Carl G. Rosberg’s research while affiliated with University of California System and other places

... This is so because personalization of rule often makes politicians assume the feeling of being above the laws of the state. This is why the issue of holding leaders accountable for their actions and inactions has been problematic and this negates the essence of democracy and good governance (Adeyeye, 2006(Adeyeye, , 2011Hyden, 2006;Price, 1974;1975 andJackson &Rosberg, 1982). Unfortunately, the people and political leaders who Van Wyk (2007) asked if they are presidents, patrons, andprofiteers, jointly create what Joseph, (1991;1987) aptly described as prebendalism and neopatrimonialism. ...

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Desiring Omelette Not Breaking the Egg: Democracy, Elections and Good Governance in Africa Desiring Omelette Not Breaking the Egg: Democracy, Elections and Good Governance in Africa

... These states only meet the requirements of the state as a territorial entity and not as a formal structure able to provide for or effectively control its citizens. 22 This has resulted in "disengagement" where citizens do not interact with the state due to their skepticism of its effectiveness and legitimacy. 23 Thus, for many, the state in postcolonial Africa is an institution best known for oppressing and exploiting the bulk of its citizens. ...

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Female Presidents in Africa: New Norms in Leadership or Reflection of Current Practice

... The common starting point is the personal nature of the chief executive and personal rule. While civil servants occupy positions with formal job descriptions and are allocated to various agencies, departments, or ministries in accordance with official organograms, scholars emphasize the endurance -from the pre-colonial era -of informal patterns of patrimonial authority, where leaders rule "by dint of personal prestige and power" and according to their personal preferences rather than codified laws (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997;Jackson & Rosberg, 1982a). As a dominant narrative of the post-colonial state, neo-patrimonialism (a hybrid of traditional and modern forms of authority) is characterized as a system in which civil servants, military leaders, and cabinet officials owe their positions as much to their personal connections to the president or prime minister as to their personal expertise and fit with their formal position. ...

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Mapping state capacity in Africa: Professionalism and reach Mapping state capacity in Africa: Professionalism and reach

... African socialism needs to be contrasted with the 'Afro-Marxist' type of model that emerged in countries such as Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia during the 1970s. In these and other countries that formed part of the 'second wave' of socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Rosberg and Callaghy, 1979), the distinctiveness of the African situation tended to be rejected in favor of the established principles of scientific socialism (that is, of Marxist-Leninism). This distinction is important because it bears so heavily on the type of technology that the developing country is predisposed to select. ...

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Public Choice, Technology and Industrialization in Tanzania: Some Paradoxes Resolved.

... Non-democratic rulers introduced new taxes in order to mobilize resources to win wars, and in return, they needed to provide openings for political representation (Schumpeter, 1991;Tilly, 1992). Negotiations over revenue in African countries operate in a post-colonial political context characterized by the absence of inter-state war, hybrid institutions, and economies in which the majority remains employed in low-technology subsistence agriculture (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982;van de Walle, 2001;Moore, 2004;Bräutigam, 2008;North et al., 2013). Thus, revenue pressure and the drive to collect revenue in Africa come from many factors other than interstate war. ...

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Unpacking revenue bargaining: Triggers, processes, and outcomes

... Call proposes that instead of using the term 'failed state' the literature should differentiate between collapsed states like Somalia, war-torn states like Afghanistan, and authoritarian states like North Korea, etc. For a similar disagreement, see (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982;Manjinkian, 2008;Ayers, 2012). However, (Goldstone, 2008) disagrees by noting that there is no universal definition of fragile or failed states (see also Nay, 2013). ...

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Governance and blue crime in the Gulf of Guinea

... For instances of quite heterogenous comparative assessments of these conceptual approaches to post-independence future seeBenot 1975;Hountondji 1983;Rosberg / Callaghy 1979 7 Koselleck 1986; for Africa, this approach is currently pursued in a sub-project "Narratives of the Future in Modern African History" at the Bayreuth Academy of Advanced African Studies http://www.bayreuth-academy.unibayreuth.de/en/teilprojekt/jenseits_von_europa/index.html (accessed 30th March 2017). ...

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The Kenya we want! : from the post-colonial departure to recent hopes

... (HAGMANN; PÉCLARD, 2010, HILL, 2005. 6 Ver: FERGUSON, 2008;JACKSON;ROSBERG, 1982ROSBERG, , 1986KAPLAN, 2003. histórica mais ampla, o encontro colonial teria promovido uma série de benefícios aos povos colonizados, como melhorias na infraestrutura pública e a expansão de direitos fundamentais. ...

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Doyle e os dilemas: sobre o retorno ao colonialismo em uma paz de via-médiaDoyle and the dilemmas: on the return to colonialism in a middle-ground peaceDoyle y los dilemas: sobre el retorno al colonialismo en una paz intermedia

... Developing states have long predicated their legitimacy on the distribution of services and promises of economic development (Young, 1988;Bratton, 1989;Fowler, 1991;Kanyinga 1996, 71;Schatzberg, 2001;Owiti et al., 2004;Johnson, 2014;Osodo & Matsvai, 1997;Jackson & Rosberg, 1984). Studies of sub-Saharan African countries specifically have shown that most people view the state as a parental figure, and as such, expect the state to take care of them by providing services that will allow them to develop (Schatzberg, 2001). ...

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Public Goods Provision: Is Provider Type Linked to Views of State Legitimacy?

... Ghana's winner-takes-all electoral formula is also fueled by the prevalence of clientelistic politics that deepens political divisions and antagonism. The comparative literature shows that electoral politics in Africa is systematically and intrinsically clientelistic (Lemarchand, 1977;Clapham, 1982;93 Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984;de Walle, 1994, 1997;Jackson and Rosberg, 1982;Hyden, 2006;Joseph, 1987). Politicians or patrons give out gifts, material favors or dispense patronage goods to citizens or clients in return for loyalty and political support at the polls (Wantchekon, 2003: 3). ...

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EXPLAINING POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTISM AND VIOLENCE IN PARLIAMENTARY BY-ELECTIONS IN GHANA