Caroline Rödiger's research works | University of Manchester and other places

Key terminology for neuroscience and law. Each discipline has specific vocabulary that differs from the definition of these words in everyday language. Some terms are shared between the two disciplines, but each discipline has their own definition of those terms. Friction in interdisciplinary teams can occur when terms are not used in the discipline-specific way, or, when scholars are unaware of the presence of specific definitions of terms within the “other” discipline. The left column lists concepts that are relevant to responsibility and have a technical meaning within neuroscience, but which lack a corresponding technical definition in law, and would therefore fall back to the meaning based on everyday usage, potentially leading to incommensurability. The right column lists concepts that have a technical meaning in law, but which create difficulties in neuroscience because they cannot be readily related to a brain circuit or cognitive process, and so fall back to meaning based on everyday usage. The central, intersection column lists key terms that are important for both the neuroscience of responsibility and for legal responsibility, but which have a meaning restricted to just one discipline, or have distinctly different meanings within each discipline. Table 1 part C clarifies these concepts by directly contrasting neuroscientific and legal definitions.

The neural fear/threat circuit and its legal implications. Colomn A: An aggressor is considered a stressor stimulus that is detected by an individual’s sensory systems. Column B: Visual information relating to the stressor is relayed via the visual thalamus to the visual cortex and directly to the central nucleus of the amygdala. The amygdala has direct projections with the peripheral nerve and muscular systems of the body, which prepare the body for appropriate response to the stressor, by activating specific and stereotyped defense behaviors. Depending on the sensory input, the individual’s appraisal will lead to different emotions: fear or anger. Column C: In fear contexts, three distinct response types are prominent: “fight, flight or freeze.” In anger contexts, reactive aggression responses predominate, but can be downregulated by the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in most circumstances, as when the individual withdraws. Column D: The individual’s response is legally significant: for example, the individual’s fight response may lead to injury, or even death, of the aggressor. The flight response might unintentionally harm a third party. Classically, legal considerations of loss of control apply to fight responses, and depend on identifying a fear or anger trigger. Neuroscientific evidence that multiple responses can arise from the same circuitry raises the question of how to treat these responses consistently in law. Illustration, text and neural models elaborated on basis of illustration from Ledoux (2003). Drawings: © Main Author anonymized.

The neuroanatomical pathways of reactive aggression illustrated in the non-human primate brain (Wilson et al., 2014). Reactive aggression is often evoked by a vocal or visual signal, in this case from an aggressive conspecific. Activation of the medial amygdala (MEA) is thought to result in the activation of the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST) and the anterior hypothalamic area (AHA), which in turn activate the periaqueductal gray (PAG). In general, the orbital frontal cortex (OFC) appears to be important for the interpretation of social cues, and inhibitory inputs from the OFC might inhibit aggression by reducing responsiveness in the amygdala. Thick arrows represent inputs and outputs to and from the brain; thin arrows represent connections within the brain; dotted lines represent inhibitory connections. Illustration, text and neural models of non-human primate aggression elaborated on basis of illustration from Nelson and Trainor (2007). Drawings: © Main Author anonymized.

Volition and control in law and in brain science: neurolegal translation of a foundational concept

September 2024

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Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

The law assumes that healthy adults are generally responsible for their actions and have the ability to control their behavior based on rational and moral principles. This contrasts with some recent neuroscientific accounts of action control. Nevertheless, both law and neuroscience acknowledge that strong emotions including fear and anger may “trigger” loss of normal voluntary control over action. Thus, “Loss of Control” is a partial defense for murder under English law, paralleling similar defenses in other legal systems. Here we consider the neuroscientific evidence for such legal classifications of responsibility, particularly focussing on how emotional states modulate voluntary motor control and sense of agency. First, we investigate whether neuroscience could contribute an evidence-base for law in this area. Second, we consider the societal impact of some areas where legal thinking regarding responsibility for action diverges from neuroscientific evidence: should we be guided by normative legal traditions, or by modern understanding of brain functions? In addressing these objectives, we propose a translation exercise between neuroscientific and legal terms, which may assist future interdisciplinary research.

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Caroline Rödiger’s research while affiliated with University of Manchester and other places

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