Christian H. Schimpf’s research while affiliated with University of Saskatchewan and other places
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The literature on populist attitudes frequently makes one of two assumptions: populist attitudes are either stable or unstable. However, few studies have examined these diverging assumptions empirically. We use panel data collected over six panel waves between 2017 and 2021 in Germany to assess the stability of populist attitudes. Integrating inter-individual stability (variable-centred) and intra-individual stability (individual trajectories), we find that populist attitudes are neither fully stable (trait) nor fully flexible (state). For example, some respondents constantly changed their view on populism while the attitudes in one out of three individuals remained stable. We also explore empirical consequences and find that populist attitudes are more closely linked to vote choice when they are stable. Accordingly, we argue for a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of populist attitudes, both at the variable and individual levels, where these attitudes are stable and consequential for only a subset of individuals.
Are populist citizens a threat to democracy? Some philosophers view populism and democracy as irreconcilable conceptions of governing. Another line of thought describes populism as useful democratic corrective. Drawing on nationally representative surveys from four European countries, this study investigates how European populist citizens think about democracy. Descriptive analyses reveal that populist worldviews only weakly predict how people think about democracy. On average, populist and non‐populist citizens aspire to similar kinds of political systems and both endorse liberal‐democratic institutions. Yet, populists and non‐populists differ in the degree to which they hold inconsistent beliefs. Citizens with populist outlook more frequently express contradictory demands that political institutions cannot possibly deliver. Based on these findings, we conclude that most populist citizens do not pursue an elaborate anti‐democratic conception of governing. Rather, the widespread dissatisfaction among populists may create an indeterminate openness for institutional change that political elites could steer in different directions.
The GLES Open Science Challenge 2021 was a pilot project aimed at demonstrating that registered reports are an appropriate and beneficial publication format in quantitative political science that helps to increase transparency and replicability in the research process and thus yields substantial and relevant contributions to our discipline. The project resulted in the publication of this special issue, which includes seven registered reports based on data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) collected in the context of the 2021 German federal election. This concluding article of the special issue brings together the perspectives of the participating authors, reviewers, organizers, and editors in order to take stock of the different experiences gained and lessons learned in the course of the project. We are confident that future projects of a similar nature in political science, as well as authors, reviewers, and editors of registered reports, will benefit from these reflections.
A prominent but underspecified explanation for the rise of populism points to individuals’ feelings of being “left behind” by the development of society. At its core lies the claim that support for populism is driven by the feeling of lacking the societal recognition one deserves. Our contribution builds on the insight that individuals can feel they lack recognition in different ways and for different reasons. We argue that—because of this multifaceted character—the common perception of being neglected by society unites otherwise heterogeneous segments of the population in their support for populism. Relying on data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) Pre-Election Cross-Section 2021, our preregistered study investigated the multiple roots of populist attitudes in feelings of lacking societal recognition in two steps. First, our results indicate that, from rural residents to sociocultural conservatives or low-income citizens, seemingly unrelated segments of society harbor feelings of lacking recognition, but for distinct reasons. Second, as anticipated, each of the distinct feelings of lacking recognition are associated with populist attitudes. These findings underscore the relevance of seemingly unpolitical factors that are deeply ingrained in the human psyche for understanding current populist sentiment. Overall, by integrating previously disparate perspectives on the rise of populism, the study offers a novel conceptualization of “feeling left behind” and explains how populism can give rise to unusual alliances that cut across traditional cleavages.
A prominent but underspecified explanation for the rise of populism points to individuals’ feelings of being “left behind” by the development of society. At its core lies the claim that support for populism is driven by the feeling of being denied the societal recognition one deserves. Our contribution builds on the insight that individuals can feel to lack recognition in different ways and for different reasons. We argue that—due to this multifaceted character—the common perception of being neglected societal recognition unites otherwise heterogeneous segments of the population in their support for populism. Relying on data from the GLES Pre-Election Cross-Section 2021, we will investigate the multiple roots of populist attitudes in feelings of lacking societal recognition in two steps. First, we will test the hypothesis that distinct feelings of lacking recognition dominate in different social segments. Second, we will test the hypothesis that each of these distinct feelings of lacking recognition are associated with populist attitudes.
Populism represents the greatest political challenge to Western democracies since World War II. The electoral successes of populist parties and actors, Brexit, the presidency of Donald Trump or campaigns against containing the coronavirus pandemic are expressions of this phenomenon, in which the electorate is mobilised against supposed elites. The revised and expanded handbook Political Populism offers a comprehensive theoretical and empirical introduction to the causes and effects of political populism, especially in the democratic systems of Europe, but also in North and South America. It focuses on explaining populism as a consequence of a legitimation crisis of the representative system as well as on the controversies and limitations in the current academic debate. Drawing on political and communication science, the book also offers a comprehensive analysis of the effects of populism on various policy areas, such as environmental, health and economic policy. With contributions by Tjitske Akkerman, Manuel Anselmi, Wolfgang Aschauer, Hans-Georg Betz, Cecilia Biancalana, Paul Blokker, Giuliano Bobba, María Esperanza Casullo, Carlos de la Torre, Paula Diehl, Sarah C. Dingler, Martin Dolezal, Marco Fölsch, Flavia Freidenberg, Sergiu Gherghina, Florian Habersack, Vlastimil Havlík, Kirk A. Hawkins, Reinhard Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha, Robert A. Huber, Gilles Ivaldi, Philip Kitzberger, Benjamin Krämer, Maria Elisabetta Lanzone, Zoe Lefkofridi, Dietmar Loch, Miroslav Mareš, Alfio Mastropaolo, Oscar Mazzoleni, Sergiu Miscoiu, Teun Pauwels, Franca Roncarolo, Saskia Pauline Ruth, Carlo Ruzza, Steven Saxonberg, Christian H. Schimpf, Damir Skenderovic, Sorina Soare, Lone Sorensen, Carlos H. Waisman, Carsten Wegscheider and Sandra Vergari. With a welcome expansion in cases and policy fields, the second edition of Political Populism: Handbook on Concepts, Questions and Strategies for Research brings together scholars from a range of disciplines to reflect on the fundamental challenge populism poses today. This Handbook is essential to every reader who wants to understand where populism comes from, how it manifests and how it influences policies, political actors and the very institutions that make democracy. Theoretically sophisticated, substantiated in its content yet approachable for the interest reader, this Handbook marks an important step in the appreciation of the complexity and consequences of this global phenomenon. Annika Werner, Australian National University Two decades of turbulent political history show that populism is here to stay, and to shape politics for a long time to come. It is considered a serious threat to traditional democratic institutions. That’s why political and communication scientists have massively engaged in studying it, in explaining it, in analyzing its features and implications. Among the several recent scholarly productions, this Handbook is perhaps the best tool put in the hands of all those who want to get a multi-dimensional yet comprehensive understanding of political populism as it is developing in Europe and in the Americas. Definitely a must-have book! Gianpietro Mazzoleni, Università di Milano, Italy This highly readable and detailed Handbook synthetizes a wealth of accumulated and innovative research on contemporary populism in Europe and the Americas. Drawing the insights of a distinguished group of specialists, the volume presents a comprehensive and updated view of the vibrant field of populist studies. Its four sections and thirty-four chapters provide stimulating perspectives on the theory, politics, and communicational dimensions of populism as well on emerging areas of research. A must read for anyone interested in understanding the complexities of a phenomenon that is likely to remain an enduring and unsettling presence in the political life of XXI century democracies. Enrique Peruzzotti, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Argentina
Multidimensional concepts are non-compensatory when higher values on one component cannot offset lower values on another. Thinking of the components of a multidimensional phenomenon as non-compensatory rather than substitutable can have wide-ranging implications, both conceptually and empirically. To demonstrate this point, we focus on populist attitudes that feature prominently in contemporary debates about liberal democracy. Given similar established public opinion constructs, the conceptual value of populist attitudes hinges on its unique specification as an attitudinal syndrome, which is characterized by the concurrent presence of its non-compensatory concept subdimensions. Yet this concept attribute is rarely considered in existing empirical research. We propose operationalization strategies that seek to take the distinct properties of non-compensatory multidimensional concepts seriously. Evidence on five populism scales in 12 countries reveals the presence and consequences of measurement-concept inconsistencies. Importantly, in some cases, using conceptually sound operationalization strategies upsets previous findings on the substantive role of populist attitudes.
Multidimensional concepts are non-compensatory when higher values on one component cannot offset lower values on another. Thinking of the components of a multidimensional phenomenon as non-compensatory rather than substitutable can have wide-ranging implications, both conceptually and empirically. To demonstrate this point, we focus on populist attitudes that feature prominently in contemporary debates about liberal democracy. Given similar established public opinion constructs, the conceptual value of populist attitudes hinges on its unique specification as an attitudinal syndrome, which is characterized by the concurrent presence of its non-compensatory concept subdimensions. Yet this concept attribute is rarely considered in existing empirical research. We propose operationalization strategies that seek to take the distinct properties of non-compensatory multidimensional concepts seriously. Evidence on five populism scales in 12 countries reveals the presence and consequences of measurement-concept inconsistencies. Importantly, in some cases, using conceptually sound operationalization strategies upsets previous findings on the substantive role of populist attitudes.
This article investigates how Canadian voters react to a perceived lack of quality provided by their most preferred parties and how the anticipated election outcome conditions the reactions. The central argument is that a lack of quality motivates voters to signal their discontent by voting insincerely—that is, they cast a protest vote. The effect is expected to be moderated by the anticipated constituency result. The arguments are tested with two-wave panel survey data from the 2015 Canadian federal election, collected by the Making Electoral Democracy Work (MEDW) project. The results support the central argument but remain inconclusive about the expected moderating effects.
Recent research in the populism literature has devoted considerable efforts to the conceptualisation and examination of populism on the individual level, that is, populist attitudes. Despite rapid progress in the field, questions of adequate measurement and empirical evaluation of measures of populist attitudes remain scarce. Seeking to remedy these shortcomings, we apply a cross-national measurement model, using item response theory, to six established and two new populist indicators. Drawing on a cross-national survey (nine European countries, n = 18,368), we engage in a four-folded analysis. First, we examine the commonly used 6-item populism scale. Second, we expand the measurement with two novel items. Third, we use the improved 8-item populism scale to further refine equally comprehensive but more concise and parsimonious populist measurements. Finally, we externally validate these sub-scales and find that some of the proposed sub-scales outperform the initial 6- and 8-item scales. We conclude that existing measures of populism capture moderate populist attitudes, but face difficulties measuring more extreme levels, while the individual information of some of the populist items remains limited. Altogether, this provides several interesting routes for future research, both within and between countries.
... Taken together, it is particularly disaffection with the political system that consistently matches the profile of "the populist citizen." In contrast, the socio-demographic characteristics of citizens who hold populist attitudes are relatively heterogeneous across regions and across left-wing and right-wing manifestations of populism (Rovira Kaltwasser & Van Hauwaert, 2020; see also Schimpf et al., 2023 on the (in)stability of populist attitudes on the individual level). However, while unemployment and objective indicators of economic deprivation appear to be related to the degree to which people adopt populist views, their views regarding society's general and economic state also exhibit a specific relationship with populist attitudes. ...
... Proportional representation encourages multiparty systems, reducing the likelihood of any single party dominating and minimizing unchecked populist influence (Bustikova & Guasti, 2017). Additionally, measures such as ranked-choice voting foster coalition-building and political compromise, promoting pluralism over populist extremism (Wuttke et al., 2023). ...
... These subjective measures have been operationalised in different ways, such as feelings of lack of recognition (Steiner et al., 2023) or lack of control (Heinisch and Jansesberger, 2022). Recent research has focused on determinants such as pessimism about the future and negative perceptions of one's own socio-economic status (Gidron and Hall, 2020) or perceived 'nostalgic deprivation' and 'status threat' (Gest et al., 2018). ...
... Doch ist die Beziehung zwischen populistischen Einstellungen und der Präferenz für direktdemokratische Verfahren weitenhin nicht eindeutig und blendet in weiten Teilen weitere mögliche Erklärungsfaktoren aus (Gherghina und Pilet 2021). So greift die jüngere Literatur zum Populismus selbst, neben klassischen ressourcentheoretischen Ansätzen, zunehmend auch (sozial-)psychologische Erklärungsfaktoren, wie Emotionen, soziales Vertrauen oder Identität auf (Koivula et al. 2017;Rydgren 2009;Rico et al. 2020;Gustavsson und Stendahl 2020;Obradović et al. 2020;Berning und Ziller 2017;Jay et al. 2019;Mauk 2020;Steiner et al. 2021;Gidron und Hall 2020). Die Integration dieser Erklärungsansätze in das Verhältnis zwischen Populismus und Verfahrenspräferenzen blieb jedoch bislang weitgehen unberücksichtigt. ...
... Nonetheless, for our goal, support for experts in government better captures the willingness of citizens to be governed by nonpartisan figures whose aim is to ensure that objective knowledge prevails over the so-called politique politicienne. To measure technocracy, we rely on Sartori's analysis for concept measurement (Wutke et al. 2020). The Sartorian approach combines a dichotomous quantifier of concept structure and a non-compensatory qualifier of concept structure. ...
... Secondly, the scale of populist attitudes developed by Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2014) does not allow us to test whether the association with sexism can be better explained by people-centrism or anti-elitism, because both ideas are fused in the survey questions. Our aim was to use an aggregate measure encompassing various subdimensions of populism, aligning with the theoretical framework and the concept that populism exists at the intersection of these subdimensions (Wuttke, Schimpf & Schoen 2020). However, future studies employing alternative scales, such as the one proposed by Schulz et al. (2018), may contribute to shedding light on the extent to which different subdimensions have distinct effects on populist attitudes, enhancing our understanding of the nuances and generalisability of the relationship between gender inequality and populist attitudes globally. ...
... Notes 1 Moreover, they may turn out to vote because of a longterm interest in maintaining democratic rule (Downs 1957, 267ff.). 2 Including the two-round presidential ballots of France (Blais 2004), the multiparty plurality contests of Canada (Schimpf 2019), India (Chatterjee and Kamal 2020) and the United Kingdom (Birch and Dennison 2019;Franklin, Niemi, and Whitten 1994;Kang 2004), the proportional system of the Netherlands (Van Spanje and Weber 2019), and the state-level elections of Germany (Kellermann 2008). 3 Using extant work as a prior, vote switching appears more likely than abstention. ...
... Several versions are currently proposed in the literature [22][23][24], and their validity and distinctiveness have been demonstrated [25]. Recent studies have, therefore, focused more on the so-called demand side of populism, that is, on both the populist attitudes of people [26,27] and the electorate of populist parties [28,29]. Yet, it should be noted that these are two different dimensions, even though they are inextricably linked [30,31]. ...
... The effect of territorial identity on populist support is not unique to the radical right. Previous research suggest that populist demand tends to be higher in regions where citizens have stronger territorial identities ( Van Hauwaert, Schimpf and Dandoy, 2019). Third, previous research has shown that populist parties tend to benefit more from bandwagon effects in second-order elections than other challenger parties (Schulte-Cloos, 2018). ...
... It often remains unclear how they have been constructed and how they relate to each other. It is also unclear whether these scales are limited in their capacity to capture respondents at the extreme ends of scales, something we observe e.g. in the related concept of populist attitudes (see [10]). In many cases it seems that they measure right-or left-wing radicalism rather than extremism. ...
