Cameron Anderson’s research while affiliated with University of California, Berkeley and other places

Does the status people possess shape their subjective well-being (SWB)? Prior research that has addressed this question has been correlational. Therefore, in the current research, we provide causal evidence of this effect: In two experiments, we found that individuals reported higher SWB when their own status was higher compared to when it was lower. However, individuals’ SWB was not only shaped by their own status, but also by others’ status. Specifically, individuals reported higher SWB when others’ status was lower than when it was higher. Thus, people have a competitive orientation towards status; they not only want to have high status on an absolute level (e.g., to be highly respected and admired), but also to have higher status than others (e.g., to be more respected and admired than others). A standard self-affirmation manipulation was used in an attempt to mitigate individuals’ competitive orientation towards status, but only helped already high-status members feel happier in groups of high-status members, rather than help low-status members feel happier when they uniquely held low status.

To promote upward mobility for the working-class, much effort has focused on making higher education more widely accessible. However, upward mobility is also powerfully determined by processes that occur after college, when individuals launch their work careers. In the current study, college students who were about to enter the labor market completed mock job interviews while being videotaped. Supporting cultural mismatch theory (Stephens, Townsend, et al., 2012), participants from working-class backgrounds displayed less disjoint agentic behavior during their interviews (e.g., less assertive behavior). This led observers to evaluate them as less intelligent and socio-emotionally skilled, and led professional hiring managers to view them as less worthy of hire – even though working-class individuals were as intelligent and more socio-emotionally skilled than their upper-class counterparts (Study 1). However, when hiring managers were told to place more value on cooperation and teamwork rather than competition and individualism, individuals who displayed low disjoint agency did not face the same bias (Study 2). This suggests that the bias against individuals from working-class backgrounds observed in Study 1 can be mitigated.

Significance Are disagreeable individuals more likely to attain power than agreeable individuals? This question is important because highly disagreeable individuals in positions of power can do a lot of damage. For example, CEOs who are nasty and bullying create cultures of abuse and tend to lead their organizations to fail. In two longitudinal prospective studies, we found that disagreeableness did not predict the attainment of power. Selfish, deceitful, and aggressive individuals were no more likely to attain power than were generous, trustworthy, and nice individuals. Why not? Disagreeable individuals were intimidating, which would have elevated their power, but they also had poorer interpersonal relationships at work, which offset any possible power advantage their behavior might have provided.

The current research tested whether the possession of high status, compared with the possession of low status, makes individuals desire having high status even more. Five studies (total N = 6,426), four of which were preregistered, supported this hypothesis. Individuals with higher status in their social groups or who were randomly assigned to a high-status condition were more motivated to have high status than were individuals with low status. Furthermore, upper-class individuals had a stronger status motive than working-class individuals, in part, due to their high status. High-status individuals had a stronger status motive, in part, because they were more confident in their ability to achieve (or retain) high status, but not because of other possible mechanisms (e.g., task self-efficacy). These findings provide a possible explanation for why status hierarchies are so stable and why inequality rises in social collectives over time.

We propose and test the overconfidence transmission hypothesis, which predicts that individuals calibrate their self-assessments in response to the confidence others display in their social group. Six studies that deploy a mix of correlational and experimental methods support this hypothesis. Evidence indicates that individuals randomly assigned to collaborate in laboratory dyads converged on levels of overconfidence about their own performance rankings. In a controlled experimental context, observing overconfident peers causally increased an individual's degree of bias. The transmission effect persisted over time and across task domains, elevating overconfidence even days after initial exposure. In addition, overconfidence spread across indirect social ties (person to person to person), and transmission operated outside of reported awareness. However, individuals showed a selective in-group bias; overconfidence was acquired only when displayed by a member of one's in-group (and not out-group), consistent with theoretical notions of selective learning bias. Combined, these results advance understanding of the social factors that underlie interindividual differences in overconfidence and suggest that social transmission processes may be in part responsible for why local confidence norms emerge in groups, teams, and organizations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

People sometimes engage in deceit out of loyalty to their group. How are these “loyal lies” judged? Are they viewed as unethical, because lying is wrong, or as ethical, because loyalty is a virtue? Conversely, how is “disloyal honesty” judged, or behaving truthfully when deceit would benefit one's group? In four studies, we found that people evaluate loyal lies and disloyal honesty differently, depending on whether they are evaluating others' or their own actions. When evaluating others' behavior, people viewed loyal lies as unethical and as less ethical than disloyal honesty, just as they viewed lies and honesty in other conditions (Studies 1, 3 and 4). However, when evaluating their own behavior, people who actually lied to benefit their groups in conditions of loyalty judged their deceit as ethical, and as more ethical than did actors who engaged in disloyal honesty – even though the latter behaved truthfully (Studies 2 and 4). Therefore, when people were called to be loyal to their group, loyalty trumped honesty, in that people viewed a loyal but dishonest act as more ethical than a disloyal but honest act.

What are the reputational consequences of being overconfident? We propose that the channel of confidence expression is one key moderator—that is, whether confidence is expressed verbally or nonverbally. In a series of experiments, participants assessed target individuals (potential collaborators or advisors) who were either overconfident or cautious. Targets expressed confidence, or a lack thereof, verbally or nonverbally. Participants then learned targets’ actual performance. Across studies, overconfidence was advantageous initially—regardless of whether targets expressed confidence verbally or nonverbally. After performance was revealed, overconfident targets who had expressed confidence verbally were viewed more negatively than cautious targets; however, overconfident targets who had expressed confidence nonverbally were still viewed more positively than cautious ones. The one condition wherein nonverbal overconfidence was detrimental was when confidence was clearly tied to a falsifiable claim. Results suggest that, compared with verbal statements, nonverbal overconfidence reaps reputational benefits because of its plausible deniability.

What are the reputational consequences of being overconfident? We propose that the channel of confidence expression is one key moderator—that is, whether confidence is expressed verbally or nonverbally. In a series of experiments, participants assessed target individuals (potential collaborators or advisors) who were either overconfident or cautious. Targets expressed confidence, or a lack thereof, verbally or nonverbally. Participants then learned targets’ actual performance. Across studies, overconfidence was advantageous initially—regardless of whether targets expressed confidence verbally or nonverbally. After performance was revealed, overconfident targets who had expressed confidence verbally were viewed more negatively than cautious targets; however, overconfident targets who had expressed confidence nonverbally were still viewed more positively than cautious ones. The one condition wherein nonverbal overconfidence was detrimental was when confidence was clearly tied to a falsifiable claim. Results suggest that, compared to verbal statements, nonverbal overconfidence reaps reputational benefits because of its plausible deniability.

When unethical practices occur in an organization, high-ranking individuals at the top of the hierarchy are expected to stop wrongdoing and redirect the organization to a more honorable path—this is, to engage in principled dissent. However, in three studies, we find that holding high-ranking positions makes people less likely to engage in principled dissent. Specifically, we find that high-ranking individuals identify more strongly with their organization or group, and therefore see its unethical practices as more ethical than do low-ranking individuals. High-ranking individuals thus engage less in principled dissent because they fail to see unethical practices as being wrong in the first place. Study 1 observed the relation between high-rank and principled dissent in an archival data set involving more than 11,000 employees. Studies 2 and 3 used experimental designs to establish the causal effect of rank and to show that identification is one key mechanism underlying it.