan is wedged between its 1959 treaty with Egypt and potentially economically beneficial cooperation with Ethiopia. Ethiopia, the source of most of the Nile, strives to increase its water share to secure its food supply and facilitate economic development. Finally, the upstream nations seek to be released from the water development restrictions placed on them by the current system. All nations fear retaliation from Egypt. This study applies game theoretic methods to study this interstate water problem using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution, which provides insights into the strategic behaviors of the conflicting parties. The developed model attempts to determine most likely outcomes of the conflict given the nations options and preferences. Results indicate that the current situation is not stable and that stable outcomes include retaliation by Egypt. A sensitivity analysis shows that the model is highly sensitive to Egypt's preferences, however, but not very sensitive to Sudan's or Ethiopia's preferences.