Bruno Charbonneau’s research while affiliated with Royal Military College of Canada and other places

Non-technical summary At the heart of the polycrisis debate is the struggle to grapple with both the scientific and political uncertainties of the Anthropocene. The struggles over what to do about the polycrisis are thus found at the intersection of science and politics. We must approach the polycrisis as simultaneously a scientific and political challenge. To do so we propose that the polycrisis project adopts the methods of decision-making under deep uncertainty as a way to integrate and encourage collaborations between the scientific and policy worlds. Technical summary The polycrisis concept points to the interaction of multiple global crises and, arguably, to the difficulties in grasping the current moment with conceptual clarity. While Lawrence et al. emphasize the causal relations between crises in multiple global systems to define and operationalize the concept, we argue that they underestimate the politics of knowledge claims about the polycrisis, from the concept's performative function, from the normative claims it enacts or enables, and from the program of action that it carries or implies. We argue instead that at the heart of the polycrisis debate is the struggle to grapple with the (deep) uncertainties – both scientific and political – of the Anthropocene. Polycrisis is found operating at the intersection of science and politics where claims to scientific knowledge and political value, and scientific and political judgements, collide. Dealing with the uncertainties of the polycrisis is thus a matter of scientific methodological conundrum and a matter of political judgement and decision. We then propose that the polycrisis research program adopts decision-making under deep uncertainty methods to reach its objectives of improving policy outcomes, but also to better navigate what we call the uncertainty possibility space of the polycrisis. Social media summary The polycrisis is a struggle to grapple with the uncertainties of the Anthropocene which demands a new policy approach.

The Sahel is regularly conceived as a space where the interaction between climate and conflict can be observed. With a high-dependence on rain-fed agriculture and livestock, climate variability leaves pastoralists and smallholders particularly vulnerable. Moreover, the region remains fragile, embodied by factors such as weak capacity of the state, inter-group inequality and a history of violent conflict; as well as a decade of regional French-led military operations. As such, it is an important case study for the question of whose security is threatened by global warming. Discussions about climate security in the Sahel are not happening in a vacuum, but during a crisis-ridden moment. This article seeks to reframe the debate by grasping all these things at once: wrestling with the historical legacies of environmental interventionism, the politics of pragmatic crisis management, and the uncertainties of a climate-change future yet to be born. It develops an argument about the need to engage with a politics of the future via the politics of knowledge production.

Conflicts are increasingly analysed as exhibiting a stealth complexity in which triggers and consequences are intricately linked to climate, environmental degradation and the struggle to control a finite pool of natural resources. The climate crisis is a multifaceted reality and, against this background, many pressing priorities compete with each other. The disruptive effect of climate variability and change on food systems is particularly acute and constitutes a direct and tangible threat to livelihoods globally. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate and discuss the importance of food systems under a climate crisis in exacerbating conflicts in the Sahelian region and propose interventions beyond and complementary to the usual military and security solutions. We demonstrate for the Sahel that (i) climate hazards are frequent and exposure to climate variability is high, (ii) hotspots of high climate variability and conflict exist, and (iii) impact pathways by which climate exacerbates food systems that can lead to conflicts are documented in the literature. While these three findings suggest clear links between conflict and climate, we find that (iv) current peace indices do not include climate and food systems indicators and therefore provide an uncomplete picture, and (v) food systems programming for climate adaptation has so far not explicitly considered peace and security outcomes. Furthermore, we propose that food systems programming that truly tackles the climate crisis should take more explicit account of peace and security outcomes in conflict-affected areas.

Africa lies at the centre of the international community’s peacebuilding interventions, and the continent’s rich multitude of actors, ideas, relationships, practices, experiences, locations, and contexts in turn shape the possibilities and practices of contemporary peacebuilding. This timely new handbook surveys and analyses peacebuilding as it operates in this specifically African context. The book begins by outlining the evolution and the various ideologies, conceptualizations, institutions, and practices of African peacebuilding. It identifies critical differences in how African peacebuilders have conceptualized and operationalized peacebuilding. The book then considers how different actors sustain, construct and use African infrastructure to identify and analyse converging, differing or competing mandates, approaches, and interests. Finally, it analyses specific thematic issues such as gender, justice, development, democracy, and the politics of knowledge, before ending with in-depth analyses of case studies drawn from across the continent. Bringing together an international line up of expert contributors, this book will be an essential read for students and scholars of African politics, post-conflict reconstruction, security and peace and conflict studies.

Quels sont les effets des interventions armées menées au nom de la « guerre contre le terrorisme » ? Fondé sur des études de cas localisées, en Afghanistan, au Mali et au Tchad, l’article invite à repenser les présupposés de l’interventionnisme et montre pourquoi la « guerre contre le terrorisme » ne peut être « gagnée » au sens classique du terme et comment elle contribue à perpétuer les conflits et à miner leur résolution. Si chaque configuration est singulière, on retrouve dans ces trois pays des processus similaires de perpétuation des conflits et de co-production de la violence armée par un ensemble d’acteurs internationaux et locaux.